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Abstract 
This research project seeks to explore aspects of the post-reporting phase of the public 
inquiry process.  Central to the public inquiry process is the concept of  legitimacy and 
the idea that a public inquiry provides and opportunity to re-legitimate the credibility of 
failed public institutions.  The current literature asserts that public inquiries re-
legitimise through the production of authoritative narratives.  As such, most of this 
scholarship has focused on the production of inquiry reports and, more recently, the 
reports themselves.  However, in an era of accountability, and in the aftermath of such a 
poignant attack upon society, the production of a report may represent an apogee, but by 
no means an end, of the re-legitimation process.  Appropriately, this thesis examines the 
post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process.  The 9/11 
Commission provides a useful research vehicle due to the bounded, and relatively 
linear, implementation process of the Commission’s recommendations.  In little more 
than four months a majority of the Commission’s recommendations were passed into 
law.  Within this implementation phase the dominant discursive process took place in 
the United States Congress.  It is the legislative reform debates in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate that is the focus of this research project.  The central 
research question is: what rhetorical legitimation strategies were employed in the 
legislative reform debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public 
inquiry process?  
This study uses a grounded theory approach to the analysis of the legislative transcripts 
of the Congressional reform debates.  This analysis revealed that proponents employed 
rhetorical strategies to legitimise a legislative ‘Call to Action’ narrative.  Also, they 
employed rhetorical legitimation strategies that emphasised themes of bipartisanship, 
hard work and expertise in order to strengthen the standing of the legislation.  
Opponents of the legislation focused rhetorical de-legitimation strategies on the theme 
of ‘flawed process’.  Finally, nearly all legislators, regardless of their view of the 
legislation, sought to appropriate the authoritative legitimacy of the Commission, by 
employing rhetorical strategies that presented their interests and motives as in line with 
the actions and wishes of the Commission.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.0 Introduction and Rationale of Thesis
Public Inquiries are ceremonial occasions organised by governments (Gephart 1993).  
Their stated purpose is sensemaking and their recommendations can aid in the cultural 
readjustment of society to a new reality (Turner, 1976).  Central to the public inquiry 
process is legitimacy.  Public institutions require the confidence and trust of the public 
to maintain their legitimacy and this public trust can be lost when institutions fail to 
prevent, or inadequately respond to, a crisis-event.  Public inquiries attempt to re-
legitimate through the production of an authoritative narrative (Brown, 2003).  As 
Brown (2003) suggests, there “[...]  is a need for further discursive research to consider 
how authority claims are made in other putatively ‘authoritative’ texts such as 
government bills [...]” (p. 109).  This need can be extended to include the debates that 
precede the implementation of such government bills, for example, the Congressional 
debates that led to the creation of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 
2004.  Legislative debates produce a significant volume of text in the form of transcripts 
and these records can provide a rich account of the authority claims and rhetoric 
employed.  If the creation of a public inquiry initiates a re-legitimation process, then it 
is unlikely that this re-legitimation process ends with the production of an inquiry 
report.  Rather, the re-legitimation process extends beyond the production of an inquiry 
report and into the activities of the post-reporting phase of a public inquiry process.
The 9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan public inquiry body created to 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the September 11th terrorist attacks on the 
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United States.  The Commission was mandated, by law, to report to the President and 
the US Congress.  Their report was to provide a narrative of the attacks set within the 
relevant context, a description of institutional failures and a set of recommendations 
focused on preventing future attacks.  In the case of the 9/11 Commission, the post-
reporting phase of the inquiry process was a very active period in which the narrative 
and recommendations of the inquiry were supported, resisted and debated.  This 
timeframe also encompassed the final months of the 2004 Presidential election.  As 
such, Congress was under significant pressure to legislate the most extensive reforms to 
the United States’ intelligence community in more than 60 years.
In the social science literature in general, and the organisation studies literature in 
particular, the study of legitimacy is common.  Two popular views are that legitimacy 
has either institutional foundations (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991; Meyer and 
Scott 1983; Zucker 1987; Meyer and Rowen 1991) or strategic origins (Dowling and 
Pfeffer 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 1981; Ashforth & Gibbs 1990); 
however, more recent developments in the literature suggests that legitimacy can have 
rhetorical origins.  These authors (e.g. Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Vaara, et al. 
2006; Van Leeuwen 2007; Erkama and Vaara 2010) study the rhetoric employed in 
creating and sustaining legitimacy.  If an important function of a public inquiry process 
is re-legitimation, then it is appropriate to explore all potential sources of legitimacy, 
including rhetorical sources of legitimacy in the wake of the publication of a public 
inquiry report. Therefore, this research project will explore the rhetorical strategies of 
legitimation and de-legitimation employed during the legislative reform debates of the 
post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission public inquiry process.
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1.1 Central Research Question
The primary interest of this research project is an examination of the re-legitimation 
phenomenon of a public inquiry process.  Previous literature on the subject has focused 
either on the inquiry process (e.g. Turner 1976; Kemp 1985; Douglas 1986; Gephart 
1992, 1993; Topal 2009) or the final report of such a process (e.g. Brown and Jones, 
2000; Brown 2000, 2003; Boudes and Laroche 2009), whereas this thesis focuses on the 
re-legitimation process during the post-reporting phase of a public inquiry.  In 
particular, this research is concerned with rhetorical strategies of legitimation and 
focuses on the legislative phase of the 9/11 Commission inquiry process.  The main 
rhetorical and legitimating event of this post-reporting period was the congressional 
intelligence reform debates.  As such, the central research question of this project is: 
What rhetorical strategies were employed in the legislative reform debates of the 
post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process?
A grounded theory analysis of the United States Congressional debates of the 9/11 
Recommendations Implementation Act (H.R.10) and the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (S.2845), in the House of Representatives, and the National 
Intelligence Reform Act (S.2845) and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act (S.2845), in the Senate, will provide insight into the rhetorical strategies for 
legitimising the narrative and the content of the legislative process, as well as rhetorical 
strategies of resistance employed by opponents of the reform proposals.  The transcripts 
of these debates, which will provide the dataset for this research project, are contained 
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in the Congressional Record of the United States Congress.  The following section will 
provide a brief outline of the research vehicle central to this thesis.
1.2 Research Vehicle
On July 22, 2004, after nearly eighteen months of investigation, the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) released 
its report detailing the “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United 
States 2004b: xv).  The 9/11 Commission Report was released into the midst of the 
2004 Presidential campaign and it was in this context that the report and its 
recommendations were developed into legislative proposals and were introduced for 
debate into the House of Representatives and the Senate.  These reform bills, the 9/11 
Recommendations Implementation Act (H.R.10) in the House of Representatives and the 
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (S.2845) in the Senate were debated and were 
passed on October 16 and October 6 respectively.  While the objective of both pieces of 
legislation was to implement intelligence reforms, as recommended by the 9/11 
Commission, the substance and focus of the two bills were not identical.  According to 
United States’ legislative practice, the Senate and the House of Representatives must 
pass identical bills before they can be sent to the President to be signed into law 
(MacKay 2005).  As per Congressional procedure, the legislation was sent to a 
conference committee comprised of a bipartisan group of legislators from both 
chambers.  These conferees negotiated a series of compromises resulting in a 
harmonised bill that was returned to both Houses for debate and a straight ‘up or down’ 
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vote.  After two failed attempts by conferees, Conference Report (S.2845) emerged from 
committee and was sent back to the House of Representatives and the Senate for final 
floor debates and voting.  On December 7 the House of Representatives passed the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (S.2845) and on December 8 the 
Senate passed this harmonised legislation allowing it to be sent to the President for his 
approval and signature.  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 
was signed into law by President Bush on the morning of December 17, 2004, thus 
implementing many of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and creating the 
largest restructuring of the American intelligence community since the end of the 
Second World War.  During the course of this post-reporting, legislative phase of the 
9/11 Commission’s work, the Senate engaged in nine days of intelligence reform debate 
and the House of Representatives debated the reforms for two days.  Collectively, these 
legislative sessions generated over 800,000 words of transcriptive records.  It is these 
records that will form the dataset for this research project.
1.3 Overview of Thesis
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis and provides a rationale and justification for the research 
project.  It articulates the central research question and situates it in the context of both 
the scholarship and the empirical context of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry 
process.  Finally, it provides a chapter by chapter outline containing a brief introduction 
to the purpose and content of each chapter.
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Chapter 2 reviews the literature of the public inquiry scholarship, the relevant 
legitimacy literature and a recently published body of research that explores the 
rhetorical strategies of legitimation.  The purpose of this chapter is to understand and to 
provide a critical evaluation of each of these three literatures in order to shape this 
investigation, identify key gaps in the literature, such as the lack of study of the post-
reporting phase of a public inquiry’s re-legitimation process and a need within the 
Rhetorical Legitimacy literature to examine this phenomenon in divergent empirical 
settings.  Having explored the literature, identified the gaps in the scholarship the 
research question can then be refined in light of these considerations.   
Chapter 3 provides a justification for the methodological choices for undertaking a 
grounded theory analysis, an explanation of the dataset that was examined and a 
description of how the analysis was carried out for this thesis.  The chapter begins with 
a brief overview of the historical context of this research project.  Next, a discussion of 
the philosophical assumptions of the nature of reality and the nature of the study of 
knowledge is presented and explains how these philosophical decisions helped to guide 
and justify the subsequent research design.  A grounded theory approach was selected as 
the most appropriate choice for answering the research question, given the nature of the 
study.  The source of data, approximately 800,000 words from the Congressional 
Record transcripts of the House and Senate intelligence reform debates, and methods of 
collection and organisation was detailed and an explanation of how the data was coded 
and analysed within the proscribed structure of a Straussian grounded theory approach 
was then provided.  Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief preview of the structure 
of the Context chapter, which details the empirical context in which this study is set.
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Chapter 4 outlines the practical context in which the congressional debates of the 
intelligence reform legislation took place.  This chapter is divided into three sections.  
The first section focuses on the attacks of September 11, 2001, outlining this 
precipitating crisis-event, the institutional failures and the calls for an investigation.  
The second section of this chapter provides background on the creation of the 9/11 
Commission, outlining its scope and mandate, discussing its activities as well as the 
production and release of its final report.  The third section of the chapter outlines the 
post-reporting phase, the period of time in which the subject of our research, the 
Congressional reform debates, took place.  This phase stretched from the 22nd of July, 
2004 until the 17th of December of the same year.  In this section a detailed accounting 
of the legislative process in both the House of Representatives and the Senate is 
provided.  Finally, the last section of this chapter provides a summary of the above 
points and a brief overview of the findings contained in the following chapter.
Chapter 5 organises and presents the findings of the analysis of the congressional 
legislative reform process.  The research question asks what are the rhetorical 
legitimation strategies employed in the Congressional reform debates.  This chapter is 
structured with a view to answering that question.  First, the chapter outlines the 
rhetorical strategies employed by proponents of the legislation to legitimise the 
legislative narrative that framed the Congressional debates.  Second, the chapter 
outlines the rhetorical strategies employed by the proponents of the reforms to 
legitimise the content of the legislation.  Third, the chapter examines rhetorical 
strategies used by opponents of the legislation to de-legitimise the legislative processes.  
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Fourth, the chapter examines how both sides in the debates sought to invoke the 
authority of the Commission’s reputation and to further legitimise their respective 
positions.  Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting a summary of the findings and 
outlining the themes for discussion in the following chapter.
Chapter 6 takes the findings from the previous chapter and explores them in the context 
of the relevant literature outlined in Chapter 2.  The chapter begins with a brief 
introduction and a restatement of the research question.  In the next section of the 
chapter, a discussion of the rhetorical strategies for legitimising both the legislative 
narrative and the legislative content is conducted.  This is followed by an examination 
of the commonalties and differences of the rhetorical strategies to de-legitimise the 
legislative process in both Houses of Congress.  The next part of this chapter explores 
the artificial inflation of the opposition by the proponents of legislative reform.  It is 
clear that once, the limited threat of opposition was neutralised, the proponents used the 
claims of a robust opposition to increase the legitimacy of their narrative.  The final 
portion of the discussion centres on the findings that show a tremendous deference 
which was afforded to the Commission and their recommendations during the 
Congressional debates by both proponents and opponents of the reform legislation.  
This phenomenon is explored in the context of the Public Inquiry literature and more 
specifically the re-legitimation function of a public inquiry process.  Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a summary of the discussion and a brief overview of the structure and 
purpose of the final chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter 7 begins with a brief introduction before providing an overview of the entire 
thesis.  This overview is followed by an examination of the key contributions of this 
research.  Next is a discussion of suggestions for future research and this is followed by 
a review of the various methodological, empirical and practical limitations of this thesis. 
Lastly, the chapter will conclude with a section dedicated to the author’s final 
reflections on the subject matter of this thesis in particular and the doctoral process in 
general.
After a brief introduction, this chapter has explained the rationale and the justification 
for this research project. It then articulated the central research question guiding the 
entirety of this thesis.  The next section provided a brief description of the research 
vehicle: the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process and the subsequent intelligence 
reform legislative debates in Congress.  It then detailed a chapter by chapter outline of 
the entire thesis, before concluding with a summary of the introductory chapter and a 
preview of the Literature Review.  In the next chapter, the public inquiry literature, the 
relevant legitimacy literature and the rhetorical  legitimation literature will be explored 
and examined critically.  The aim is to provide a better understanding of the applicable 
scholarship, to identify under-researched areas in the literature and to illustrate and 
support the construction of the central research question
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
2.0 Chapter Introduction
The purpose of this literature review is to explore the phenomenon of re-legitimation in 
the context of the public inquiry process.  As such, this review will examine three areas 
of scholarship: the study of public inquiries, legitimacy and rhetorical legitimation.  The 
first section will focus on the phenomenon of public inquiries and the public inquiry 
process.  There is a relatively small, but interesting body of public inquiry literature 
situated within organisation studies scholarship (e.g. Turner 1976; Gephart 1993, 1997; 
Brown 2000, 2003; Topal 2009).  Authors in this area examine the public inquiry 
process, paying special attention to a number of common thematic areas including: 
sensemaking, legitimacy and hegemonic narrative creation.  The public inquiry process 
is viewed as an opportunity to provide a comprehensive accounting of what has 
happened (sensemaking) and an opportunity for governments to re-establish the public’s 
trust and confidence in their abilities (re-legitimation).  As Brown (2000, 2003) and 
Topal (2009) assert, this is accomplished through the construction of an authoritative 
inquiry report containing a hegemonic narrative.  Public inquiries create a single official 
narrative and often make recommendations to fix critical systemic weaknesses 
identified during the course of the investigation.  By doing this, they attempt to appear 
authoritative thereby rebuilding public trust and restoring institutional legitimacy.    
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Figure 3.0 illustrates the phases of the 9/11 public inquiry process, from the pre-crisis 
period to the time at which significant organisational changes were implemented with 
the passing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Figure 2.0 - Stages of a Public Inquiry Process
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As scholars in this field have sought to understand the re-legitimation process, they 
have done so by focusing either on the public inquiry process, or on the final reports 
that these inquiries have produced.  While the current research of public inquiries stops 
with the production of the public inquiry report, clearly the re-legitimation process does 
not.  An inquiry report that is not acted upon risks the perception that no one is taking 
action to correct past institutional failures.  Therefore it is important that the post-
reporting phase, is explored and the ‘What comes next?’ question is examined.  For 
scholars concerned with re-legitimation, within the context of the public inquiry 
process, this exploration of the post-reporting phase could yield valuable insights not 
currently present in the scholarship.  As such, this is the gap in the public inquiry 
literature that this research projects seeks to fill.
 
Page | 11
From an examination of the literature on the public inquiry process, we will turn our 
focus next to concepts and theories of legitimacy. Clearly, an understanding of 
legitimacy is vital to the exploration of the re-legitimation process within the public 
inquiry literature.  As the scholarship of legitimacy has a long history and spans 
numerous disciplines, it is important to understand how this knowledge has developed 
and what influences are present in the contemporary work on organisational legitimacy.  
An understanding of legitimacy is also vital to the exploration of our third academic 
literature of interest: the rhetorical legitimation literature.  While this research project 
hopes to further an understanding of legitimacy, it will do so within the context of the 
public inquiry and the rhetorical legitimation literature.  Particular attention will be paid 
to the work of Suchman (1995).  In his attempts to reconcile the strategic/institutional 
dichotomy present in the current handling of legitimacy in the organisation studies 
literature, he provides a model of sources of legitimacy that opens the door to new ways 
of thinking about this concept.  His work is also foundational to the work of authors 
engaged in both the public inquiry and rhetorical legitimation research.  As such, 
familiarity with his work is important to a detailed examination of the public inquiry - 
rhetorical legitimation nexus. In general, however, the legitimacy literature reviewed in 
this chapter is included to enhance our understanding of legitimacy, but also to improve 
our ability to understand and contribute to the remaining two areas of study.  The 
legitimacy literature will be important also, in an empirical sense, as the rhetorical 
strategies employed to legitimise and de-legitimise the legislative reform debates in 
Congress are explored.
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Third, as we are concerned with the rhetorical strategies employed to legitimise and 
oppose intelligence reform efforts of the legislative debates that occurred subsequent to 
the release of the Commission’s report, we will examine the rhetorical legitimation 
literature.  This nascent area of study explores how rhetoric is employed to legitimate 
profound institutional change and contains fewer than a dozen articles.  New and under-
developed, the rhetorical legitimation scholarship provides a rich opportunity for 
scholarly contribution.  Studies, conducted in a limited number of organisational 
settings, would benefit from similar research in a variety of empirical contexts.  This 
research project will contribute to the emerging field of rhetorical legitimation by 
providing insight into a new and unique institutional setting.  Given the centrality of the 
congressional reform debates to the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s 
inquiry process and the importance of the rhetoric of legislators in these debates, it is 
clear that an exploration of the rhetorical legitimacy literature is vital to the aims of this 
research project.  Additionally, rhetorical legitimation scholars, such as Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005) and Vaara, et al (2007) and Vaara and Tienari (2008), provide 
guidance on the structuring of rhetorically-focused research such as this project.  Lastly, 
the literature review chapter will conclude by reviewing the existing gaps in the 
literature and inform our choices of focus and help to define the research question.
                                      
2.1 The Public Inquiry Literature
2.1.1 How does the literature define public inquiries?
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While the primary impact of the public inquiry process rests in the realm of public 
policy, its analysis has proven valuable in uncovering the less obvious roles of public 
inquiries.  The study of the public inquiry process within this context is well established 
and has produced a body of research with diverse themes (see: Turner 1976; Gephart 
1992, 1993; Brown 2000, 2003; Boudes and Laroche 2009; Topal 2009).   There is no 
singular and all-encompassing definition of public inquiries, however, there is a general 
understanding of the concept which often highlights common areas of emphasis.  In this 
section, we will examine how the authors themselves define and attempt to explain the 
phenomenon of public inquiries with the intention of cultivating a general overview of 
how the relevant literature views this activity.
Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2006) notes that  the definition of “[t]he term ‘public inquiry’ is a 
loose one [...] [and that it is] often used to denote different types of institutions and 
functions.  Important distinctions can be made, for example, between planning, advising 
and investigating [public inquiries]” (p. 624).  Howe (1999) makes a similar distinction 
and highlights three different types of public inquiries: the policy-driven public inquiry, 
the public inquiry conducted within a legislative body, and the public inquiry which is 
tasked with studying a particular and significant event for which it would be 
inappropriate to investigate from within a legislative body, given the likelihood for 
partisanship and potential conflict of interest.  He focuses on this third type of inquiry: 
one that is non-partisan, extra-legislative and focused on a particular trigger event.  He 
envisions a situation in which the establishment of a public inquiry is necessitated by 
“[...] some major disaster and [the purpose is] to learn lessons from it; or to consider 
some other matter of public concern, which requires thorough and impartial 
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investigation [...]” (Howe 1999: 295).  The creation of the 9/11 Commission was for the 
purposes of investigating a crisis event and advising on a post-crisis course of action 
and, as such, fits within this third category.
The study of investigatory, post-crisis inquiries dominates much of the literature on the 
subject (e.g.: Brown 2003, 2000; Brown and Jones, 2000; Gephart 1997, 1993, 1992, 
1991, 1990, 1988; Turner 1976).  This research project follows in this tradition, as it 
seeks to examine retrospectively the crisis event of the terrorist attacks of September 
11th 2001.  This process was conducted by the 9/11 Commission which produced 
recommendations, a majority of which, were codified in law by the United States’ 
Congress through the creation and passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.  It is clear that the literature would consider the 9/11 
Commission’s public inquiry process to be an investigatory public inquiry with the roll 
of advising on a post-crisis course of action.  Exploring the literature further, one can 
better understand the characteristics of this type of public inquiry.
To gain a better understanding as to the characteristics that a public inquiry might 
possess, and thereby clarify a working definition, one can review the criteria used by 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2006).  Drawing from others in the field, the author develops a list of 
characteristics which help to define this category of inquiry further.  It is:
 “1. An ad hoc institution: that is, one established for a particular task; once its 
 primary task is concluded, the tribunal is dissolved;
 2. Formally external to the executive;
 3. Established by the government or a minister;
 4. As a result of the appointer’s discretion: that is, not the result of a requirement 
 prescribed by any statute or other rule;
 5. For the main task of investigation: a criterion used to distinguish between 
 investigative and advisory functions (Weare 1955, pp. 42-2);
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 6. Of past event(s);
 7. In a public way: that is, it is not only directed inward (to the appointing body) 
 but also outward, to the public, typically during a crisis of confidence between 
 the public and government (Wade and Forsyth 1994, p. 1007), in a way which 
 allows exposure of relevant facts to public scrutiny (Clarke 2000, p.8)” (p. 624).
While the above criteria are used to determine which public inquiries the author was to 
focus on for his 2006 article, it acts to define further the above mentioned post-crisis 
investigatory inquiry.  Some of these characteristics suggest a role for the inquiry that is 
explored in detail within the existing literature highlighting issues of confidence 
between the public and the government [re-legitimation] and the exposure of relevant 
facts to scrutiny [in part, sensemaking].  These themes of re-legitimation and 
sensemaking will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.
Turner (1976) offers a more general explanation of what a public inquiry is and what it 
does.  A public inquiry is, “an explanatory account from the statements of witnesses, 
[that] publicly allocates responsibility and blame, and makes recommendations that 
provide evidence for societal and organizational learning” (p. 380).  The idea that the 
public inquiry is an explanatory account is detailed further by Gephart (1993) when he 
asserts that: 
“[a] public inquiry is a ceremonial event organized by a government agency that 
assembles, often using the power of subpoena, persons knowledgeable about a 
disaster. The purpose of the inquiry is generally to make sense of the causes and 
consequences of the disaster and the behavior of actors and organizations 
involved in the events. 
The inquiry has the goal of producing native accounts, the testimony of people 
knowledgeable about the disastrous events. It does this by creating a spatially and 
temporally bounded set of face-to-face interactions among relevant parties, during 
which witnesses are examined and cross-examined to create a detailed record of 
their involvement in the disaster” (pp. 1474-1475).
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In this definition, Gephart states that the purpose of an inquiry is to ‘make sense’ with 
the intent of producing ‘native accounts’ and to ‘create a detailed record’.  It is through 
the collection of facts and hearing of testimony that allows a commission to create a 
detailed record of what has happened.  This record, or narrative, often becomes the 
official history of the disaster event.  In this sense, the commission is tasked with 
creating an official, monological narrative of what has happened.  This official 
narrativisation is a theme that is explored in the literature.  It is this detailed record, or 
public inquiry report, that is of primary interest to Brown (2003).  He acknowledges 
common key elements of public inquiries found in the literature, but continues on to say 
that, “[w]hile public inquiries are interesting ceremonial occasions (Gephart, 1992) that 
play important roles in the cultural adjustment stage of critical events (Turner, 1976), it 
is the reports that they produce which are the main focus of attention [of this 
article]” (p. 95).  Brown (2000) explains his preference for focusing on the texts 
produced by public inquiries, rather than simply on the crisis event being investigated: 
“While some sensemaking research has drawn on the findings of inquiries 
(Douglas, 1986; Gephart, 1992, 1994; Gephart, Steier, & Lawrence, 1990; Kemp, 
1985; Turner, 1976, 1978), these have tended to focus on the events described 
rather than on the texts they have produced. This is unfortunate because public 
inquiries are particularly interesting multilevel micro-macro events in "which 
micro-level sensemaking practices produce the macro social order as a set of 
representative meanings tracked across social settings" (Gephart, Steier, & 
Lawrence, 1990, p.44-45; Cicourel & Knorr-Cetina, 1981).  [Therefore a] detailed 
focus on such texts may thus assist us in theorizing multiple levels of 
sensemaking” (pp. 5-6).
From a practical view, public inquiry reports provide a wealth of data for a researcher.  
As Topal (2009) notes: “Public hearings and inquiries have generally been a source of 
empirical data rather than a topic of study in their own right in organizational 
research” (p. 280).  In contrast to much of the literature on public inquiries, this research 
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project will not use the 9/11 Commission simply as a source of empirical data and 
divorce itself from the study of the public inquiry process, as Topal suggests.  Neither 
will it focus exclusively on the texts produced by the Commission, as Brown’s work has 
done.  Rather, this project will seek to extend its examination beyond the texts of the 
Commission and into the post-reporting period, and in particular, of the legislative 
debate and Congressional efforts to restructure significantly the intelligence community 
of the United States.  
Brown (2000), Gephart (1993), Turner (1976), Kemp (1985) and Topal (2009), 
approach the study of the public inquiry process from the discipline of organisational 
studies and while their research attempts to understand a number of themes, there are 
significant common issues which emerge.  Broadly, these themes can be categorised as 
Sensemaking, Narrative Creation, Organisational Learning, Re-Legitimation and De-
politicisation.  There is significant overlap and interaction of these themes and while 
this review will attempt to classify the literature in a thematic manner, it is not possible 
to separate these themes entirely.   Accordingly, the common themes of sensemaking, 
re-legitimation and hegemonic narrative will be discussed in the following sections.  
However, to develop an enhanced understanding of the inquiry phenomenon, attention 
will now shift from addressing what public inquiries are, to exploring when they are 
appropriate and likely to have the most impact.
                                                                                         
2.1.2 When Public Inquiries are needed most
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Within the literature defining public inquiries, there have been general references to the 
sorts of events that have necessitated a close examination by the public inquiry process.  
However, some authors (Turner 1976; Gephart 1993; Boudes and Laroche 2009) within 
the literature write in more detail as to what events should trigger the public inquiry 
process and under what circumstances the public inquiry is most relevant.  A public 
inquiry is an official retrospective investigation into a particular event.  Clearly, not all 
past events undergo such scrutiny. However, Turner (1976) suggests why some events 
deserve this treatment and why others do not:
“In accounting for failures in foresight, undesirable events known about in 
advance but which were unavoidable with the resources available can be 
disregarded.  In addition, little time need be spent on catastrophes that were 
completely unpredictable.  Neither of these categories present problems of 
explanation.  In the former case, because of lack of resources, no action was 
possible.  In the latter, no action could have been taken because of total lack of 
information or intelligence” (p. 380).  
In other words, an event that is worth being scrutinised through the lens of a public 
inquiry process must be both predictable and avoidable.  That is not to say that either 
the prediction or the avoidance would be straightforward or easy.  It may be that an 
organisation was structured in such a way that made the prediction nearly impossible 
given that structure.  Equally, the sheer complexity in planning and overall cost of 
taking action to avoid a particular crisis may be immense, but in hindsight, post-crisis, 
such a significant effort and cost could and would have been mobilised.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are prime examples of such a daunting 
event.  Despite the sheer enormity of the intelligence information that needed to be 
sifted, and the disbelief that accompanied the attacks,  there were intelligence fragments 
that could have been pieced together if, for example, the structure of intelligence 
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analysis at the time had allowed for the sharing of information between the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Gorman 2009).  Likewise, 
the intelligence community did not entirely lack the imagination necessary to foresee 
these new and devastating terror tactics of airborne suicide attacks against significant 
and symbolic infrastructure.  While it contained no actionable intelligence, the August 
26, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief entitled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ 
showed that the American Intelligence Community knew of Al-Qaeda’s intentions and 
even suggested that its members might attempt airline hijackings as their preferred 
tactic.  While it would have been a very significant leap in imagination and foresight to 
understand the details of their devastatingly effective hijacking tactics or timings and 
targeting information, there is a possibility that these attacks, under different 
circumstances, and with additional information, improved intelligence coordination and 
a number of other factors, there remains the possibility, if not the probability, that these 
attacks were both discoverable and knowable.  If knowable, these attacks were certainly 
preventable.  As with all human-caused disasters of this scale, given the right 
circumstances and level of resources they are preventable.  Therefore being both 
preventable and knowable, the attacks of September 11, 2001 would qualify, according 
to Turner (1976), as a prime candidate for examination by a public inquiry process.
Having discussed what crisis events are best suited to an inquiry process, we can return 
to the commonly understood purpose of these inquiries.  Boudes and Laroche (2009) 
cite Weick’s (2005) formulation of the sensemaking process:  “ [...] making sense of an 
event implies providing answers to two questions: What’s the story? and Now what 
should I do” (p. 1)?   This is a straightforward and clear articulation of sensemaking; 
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however, Boudes and Laroche (2009) take Weick’s definition and expand it with 
application to the public inquiry process:  
“Going into further detail, we argue that a key feature of post-crisis inquiry 
report (PCIR) writing is how commonplace questions about crisis are dealt with: 
What happened?; Was it foreseeable?; Who is responsible?; What is to be done 
to ensure that [a] crisis never happen[s] again” (pp. 1-2)?
Indeed, with the exception of assigning ‘responsibility’ or blame for the institutional 
failures that contributed to the ‘success’ of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the 
Commission’s stated goals are very similar to Boudes and Laroche’s (2009) 
formulation.  (The Commission intentionally formulated their assignment of 
responsibility/blame in the context of ‘what’ rather than ‘who’.) This can be seen in 
excerpts from the Preface of the Commission’s Final Report:
“The nation was unprepared.  How did this happen, and how can we avoid such 
tragedy again? [...] Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of 
the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned. [...] At the outset of 
our work, we said we were looking backward in order to look forward.  We hope 
that the terrible losses chronicled in this report can create something positive -an 
America that is safer, stronger, and wiser. [...]
We have endeavored to provide the most complete account we can of the events 
of September 11, what happened and why. [...] We present this report as a 
foundation for a better understanding of a landmark in the history of our nation.  
[...] We have made a limited number of [recommendations].  We decided 
consciously to focus on “recommendations we believe to be the most important, 
whose implementations can make the greatest difference.”  [And finally] We 
hope that our report will encourage our fellow citizens to study, reflect-and 
act”  (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 2004b: 
xv-xviii).
However, there are significant aims and impacts of the public inquiry process that, 
while not as explicitly stated, are of equal or greater significance.  While the 
reconstruction of a plausible narrative of events is necessary to the process of 
sensemaking, understanding and possibly change, the creation of a single narrative, a 
dominant narrative, a hegemonic narrative also serves other, less obvious purposes.  
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These functions can include the creation of a hegemonic narrative to assist in the 
depoliticisation of fault and the re-legitimation of institutions that have failed or have 
appeared to fail in the eyes of society.  We will examine the literature that explores these 
hidden functions of the public inquiry process in the following sections.  But first, we 
must set the scene with a discussion of the literature that is concerned with the role of 
sensemaking in public inquiries.
2.1.3 Public Inquiry sensemaking
As noted above, public commissions and their reports are ‘ceremonial occasions’ 
organised by governments (Gephart, 1993).  Their recommendations can aid in the 
cultural readjustment of society to a new reality, normally following a failure of 
foresight and concomitant disaster (Turner, 1976); but not always.  Public commission 
reports are important because the sensemaking and sensegiving processes within them 
help to structure the unknown (Waterman, 1990).  As such, a primary task of the public 
inquiry process is that of sensemaking, upon which many of its other explicit and 
implicit functions are based.  Karl Weick (1995) summarises the views of several 
sensemaking scholars, as he outlines the concept of sensemaking: 
“The concept of sensemaking, is well named because, literally, it means the 
making of sense.  Active agents construct sensible and sensable (Huber & Daft, 
1987, p. 154) events.  They “structure the unknown” (Waterman, 1990, p. 41).  
[...] When people put stimuli into frameworks, this enables them “to comprehend, 
understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and predict” (Starbuck & Milliken, 
1988, p. 51)” (p. 4).
The sensemaking in which public inquiries engage, is for the purpose of ‘making sense’ 
of a past event.  They are charged with ‘constructing’ an official narrative with a 
number of motives according to the public inquiry literature.  These motives include the 
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necessity that the board of inquiry ‘comprehend’ the event, ‘understand’ how and why it 
took place and to present their findings in such a way that promotes ‘explanation’, and 
often ‘attributes’ responsibility and blame.  While not all inquiries are required to 
‘extrapolate’ or ‘predict’ future events, extrapolation and prediction is often implicit in 
their recommendations, in that the inquiry body is suggesting that if changes, 
specifically the changes that they present, are not enacted then the problem will not be 
solved; thus risking a future reoccurrence of a similar crisis event.
Turner (1976), conceived of the public inquiry process as an opportunity to structure an 
ill-defined problem in a way that it could be ‘absorbed’ and understood by the ‘culture’.  
This reflects an understanding of the public confusion and outrage that commonly 
follows such disaster events and a subsequent need for the crisis to be understood, thus 
creating an official narrative, which is essential for reducing general anxiety, rebuilding 
trust in failed institutions and providing a basis for a series of proposals that further the 
goal of systemic re-legitimation (Brown 2000, 2003).
This idea that the crisis event needs to be understood, and subsequently framed, in such 
a way as to ensure that it can be digested by the culture is done so through the creation 
of an official accounting of the event in question.  This official narrative must be both 
plausible and authoritative (Brown 2003; Gephart and Pitter 1996; Boudes and Laroche 
2009).  Providing a standard of success against which a public inquiry can be measured, 
Brown (2003) writes:
“In effect, a hegemonically successful report is one that is wholly or largely 
uncritically accepted as providing a comprehensive and accurate account of the 
events it purports to describe, which is seen to be fair in its assessment of 
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culpability and the allocation of blame, and which makes seemingly appropriate 
recommendations” (p. 96).
By these standards, the Final Report of the 9/11 Commission could be considered a 
hegemonic success.  As the study will explore, the Commission’s findings were 
uncritically accepted.  As Posner (2005) notes, “The media response to the 9/11 
Commission’s report was on the whole uncritical, indeed perfunctory” (pp. 11-12).  This 
‘uncritical’ and ‘perfunctory’ nature of media coverage was observed in the early stages 
of the research for this thesis.  Upon a review of the media coverage contained in three 
major American newspapers, (USA Today, the Washington Post and the New York 
Times, from July to December 2004), only descriptive accounts of the inquiry process 
were reported.  Surprisingly, not even editorial content challenged either the primary 
assumptions or the formal narrative upon which the Commission’s recommendations 
and Congress’ legislative action was based.  (Given the volume of news articles from 
these outlets, approximately 800 in total, and the existing volume contained in the 
Congressional Record transcripts of the reform debates in the House of Representatives  
and the Senate, over 800,000 words; it was determined that this research project would 
focus on the Congressional debates and that media coverage of this process would be 
left for possible future research.)  In fact, the style, content and detail of the narrative 
portion of the Report was roundly praised (Kean, et al. 2007).  The bi-partisan nature 
and approach of the Commission ensured that any individual or political responsibility 
or blame was omitted.  This starved politicians, political parties and political interest 
groups of critical ammunition that would have had the potential to polarise debate and 
compromise the power of the Commission’s influence, narrative or recommendations. 
Alternatively, the Commission focused on the failure of institutions and organisations, 
and on the misallocation of limited resources.  Finally, the recommendations were 
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focused, limited and imbued with a sense of appropriateness.  This rich, monological 
narrativisation, de-politicisation of blame, and sense of appropriateness all make 
important contributions to the legitimacy of the process, the strengthening of public 
trust and the re-legitimation of failed institutions.  It is this re-legitimation process that 
will be explored in greater detail in the following section.
2.1.4 An exercise in re-legitimation
As Brown (2000) asserts, “Public inquiries and the reports they produce are centrally 
concerned with establishing the legitimacy of organizations and institutions,” (p. 8) and 
he draws primarily upon Suchman (1995) to provide a relevant conception of legitimacy  
as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995: 574).  However, Brown is not alone in 
emphasising the re-legitimating role of the public inquiry process.  Topal (2009) takes a 
critical view of the role of legitimation in the context of the public inquiry process.  In 
his study of public hearings he asserts that the practice of legitimation is used to ‘enact 
institutional power’ (p. 227).  His research project posits three main research questions: 
“How do participants in a public hearing make sense of a risky economic 
development?; How does a governmental agency in a public hearing decide on a 
risky economic development?; How does [the hearing/inquiry body] use its 
decision to produce an image of legitimacy that conceals yet enables the operation 
of legitimate power” (p. 282)?
While the first two research questions deal with the subject matter of Topal’s case 
material in particular, and with a public hearing process that deals with the approval of 
planning requests in general, the final research question is readily generalisable with 
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implications for the legitimation role of the public inquiry process that we seek to 
examine in this thesis.
How then does an inquiry body produce an image of legitimacy?  Topal (2009) finds 
that this image of legitimacy is created with three particular features:
“The participation of affected parties, compliance with the regulations established 
(and assumed) to represent general public interest with the Board is legally 
authorized to define and protect. [...] a cost benefit analysis based on expert 
knowledge which seems to result in rational evaluation (p. 290)”.
The 9/11 Commission appears to meet these three features required to produce an image 
of legitimacy.  First, Thomas Kean, Chairman of the 9/11 Commission stated that it was 
his intention to: “[...] be nonpartisan and independent.  We would stay in touch with the 
families who had a unique interest in our work, while staying in touch with the 
American people” (Kean, et al. 2007).  Second, the Commission was very vigilant in 
adhering to their Congressionally authorised mandate.  Third, the Commission’s 
recommendations seemed appropriate and plausible thereby generating considerable 
praise from the media, the public and from Congressional legislators, this approval was 
made clear during the subsequent intelligence reform debates in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.
There are a number of common themes in the Public Inquiry Literature; however, it is 
clear that the literature is concerned primarily with the creation, execution and reporting 
of the public inquiry process.  This begs the question: What happens next?  In the case 
of the 9/11 Commission, the release of the final report was followed by extensive 
legislative debates in both the House of Representatives and the Senate during the post-
reporting phase of the inquiry process.  These debates appear to be influenced by the 
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Commission, through its narrative, its final report and its recommendations.  But how 
did these debates unfold.  What rhetorical strategies were employed to legitimise and 
de-legitimise the legislative reform efforts?  By focusing on this post-reporting phase of 
a public inquiry process, greater understanding can be acquired as to the public inquiry 
re-legitimation process.  This current gap in the public inquiry literature has the 
potential to make an interesting and significant contribution to the discussion of the 
nature and the roll of re-legitimising institutions in a post-disaster setting.
2.2 Perspectives on Legitimacy
Legitimacy is an important social phenomenon and has drawn a significant amount of 
academic study across a variety of social science disciplines.  Its importance is not 
surprising when one considers that legitimacy is central to the maintenance of society, 
social hierarchies and a whole range of human interactions from the economic to the 
political and from the personal to the societal.  While contemporary literature in 
Organisation Studies deals with many focused applications of legitimacy, the roots of 
our modern understanding of this phenomenon, originates in its general application to 
the study of society and human interaction.  This is not an attempt to create a 
comprehensive catalogue of the evolution of Western thought on the concept of 
legitimacy (for a comprehensive timeline see: Zelditch in Jost and Major, 2001).  
However, it is important to understand how the thinking on legitimacy has developed 
and to understand the theoretical foundations of contemporary thought on organisational 
legitimacy.
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Traditionally, the focus of legitimacy has been within the broader societal context.  
More specifically, interest has been focused on the legitimacy of, and the legitimation 
of, authority and the authoritative exercise of power within society.  How is it, and why 
is it, that societies are divided between those who rule and those who are ruled.  How do 
rulers maintain their power and why do the ruled agree to this arrangement.  This is not 
a new debate and can be traced back to the origins of ancient western philosophy. 
Broadly, two theories of society have emerged and dominated sociological debate: 
Consensus Theory and Conflict Theory (Horowitz 1962).
2.2.1 Consensus theory
The premise of this theory is, as the title suggests, that legitimacy is derived from a 
consensual agreement between the rulers and the ruled.  Both parties agree to these 
arrangements, because they are based on a shared set of values and norms, and it is the 
voluntary nature of this agreement that allows this arrangement to be considered 
legitimate.  The establishment of a legitimate regime, based on these shared values, 
ensures societal stability.  It is this stability that further incentivises the people to 
consent to being governed.
The origins of a consensus view of social relations can be traced back to classical 
western philosophy.  Aristotle (1991), writing in Politics, attempts to form a theory of 
political stability.  He concludes that the legitimacy of a government depends on both 
constitutionalism and consent. 
“[...] in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false idea of 
freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state.  For two 
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principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of the majority and 
freedom.  Men think that what is just is equal; and that equality is the supremacy 
of the popular will; and that freedom means the doing what a man likes.  In such 
democracies everyone lives as he pleases [...] [b]ut this is all wrong; men should 
not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is their 
salvation” (p. 126).
First contemporary efforts towards the creation of a pure consensus theory of legitimacy  
were published by Parsons (1960).  Parsons’ conception of legitimacy was that the 
acceptance of the social arrangement was voluntary, that this consent was based on a 
shared belief, between the rulers and the ruled, in societal values and norms, that it is 
this consensus that makes the social order right and therefore legitimate, and that only a 
legitimately ordered society can be stable (Zelditch, 2001).  It is this stability that 
Aristotle is referencing when he refers to the salvation of men.
The benefits that legitimacy bestows upon the rulers of the regime, are perhaps more 
obvious.  First, the more legitimate the rulers’ authority, the easier it is for them to 
exercise their power.  This is of particular importance during challenging periods.  As 
Tyler (2006) notes: 
 “When the public views government as legitimate, it has an alternative basis for 
 support during difficult times.  Further when government can call upon the 
 values of the population to encourage desired behavior, society has more 
 flexibility about how it deploys resources” (p. 126).  
Second, legitimacy allows those in power “to believe that what they are doing is right 
[and in] accordance with some higher law [which allows them to fulfill the] need to 
justify themselves” (Mitchell 1979: 14).   The people agree to the societal arrangement 
and in return receive the fruits of security and stability and the rulers, in addition to the 
more obvious comforts which accompany power, are able to believe that their actions 
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are in concordance with a higher authority.  Providing a competing view of legitimacy 
arrangements within society are the proponents of Conflict Theory.
2.2.2 Conflict theory
Machiavelli, writing in the sixteenth century, provides the first fully descriptive account 
of legitimacy; however, his account deviates from the consensual view of society and is 
rooted in the dynamics of societal conflict.   This conflict view of societal relations 
makes a number of assumptions:
“(a) the fundamental basis for both action and order is instrumental (i.e., governed 
by rational self-interest); (b) the real interests of the rulers and the ruled are in 
conflict; and (c) it is power that makes the rules binding.  But (d) pure power 
cannot make people believe that a rule is “right”; (e) ideology, myth and ritual are 
necessary to legitimate rules, make them “right” by masking the real interests of 
the ruler and the ruled; and (f) in the long run, pure power is unstable unless 
legitimated, so legitimacy is a prerequisite of any social order” (Zelditch 2001: 
42).
Therefore the self-interest of the rulers is masked from the population through the 
strategic use of myth and ideology.  It is this strategic use of legitimacy that is necessary 
to ensure enduring stability within a society thus preserving the advantageous social 
structures and hierarchy of the rulers.  It is this strategic element of legitimacy that has 
“[...] influenced all subsequent theories of legitimacy, whether conflict, consensus, or 
any mix of the two.  Its basic principle is the economy of legitimacy.  Princes make the 
unaccepted acceptable [...]” (Zelditch 2001: 3). While modern society has replaced 
princes with politicians, the preservation of state institutions remains vital.  When these 
institutions are threatened or weakened, it is often a priority to re-legitimate in the wake 
of real or perceived failures.  Ceremonial occasions or processes, which rely on myth 
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and ideology, such as public inquiries or Congressional legislative action can be vital 
tools for reasserting the dominance of the existing institutional structures.
Central to the development and dissemination of conflict theories to society is Karl 
Marx (Parkin 1972).  Conflict in his world-view occurs between groups within society 
struggling to acquire limited resources.  
 “Marx’s hypothesis is that because the ruling class controls the means of mental 
 production (e.g., religion, education, communications), ruling ideas in any epoch 
 are the ideas of the ruling class.  The function of these ideas is to conceal, rather 
 than reveal, conflict of the real interests of the classes” (Zelditch 2001: 42).  
As seen in the writings of Machiavelli, and central to the views of Marx, the primary 
function of legitimacy is to conceal the true interests of the elite.  The view of conflict 
theorists is that if an objective observer were able to view society, it would be clear to 
that observer that the legitimating myths, values and norms are, in fact, ‘masking’ the 
self-interest of the ruling class.  Non-dominant groups mistake these values and norms 
because of their ‘false consciousness’, which is evident to the objective observer.  “The 
risk, highlighted by conflict theorists, is that justice judgements themselves will be the 
result of ‘false consciousness’, with the members of subordinate groups adopting the 
legitimating myths put forward by the dominant class” (Tyler 2006: 28).  The concept of 
legitimating myths, or dominant narratives, is important in the public inquiry literature.  
The purpose of these myths and narratives is the re-establishment of the public’s trust 
and the re-legitimation of state institutions.  
Despite the divergence in these theories of legitimacy, this is not an unreconcilable 
dichotomy.  Consensus can exist in conflict theory and vice versa.  Elements of both the 
consensus and conflict theories of legitimacy can be seen in the public inquiry process, 
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in general, and the 9/11 Commission process in particular and a number of theorist have 
taken a mixed view of legitimacy that incorporates elements of both paradigms.  One of 
the most influential theorists to the modern understanding of legitimacy who adopted a 
hybrid view of this problem, is German economist and sociologist, Max Weber.
2.2.3 Max Weber
The writings of Weber have been foundational to the contemporary understanding of 
legitimacy and legitimation in many disciplines, but particularly in the area of 
Organisation Studies (Ruef & Scott 1998; Suchman 1995; Greenwood, et al. 2008).  
Weber’s “concept of “legitimacy” refers to the acceptance of the validity of an order of 
rules” (Lassman 2000, p. 87).  This is similar to Aristotle’s assertion that the legitimacy 
of a government is based on constitutionalism and consent.  However, in a broader 
context, Weber is concerned with a central set of questions that focuses on the reasons 
why a given population consents to be ruled and when this behaviour occurs.  Weber 
(2002) notes that:
“[...] the state is a relationship of rule by human beings over human beings, and 
one that rests on the legitimate use of violence [...].  For the state to remain in 
existence, those who are ruled must submit to the authority claimed by whoever 
rules at any given time. [...]
[Given this observation, Weber (2002) asks two central questions:] “When do 
people do this, and why?  What inner justifications and what external means 
support this rule” (p. 311)?
Weber (1958) proposes three sources of regime authority: legal domination, traditional 
domination and charismatic domination.  Each of these forms of domination, to varying 
degrees, relies on the legitimacy enjoyed by the ruling elite.  While authority can be 
exercised and maintained without legitimacy, the cost and allocation of resources to 
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employ the necessary levels of coercion can be extremely significant.  As Tyler (2006) 
notes:
[A weakness in the legitimacy of a regime] leaves society vulnerable because 
disruptions in the control of resources brought on by periods of scarcity or conflict 
quickly lead to collapse of effective social order.  [However,] when the public 
views government as legitimate, it has an alternative basis for support during 
difficult times ” (p. 377).  
This reservoir of legitimacy, allows for greater flexibility in allocating limited resources 
to more productive ends.  This is not unlike the view of some organisational theorists 
who adhere to the strategic view of legitimacy. (The strategic/institutional dichotomy of 
legitimacy in an organisational context will be addressed later in this chapter.)  These 
organisation theorists suggest that legitimacy should be viewed as an important 
operational resource of an organisation (e.g: Suchman, 1988; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; 
Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975).
Returning to Weber’s sources of authority, we can see how each seeks to harness 
legitimacy.  Legal domination exists through the development of a transparent system of 
administrative rules, procedures and laws.  Those in authority are seen to be lawfully 
appointed or elected and are more easily able to exercise power and authority over 
others.  Their power is bounded by the very same rule-set from which they derive their 
power (Weber 1958).  This ruling archetype is prevalent as the official source of 
authority in the modern liberal-democratic nation state.  Leaders are elected by the 
population under rules laid down by constitutional documents and conventions.  
Lawmakers, with an elected mandate, enact laws by which all are bound.  These laws 
are interpreted, and disputes are settled, by the judiciary.  In these societies, legal 
domination permeates down through all layers of government and is intended to 
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empower and restrict all in society.  From broad constitutional rights to local bylaw 
matters, the tacit agreement of the population and the coercive power of the state ensure 
the continuation of the domination of the legal and regulatory framework.  When these 
legal and regulatory systems fail, or even appear to fail, their legitimacy is damaged and 
their authority is threatened.  Therefore, there is an urgent need to restore the legitimacy 
of these systems and institutions.  Within the context of the public inquiry process this is 
done by an ad hoc, temporary investigatory body such as a public commission.   
Ironically, the commission of inquiry derives some of its legitimacy from the very 
institutions that have been compromised and which it seeks to strengthen.  In the case of 
the 9/11 public inquiry, the Commission itself derived some of its legal authority from 
the fact that it was created through an act of the Legislative Branch, in agreement with 
the Executive.   Regardless, an understanding of this source of authority will be 
important as we deconstruct the rhetorical strategies employed to debate the intelligence 
reform legislation in Congress.
While this mode of domination is vital to the maintenance of a contemporary, 
functioning nation state, and while it is the most easily observable given that these laws 
and regulations are mostly written, it is important not to underestimate the power of 
Weber’s two remaining domination types.  Traditional domination occurs when 
legitimacy is drawn from a justification that one is in a position of power because one 
has always been in a position of power.  This type of domination is evident, and of 
particular importance in a monarchy, where power and authority is inherited.  Vestiges 
of this type of domination can be seen throughout Europe and the British 
Commonwealth and while these monarchs have varying degrees of authority and 
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responsibilities, almost exclusively restrained by a system of legal domination, their 
wealth and influence is maintained largely as a remnant of the feudal history of these 
societies.  Finally, Weber (1978) describes charismatic domination in which legitimacy 
originates with the charisma of a leader.  Charisma is “a certain quality in an individual 
personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed 
with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or 
qualities” (p. 241).  Societies with systems of legal or traditional domination are not 
immune to the influence of charismatic domination.  The societies of some of the 
twentieth century’s most powerful nations were dramatically transformed by 
‘charismatic leadership’ (e.g.: Russia, China, Germany).  While purely charismatic 
domination appears to be of lesser importance, in contemporary liberal democratic 
society, the authority derived from the charisma of politicians appears to have a 
significant influence on election outcomes.  Politicians encourage and cultivate personal 
imagery that they hope will sufficiently impress the electorate.  Charisma, while not a 
primary source of authority in modern society, remains relevant in an electoral sense.  It 
can be a contributing factor to the success of a politician standing for public office.  
Victory in an election then bestows upon the newly-elected leader further authority by 
virtue of the democratic traditions and the legal regime of a society.  This example 
highlights the mutually inclusive, and often mutually reinforcing, nature of these 
Weberian sources of authority.
These archetypes draw their authority, either explicitly or implicitly, from the 
understanding between the governors and the governed.  This pact is based on the 
premise that the population views the authorities as legitimate.  Therefore authority, 
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whether coercive or consensual, must possess sufficient legitimacy within its relevant 
context.  i.e. the degree of legitimacy required to govern is inversely proportioned to the 
degree to which a coercive relationship exist between the governing and the governed.
While Weber’s writings have been highly influential within the Social Sciences to the 
conception of authority and legitimacy, his views have not received an uncritical 
acceptance.  One of the main critiques of his treatment of legitimacy is that he attempts 
to insulate legitimacy from subjectivity.  As Lassman (2000) notes: “Weber’s use of the 
concept of “legitimacy” would appear to remove the possibility of saying that some 
states are simply “illegitimate” even though its citizens or subjects obey its commands 
or laws” (p. 87).
This moral agnosticism is echoed by Grafstein (1981) who concurs and states that:  
“[i]n Weber's hands [...] legitimacy no longer represents an evaluation of a regime; 
indeed, it no longer refers directly to the regime itself. Rather, it is defined as the 
belief of citizens that the regime is, to speak in circles, legitimate. Legitimacy 
becomes, for Weber, simply a matter of fact, the fact that citizens hold a certain 
belief.  [...] In the end, Weber virtually identifies legitimacy with stable and 
effective political power, reducing it to a routine submission to authority” (p. 
456).
This is a major point of contention for critics of Weber’s understanding of legitimacy 
and authority.  (For further criticism of Weber’s conception of legitimacy see: David 
Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, London: Macmillan, 1991; John H. Schaar, 
“Legitimacy in the Modern State,” in William Connolly (ed), Legitimacy and the State, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.)  One can see that aspects of all three of Weber’s 
sources of domination: legal, traditional and charismatic are all, to varying degrees, 
relevant in the modern, western, liberal democratic state.  As such, it is not difficult to 
understand why contemporary authors, writing on legitimacy, would look to Weber for a 
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greater understanding of the concept of legitimacy.  These categories of legitimacy were 
used, in part, as a basis for subsequent and more contemporary models.  For example, 
Suchman (1995) acknowledges the influence of Weber’s sources of legitimacy when 
attempting to reconcile the dichotomy that exists in the recent organisation theory 
scholarship between strategic and institutional views of legitimacy.  Therefore, 
understanding Weber’s tripartite model of legitimacy is important when examining 
contemporary theorising on this topic. 
2.2.4. Legitimacy in Organisation Studies
To this point, the discussion of legitimacy and legitimation has been applied to societal-
level issues of governance and the just application of power and authority.  An 
understanding of legitimacy in this broader context is helpful in understanding the ways 
in which legitimacy manifests within sub-societal units such as organisations and 
institutions.  As Weber (1994) asserts the “modern state is an ‘organisation’ in exactly 
the same way as a factory; indeed that is its specific historical characteristic” (p. 146).  
Therefore, elements of these macro-theories of legitimacy and the legitimation process 
can be leveraged to explain these sorts of social relations at the institutional level.
Suchman (1995) notes that: “Drawing from the foundational work of Weber (1978) and 
Parsons (1960), [Organisation Studies] researchers have made legitimacy into an 
anchor-point of a vastly expanded theoretical apparatus addressing the normative and 
cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower organizational actors” (p. 571).  
Definitions of organisational legitimacy have centred around three primary sources: 
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self-justification (Maurer), cultural conformity (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Parsons 
1960), and the primacy of  understandability (cognitive) over their desirability 
(evaluative) (Meyer & Scott, 1983; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) (Suchman 1995: 573).
Providing a detailed definition of the phenomenon of organisational legitimacy, Meyer 
and Scott (1983) assert that 
“[...] organizational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an 
organization -the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts 
provide  explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or 
deny alternatives [...].  [Therefore, a] completely legitimate organization would be 
one about which no questions could be raised” (p. 201). 
Traditional views of legitimacy, within Organisation Studies, can be divided broadly 
into two main approaches: the strategic approach and the institutional approach.  
2.2.5 Strategic and institutional approaches to legitimacy 
The strategic approach to legitimacy “adopts a managerial perspective and emphasizes 
the ways in which organizations instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative 
symbols in order to garner societal support” (Suchman, 1995: 572); it also implies a 
degree of agency in which actors can manage and bolster organisational legitimacy (see: 
Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Pfeffer 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik 
1978).    In contrast to the strategic approach to legitimacy, the institutional approach 
“adopts a more detached stance and emphasizes the ways in which sector-wide 
structuration dynamics generate cultural pressures that transcend any single 
organization’s purposive control” (Suchman, 1995, p. 572).  Institutional legitimacy 
views legitimacy as a byproduct of successful interaction with an existing structure.  
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(Authors who take this view include: DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1991; 
Meyer & Scott 1983; Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Zucker 1987).  It is this divide in the 
view of legitimacy, between strategic and institutional, that motivated Suchman to 
attempt a compromise.
Suchman’s Taxonomy of Legitimacy Types
As noted above, the debate on legitimacy in the discipline of Organisational Studies is 
spirited and very wide ranging.  Suchman (1995) is concerned that without a ‘careful 
and even-handed’ synthesis “[...] research on organizational legitimacy threatens to 
degenerate into a chorus of dissonant voices, fragmenting scholarly discourse and 
disrupting the flow of information from theorists to practitioners” (p. 572).  In an effort 
to avoid this outcome, Suchman (1995) synthesises “the large but diverse literature on 
organizational legitimacy, highlighting similarities and disparities among the leading 
strategic and institutional approaches” (p. 571).  He attempts to navigate the path 
between the prominent view of organizational legitimacy as a primarily strategic 
concern and the competing view that organizational legitimacy is in essence an 
institutional phenomenon.  He acknowledges that “cultural environments [...] [are] 
fundamentally constitutive of organizational life, and [he] adopt[s] a somewhat 
skeptical attitude toward the autonomy, objectivity and potency of managers” (p. 577).  
However, Suchman (1995) does address the challenges organisations are confronted 
with when they handle “symbolic relationships with demanding constituents” (p. 577).  
Ultimately, Suchman acknowledges agency with a series of recommendations for 
gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy in practice.  In attempting to bridge the 
gap between these two conflicting views (strategic and institutional) of organisational 
legitimacy, Suchman (1995) groups types of legitimacy into three broad categories.  He 
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labels these categories as: pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy and cognitive 
legitimacy.
Pragmatic Legitimacy
Suchman’s definition of pragmatic legitimacy asserts that legitimacy is granted because 
an individual within the organisation's audience determines that the actions of the 
organisation will directly benefit the individual.  The legitimacy is considered pragmatic 
because the individual is making a practical decision that the organisation is 
contributing to their self-interest and therefore possesses legitimacy.  At the most basic 
level, this is a type of exchange legitimacy between the individual and the organisation.  
The organisation provides some benefit to the individual and the individual considers 
the organisation to be providing a legitimate product or need.  As a result, the 
organisation's legitimacy is strengthened.  However, an organisation can enjoy 
pragmatic legitimation even when there is not a direct exchange.  It may be that the 
organisation provides a less-direct social, economic or political benefit that is valued by 
the individual.  Being seen to provide this broader societal benefit can also help to 
bestow a form of pragmatic legitimacy.  Suchman (1995) defines this sub-category of 
pragmatic legitimacy as influence legitimacy.  
Finally, an organisation can be seen to hold views, priorities or values which are 
sympathetic or complimentary to the views of the individual.  While there is no clearly 
tangible benefit to the individual, the perception of shared values is sufficient to 
contribute to the organisation's legitimation efforts. Suchman (1995) refers to this final 
sub-category of pragmatic legitimacy as dispositional legitimacy (pp. 578-579).
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Moral Legitimacy
Suchman (1995) designates his second category of legitimacy: moral legitimacy.  Moral 
legitimacy differs from pragmatic legitimacy in that there need not be an immediate 
calculation of self-interest; rather, the determining calculation is based on the degree to 
which the action is judged correct and in the interests of the wider society.  “These 
judgements, in turn, usually reflect beliefs about whether the activity effectively 
promotes societal welfare, as defined by the audience’s socially constructed value 
system” (p. 579).  This does not, however, mean that judgements of moral legitimacy 
are interest-free; however, they differ from the more narrowly considered self-interested 
determination of pragmatic legitimacy in that they contain a very pro-social element 
(Suchman, 1995).  As with pragmatic legitimacy, Suchman (1995), divides moral 
legitimacy into four sub-categories.  These sub-types of moral legitimacy are: 
consequential, procedural, structural and personal.
  
Cognitive Legitimacy
Suchman’s final category of legitimacy is that of cognitive legitimacy.  He highlights 
two types of cognitive-based legitimacy: one which relies on comprehensibility and one 
which relies on taken-for-grantedness.  Comprehensibility focuses on the ability of an 
individual to understand an organisation and its activities and the degree of fit between 
these actions and existing societal models.  As Suchman (1995) notes: “Legitimacy, 
according to this view, stems mainly from the availability of cultural models that furnish 
plausible explanations for the organization and its endeavors (Scott, 1991; Wuthnow, 
Hunter, Bergesen, & Kurzweil, 1984)” (p. 582).  Further, it is important to note that 
only those explanations that are compatible with the norms and values of the societal 
context and the individual’s day-to-day experiences of reality will gain legitimacy 
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(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; cf. Geertz, 1973, as cited in Suchman 1995).  Finally, the 
most powerful source of legitimacy is one that is taken-for-granted and therefore 
beyond the realm of evaluation or conscious cognitive evaluation.  As Suchman (1995) 
explains “[i]f alternatives become unthinkable, challenges become impossible, [then] 
the legitimated entity becomes unassailable by construction” (p. 583).  However, 
Suchman is quick to note that this is a very uncommon achievement, as very seldom in 
‘market economies and pluralist political cultures’ is it assumed that only one 
organisation is capable of managing a given technology or programme.
While Suchman’s taxonomy of legitimacy is expansive, it does provide a helpful review 
of the multitude of sources of legitimacy.  Its attempt to integrate the strategic and 
institutional approaches to organisation legitimacy is inclusive of the contemporary 
academic literature on the topic.  This is one of the reasons that Suchman’s model has 
been highlighted.  By recognising the increasingly counter-productive division between 
the strategic and institutional views of legitimacy within the field of organisation 
studies, Suchman attempts a new way of understanding legitimacy in an organisational 
setting.  This approach attempts to reduce the dichotomous nature of the study of 
legitimacy which is particularly important for this research project that will seek to 
adopt a focus on legitimacy that elevates neither strategic nor institutional views of 
legitimacy, but rather attempts to engage with more recent literature which emphasises 
rhetorical sources of legitimacy.  Suchman’s work opens the door to new views of 
legitimacy and his work has been important not only to authors such as Brown (2000) 
and Brown and Jones (2000) in the realm of the public inquiry literature, but also his 
model has proved important to rhetorical legitimation scholars such as Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005).  It is for these reasons that we have highlighted Suchman’s 
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contribution to the legitimacy scholarship.  Finally, as we move into the last section of 
the literature review, the appropriateness of Suchman’s taxonomy will be made clear 
when discussing techniques of rhetorical persuasion and the models created by the 
scholars in this area.
2.2.6 Public Inquiries: An exercise in re-legitimation
General conceptions of legitimacy and its theoretical development in the academic 
literature have been explored in previous sections of this chapter.  What follows is an 
examination of the issue of legitimacy as it relates to the public inquiry literature.  
While not all authors speak of legitimacy directly, their work on public commissions 
discusses issues and concepts that require, or assume, a base level of legitimacy of the 
public inquiry process and its subsequent recommendations.  This section will examine 
both the explicit (legitimacy) and implicit (blame, authority, sensemaking and narrative 
creation) manifestations of legitimacy in the public inquiry literature.
2.2.6.1 Legitimacy and the public inquiry process
For the purposes of this study, we draw upon Suchman (1995) for what he considers to 
be “an inclusive, broad-based definition of legitimacy that incorporates both the 
evaluative and the cognitive dimensions and that explicitly acknowledges the role of the 
social audience in legitimation dynamics” (p. 574).  With this in mind, Suchman (1995) 
defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
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norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574).  Under this definition of legitimacy it is 
clear to see how government agencies and institutions have their legitimacy diminished 
when their regulatory regimes fail to protect their constituents.  In some instances it is a 
failure such as lack of sufficient oversight or resources in medical facilities (Brown 
2000, Boudes & Larouche 2009), industrial accidents (Brown 2003; Gephart 1994; 
Topal 2009), or man-made, natural disasters (Turner 1976) which act to diminish trust 
in regulatory regimes and de-legitimize institutional reputation.
The failure of the United States’ Government, its institutions and agencies, to prevent 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 provide a clear example of multiple regulatory 
regime failures. These catastrophic failures, and the resultant destruction of property 
and loss of life, were not viewed as ‘desirable’ and the action, or the inability to marshal 
effective action on the part of the Government was not viewed as either ‘proper or 
appropriate’ by the American public.  Within the ‘socially constructed system of norms, 
values, and beliefs’ of the United States, the primary role of the Government is to 
protect the nation.  In this focal task, the Government failed.  The scope and impact of 
this failure risked a serious de-legitimation and questioning of Government authority.   
As legitimacy is the key element to non-coercive authority and governance , the need to 
re-legitimate these failed institutions in the wake of this crisis was strong.  As the public 
inquiry literature enumerates, the re-establishment of enforcement of institutional 
legitimacy is a central role for the public inquiry process.
The public inquiry literature deals with legitimacy in two main ways.  Some authors are 
concerned directly with legitimacy in their exploration of the the re-legitimation process 
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(Gephart 1994; Boudes and Laroche 2009).  However, even the authors for whom their 
primary concerns are for issues other than legitimacy, nevertheless, deal with 
motivations that imply or demand a certain level of legitimacy in order to succeed.  
These authors deal with authoritative narrative (Brown 2003),  de-politicisation of 
disaster events (Brown 2000; Gephart 1992; Kemp 1985) and the re-enforcement of 
dominant institutions (Elliot and Smith 2006; Topal 2009).  While not specifically 
mentioning the phenomenon by name, legitimacy plays a significant role in 
accomplishing these goals.    As such, we will deal with both the explicit and implicit 
treatment of legitimacy within the public inquiry literature.
As Brown (2000) asserts, “Public inquiries and the reports they produce are centrally 
concerned with establishing the legitimacy of organizations and institutions,” (p. 8) and 
he also draws primarily on Suchman (1995) to provide a relevant conception of 
legitimacy as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions" (p. 8).  Within the public inquiry scholarship a few 
authors focus primarily on the issue of legitimacy and the re-legitimation process.  
However, a greater number of researchers choose to focus on other phenomena, of 
which, legitimacy is a secondary, underlying concept.  In other words, gaining 
legitimacy or advancing the re-legitimation process is one contributing factor to the 
success of other activities.  
For example, Brown (2003) in his analysis of the Cullen Report into the Piper Alpha 
offshore oil platform fire, is concerned with a related legitimation phenomenon: 
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authority.  More specifically, the ability of a public inquiry report to “function 
hegemonically to impose a particular version of reality on their readers” (p. 95).  He 
seeks to investigate “the means by which inquiry reports accomplish verisimilitude 
[and] how this form of public discourse depoliticizes disaster events, legitimates social 
institutions, and lessens anxiety by concocting myths that emphasize our omnipotence 
and capacity to control” (p. 95).  A verisimilitudinous accounting of events or, more 
simply stated, an official narrative which possesses the appearance of being true or real, 
is a vital artefact of a ‘successful’ public inquiry process.  As Brown (2005) 
acknowledges, it enables depoliticisation, institutional legitimation and can lessen 
general anxiety.  It also sets the focus of the public discourse, sets the foundations from 
which recommendations are formed and creates or influences the environment in which 
changes in policy are debated and made.  The foundational nature of the official 
narrative of the 9/11 attacks is stated directly in the preface to the 9/11 Commission 
Report: “We present the narrative of this report and the recommendations that flow from 
it to the President of the United States, the United States Congress, and the American 
people for their considerations” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The 
United States 2004b: xv).  Later in the preface to the report they acknowledge that they 
“were looking backward in order to look forward” (Ibid.: xvi).  In other words, looking 
back to construct a narrative in order to look forward in making their recommendations.
Thus far this chapter has examined the public inquiry literature and elements of the 
legitimacy literature.  From the public inquiry literature we have determined that the 
existing literature focuses either on the disaster-event, the inquiry process or the inquiry 
process’ final reports.  There has been no focus on answering the question of: ‘What 
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comes next?‘  What happens to important and central phenomenon such as the re-
legitimation process, after the final report has been published?  While there has been 
significant study of the phenomenon of legitimacy, the majority of the Organisation 
Studies literature on the subject focusses on the divide between strategic and 
institutional sources of legitimacy.  However, Suchman (1995) has sought to bridge this 
dichotomy and develop an inclusive model of organisational legitimacy.  This 
consideration of legitimacy, that eschews the oppositional nature of the strategic/
institutional divide, has been influential in both public inquiry scholarship and with 
more recent developments in the scholarship of rhetorical sources of legitimacy, which 
will be discussed in the following section. 
2.3 The Linguistic Turn
During the twentieth century, the broader social sciences experienced a linguistic turn 
that emphasised the centrality of the relationship between language and philosophy (see: 
Wittgenstein, et, al 2001; Rorty 1967).  In disciplines such as sociology, social 
psychology, communication theory and cultural anthropology there was an increasing 
focus on language and texts as a source of insight in to society, social institutions and 
social phenomenon (Brown 1990; Van Dijk 1997; Alvesson and Kärreman 2000).  As 
Heracleous and Barrett (2001) assert: “[t]he linguistic turn in the social sciences 
prompted calls for a more complex understanding of organizations that would 
emphasize language not only as enabling information exchange but also as constructing 
social and organizational reality” (p. 755).  
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This focus on language in the social sciences had a significant affect on organisation 
studies research which led to a discursive turn during the later half of the century 
(Alvesson and Kärreman 2000; Heracleous and Barrett 2001; Oswick, et al. 2007).  This 
was brought to bare on a wide-range of topics.  For example, Pettigrew (1979) used a 
longitudinal-processual approach to investigate organisations; Thatchenkery (2001) 
employed hermeneutics; Phillips and Brown (1993) utilised a critical hermeneutic 
approach; Heracleous and Hendry (2000) and Golant and Sillince (2007) have explored 
structurational perspectives; and Alvesson & Kärreman (2000) and Phillips and Hardy 
(2002) made use of discourse analysis. More recently, authors have employed various 
forms of content analysis (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), and the abductive approach 
of critical discourse analysis (Vaara, et al. (2006); Erkama and Vaara (2010)).
In addition to the abundance of new methodological tools, the linguistic turn has 
sparked a debate about the relationship of language to social reality and the extent to 
which language is rightly the sole focus or whether it is simply one important element 
of social reality (Vaara, et al, 2006).  Traditional views on this matter suggest that 
language simply reflects social realities.  Therefore language is representational of 
social reality and the study of language can uncover social truths.  However, post-
modernists and those who embrace discourse analysis argue that “an emphasis on the 
representational capacities of language conceal and obfuscate the more productive 
question of its creative and functional capacities: what language actually 
accomplishes” (Alvesson and Kärreman 2000: 137)  Authors such as Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) have used empirical research to show that “[...] people do not use 
language primarily to make accurate representations of perceived objects, but rather, to 
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accomplish things, and [that] [...] the variety of means employed to achieve these 
accomplishments are vastly underestimated in conventional research” (Alvesson and 
Kärreman 2000: 137).  Findings such as these may challenge the mainstream view of 
language as a transparent vehicle for understanding.  However, the recognition that 
language can be used to accomplish certain objectives dates to antiquity.
2.3.1 Rhetoric
Like legitimacy, the studies of rhetoric have an ancient past.  In the fourth century AD, 
Plato wrote critically about rhetoric.  In Plato’s view, communication could take two 
forms: dialectical and rhetorical.  Dialectic was viewed as argumentation based in 
knowledge and logic; whereas, rhetoric was argumentation practiced by the sophists and 
lacking substance.   In The Giorgias, Plato constructed a fictional discussion between 
Socrates and Giorgias, the father of sophistry, in which Socrates, arguing against the use 
of rhetoric, said “So when an orator is more persuasive than a doctor, a non-knower will 
be more persuasive than a knower among non-knowers” (Cooper and Hutchinson 1997: 
804).  While the doctor’s knowledge is based on experience and specialised 
understanding, if he were to be less persuasive than an orator with no medical 
knowledge then, despite having the correct information, he would not be able to 
convince the audience without a medical background that he was speaking the truth.  
Therefore, in the Platonic view, rhetoric is a tool for persuasion that is empty of 
knowledge, potentially deceitful and possibly dangerous if employed to further immoral 
or unethical ends. “The thrust of Platonic skepticism is that persuasion, by definition, 
renders onto its user immense power and control” (Hartelius and Browning 2008: 16).  
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In this critical view, rhetoric can be seen in the contemporary management and 
organisation literature and can be seen as well in the exploration of rhetoric as a tool of 
control exercised by management over workers (Barley and Kunda 1992; Oakes, et al. 
1998; David and Strang 2006).  However, there is an emerging view that rhetoric is 
more than a cynical tool of deceit and authors such as Sillince (1999) and Hartelius and 
Browning (2008) would advocate that rhetoric is a fundamental and unavoidable 
element of discourse and that it should be studied in accordance with the classical 
understanding as a stylistic resource.  Treated in this manner, Suddaby and Greenwood 
(2005) argue that “[r]hetoric, and particularly the ‘new rhetoric’ (Freedman and 
Medway, 1994), restricts its focus to explicitly political or interest-laden discourse and 
seeks to identify genres or recurrent patterns of interests, goals, and shared assumptions 
that become embedded in persuasive texts ...” (p. 40).  By acknowledging the 
importance and utility of rhetoric and using it as an instrument of investigation of 
organisational phenomenon, scholars have been able to engage with a broad spectrum of 
research themes.  Hartelius and Browning (2008) call attention to five major themes of 
Rhetorical studies in managerial research.  They are:
 “1. Rhetoric is theoretical and practical;
 2. Rhetoric creates, sustains and challenges organisational orders;
 3. Rhetoric is constructive and constitutive of identity;
 4. Managers are rhetors;
 5. Rhetoric is inextricably linked to both rationality and narrative form”
  (pp. 19-32).
As we continue to examine the connection between rhetoric and legitimacy in the 
following section, it will become clear that this literature ascribes to at least three of 
these five themes: the theoretical and practical implications of rhetoric, the need for 
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rhetorical appeals to shift institutional logics, thus legitimating a new organisational 
order, and the link between rhetoric (and legitimacy) to rationality and narrative.
2.3.2 Exploring rhetorical sources of legitimation
As has been explained in the previous section there are two distinct literatures on 
legitimacy within Organisation Studies.   The first taking the view that legitimacy is 
institutional in nature and originates from an appropriate interface between the 
organisation and its broader context.  The second focuses on the strategic sources of 
legitimacy and ascribes much more importance to agency and the ability of an 
organisation to actively pursue and enhance its legitimacy.  While these are the 
dominant, competing views on legitimacy in the organisation studies literature, there is 
a small and emerging literature that focuses on a third view of legitimacy based on 
linguistic and rhetorical sources of legitimacy.  This literature argues that legitimacy, as 
a social phenomenon, is linked very closely with the use of language and discursive 
practices.  Berger & Luckmann (1966) assert that the act of language is the act of 
legitimation: 
“Incipient legitimation is present as soon as a system of linguistic objectification 
of human experience is transmitted.  For example, the transmission of a kinship 
vocabulary ipso facto legitimates the kinship structure.  The fundamental 
legitimating ‘explanations‘ are so to speak, built into the vocabulary” (p. 112).
This would suggest that a careful examination of discursive practices are central to 
understanding the concept of legitimacy. As such, the study of the role of language as 
central to the legitimation process, in addition to structural and strategic sources, is an 
emerging concern within legitimacy research in the field of organisation studies (see for 
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example: Fine (1996); Zbaracki (1998); Heracleous and Hendry (2000); Emrich et al. 
(2001); Philips and Hardy (2002); Philips, et al. (2004) & Golant and Sillince, (2007)).
2.3.3 A rhetorical focus 
There is a small, but growing, body of literature that examines the ways in which 
rhetoric is used to build legitimacy (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Vaara, et al. 2006; 
Van Leeuwen 2007; Vaara and Tienari 2008; Erkama and Vaara 2010).  Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005) examine the role that rhetoric played in the legitimation of 
significant institutional change in the case of multi-disciplinary professional firms 
(MDP).  This ‘legitimacy contest’ was precipitated by the purchase of a law firm by the 
Canadian division of Ernst & Young.  This acquisition sparked debate as to whether it 
was appropriate to allow the co-mingling of legal and auditing services within a single 
organisation.  The authors employ neo-institutional theory to answer how affected 
actors seek to confer or deny legitimacy to new institutional forms.  They note that new 
institutional forms do not emerge frequently.  Further, they assert that it is only through 
the displacement of the existing institutional logics, with an amended and supporting set 
of logics, that new institutional forms acquire legitimacy and come into existence.  They 
argue that this displacement of logics, is achieved primarily through the use of 
persuasive language or rhetoric (p. 35).  To examine the shift in institutional logics of 
MDPs, they took as their primary data the transcripts of testimony given to the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Commission to Study Multidisciplinary Practice and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Public Hearings on Auditor 
Independence.  
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“Collectively the transcripts and supporting documents provide[d] a 
comprehensive account of the language used to contest the legitimacy of the new 
organizational form. [...]  The data thus capture the arguments used by key actors 
engaged in a legitimacy contest over institutional logics” (Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2005: 42).
The authors analysed their data using a modified version of content analysis, first 
focusing on manifest content and then focusing on the latent content of the data (p. 
43-44).  During the second stage of data analysis the authors categorised argumentation 
according to both classic rhetoric (kairos: sensitivity to time; audience: contextual focus 
of the argument; decorum: shaping the argument to both the moment and the audience.) 
and persuasive appeal (logos: appeal to logic; pathos: appeal to emotions; ethos: appeals 
made on the basis of character.) (p. 44).  From this analysis, five categories of 
classification emerged: historical, value-based, teleological, ontological and 
cosmological.   This work contributes to the understanding of the development of 
cognitive legitimacy by illustrating how rhetoric is used to shape institutional logics 
thus creating momentum for, and eliminating resistance to, institutional change.
Like Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), Vaara, et al (2006) also examine the phenomenon 
of organisational transformation.  Whereas, Suddaby and Greenwood examined the 
legitimation process that allowed the amalgamation of legal and audit services in MDP 
firms, Vaara, et al examine the discursive legitimation of industrial restructuring.  Vaara, 
et al, examined the merger between the Finnish pulp and paper firm Enso with the 
Swedish firm Stora.  Using a CDA method, based on the work of Fairclough (1997; 
2003) and the discourse historical method of Van Leeuwan & Wodak (1999) and Wodak 
and Meyer (2002), the authors examine the media accounts of the merger process 
exclusively (pp. 6-7).  Their research takes the form of a three-stage analysis.  In the 
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first stage they conduct a thematic analysis in order to highlight important issues within 
the case and in the arena of global industrial restructuring more broadly.  (Important 
issues that emerged from their data were: price, ownership, synergy and other benefits, 
staff reductions, cultural differences and division of management positions and 
responsibilities.)  Interestingly, as Vaara, et al. (2006) note, the authors chose to refine 
their dataset at this point by “removing more ‘factual’ news-like pieces of texts from 
[their] material” (p. 11).  The second stage of analysis involved an inter-discursive 
analysis, with attention to discourses employed when addressing the previously 
identified themes.  They were able to identify neoliberal, nationalistic, humanistic and 
entertainment discourses.  Finally, they employed a textual analysis in order to discover 
how particular discourses were employed for either legitimation or de-legitimation 
purposes.   The result was the identification of five main types of legitimation strategies: 
normalisation, authorisation, rationalisation, moralisation and narrativisation.  The most 
important contributions, relevant to legitimating of organisational change, made by 
Vaara, et al. (2006) are two-fold.  First, they contribute to the understanding of 
discursive elements of legitimacy through the creation of their framework of 
legitimation strategies.  While perhaps not revolutionary, in that rationalisation and 
moralisation match the classic rhetorical categories of logos and ethos closely and 
normalisation and authorisation could be comfortably associated with Weberian 
concepts of traditional and legal domination, this framework is a useful synthesis of 
rhetorical and other strategies of legitimation.   Second, as Vaara, et al. (2006) note, this 
research “helps understand the role of the media in the complex production, 
transmission, and consumption processes that create senses of legitimacy/illegitimacy 
around specific organizational phenomenon” (p. 26).
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Erkama and Vaara (2010) are concerned with rhetorical strategies of legitimation as 
well.  Specifically, they focus on the rhetorical legitimation of the closure of the Volvo-
owned, Carrus manufacturing plant in Finland.   Erkama and Vaara (2010) compiled a 
dataset in line with a ‘classical qualitative case study’ in which they examined 
transcripts of interviews, media reports, minutes of meetings, confidential company 
documents as well as official publications, through the use of an ‘abductive’ approach 
that allowed them to refine their theoretical ideas as their analysis progressed.   The aim 
of their research was to provide a “more nuanced understanding of how contemporary 
industrial closures are legitimated and resisted [and] [...] increase the theoretical 
understanding of the role of rhetoric in legitimation more generally” (p. 813).  The 
authors draw on the same classic rhetorical classification system as Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005), that of logos, pathos and ethos, but add the categories of autopoiesis 
and cosmos.  “Autopoiesis deals with narratives of purpose and identity [and] [...] 
cosmos deals with arguments of inevitability” (Erkama and Vaara, 2010: 829-831).  In 
this instance the inevitability was the tide of globalisation.  They assert that this allows a 
better understanding of “the multiple discursive facets in the legitimation of drastic 
organizational restructuring decisions such as industrial shutdowns” (p. 833).  However, 
the authors note the need for future research of “cases in different socio-political and 
cultural contexts to be able to distinguish and compare rhetorical dynamics in more 
nuanced ways” (p. 835).  One such case in a different cultural and socio-political 
context, in which rhetorical strategies were employed to legitimise profound 
institutional change, were the intelligence reform debates of the United States Congress. 
This research project has the potential to make a valuable contribution to the emerging, 
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yet under-developed, rhetorical sources of legitimation scholarship.  As is clear from 
this recent body of literature on the rhetorical sources of legitimacy, scholars have 
formulated their own frameworks to account for the ways in which rhetorical strategies 
are deployed in legitimation processes.  While a general consensus on a universal 
system of categorisation has not been reached, significant overlap in the categories, if 
not the nomenclature, is evident.  As such, this body of literature will be central to 
informing both the theory and the method of this research project.
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature in three important areas of scholarship.  
First, the public inquiry literature was examined, noting both how public inquiries are 
defined within the literature and in what situations they are most needed.  As a primary 
function of most public inquiries is investigatory, sensemaking is a common theme 
within this scholarship and the topic of public inquiry sensemaking was examined.  
Finally in this section, the issue of legitimacy in the context of the public inquiry 
process was considered and in particular the research on the re-legitimation functions of 
the process was surveyed.  
Next, a select history of the understanding of legitimacy in society was considered with 
a focus on elements of consensus theory, conflict theory and Weberian conceptions of 
authority and legitimacy.  As these have informed the understanding and treatment of 
legitimacy in the field of Organisation Studies, it was important to review these salient 
concepts and theories.  Recognising the strategic/institutional divisions within the 
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contemporary scholarship of legitimacy, we relied on an understanding of Suchman 
(1995) and his hybrid model of sources of legitimacy which attempts to move beyond 
this traditional split.  This model is used both within the public inquiry literature and 
within the rhetorical legitimacy scholarship and its review within the context of this 
chapter is helpful to understanding other models and sources of legitimacy.  The next 
section of the review, looked at the concept of legitimacy exclusively within the public 
inquiry literature.  Finally, in this section of the Literature Review, after summarising 
the chapter’s contents, we will review the gaps that present in the current literature and 
lastly make suggestions as to how this research project can make meaningful 
contributions to strengthen the existing literatures.
While the public inquiry literature deals with a number of theoretical issues, in practical 
terms, it focuses on either the inquiry process or the inquiry reports.  While these are 
interesting phenomena, there is a significant omission in the focus of the literature.  
Currently, the literature does not examine the post-reporting phase of the public inquiry 
process.  This appears to be a significant gap in the public inquiry literature.  If public 
inquiries provide an opportunity for cultural readjustment (Turner 1976), or that their 
purpose is to facilitate a re-legitimation process to repair the damaged authority of failed 
institutions (Brown 2000, 2003; Topal 2009), then clearly a cultural readjustment or a 
re-legitimation process would not stop with the publication of the inquiry report.  What 
remains under-examined in this literature is the actual impact of an inquiry’s work on 
institutions and society well in to the post-reporting phase of the public inquiry process.  
Additionally, there has been relatively little attention paid to the re-legitimation process.  
Brown (2003) notes that this process is initiated through the production of an 
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authoritative inquiry report; however, there is scant empirical research that follows these 
reports and their recommendations from publication to implementation.  
As noted above, research on sources of legitimacy, within the Organisation Studies 
literature, adhered to a fundamental split between those who attribute legitimacy to 
institutional factors and those who believe that agency has a role to play in the creation 
of legitimacy and that legitimacy can be strategically pursued.  Following the linguistic 
turn in the social sciences in general, and in Organisation Studies in particular, a small, 
but interesting body of rhetorical legitimacy literature has emerged.  This research space 
is occupied by less than a dozen articles, all conducted within different organisational 
and societal contexts, most adopting differing methods and all producing unique models 
that seek to create a taxonomic model to identify and explain rhetorical sources of 
legitimacy.  As noted by authors in this field, there is a need to explore further rhetorical 
legitimation practices in new and diverse empirical context and in instances of profound 
institutional change.
The 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process provides such a previously unexplored 
opportunity which fits with the existing gaps in the literature.  Within the public inquiry 
literature, not only has the 9/11 public inquiry process not been the subject of research, 
more broadly this literature has yet to examine the post-reporting phase of an inquiry 
process.  From the perspective of the rhetorical legitimation literature, the 
Congressional debates of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations provide an 
opportunity to study rhetoric in the pursuit, or opposition, of significant institutional 
change.  Few settings abound in rhetoric as the floor of a legislative chamber and with 
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the complete transcripts contained and available in the Congressional Record of the 
United States Congress, the rhetorical dataset is readily accessible for analysis.  
Therefore, this research project will focus on the most rhetorically and procedurally 
significant event of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry 
process: the congressional debates of the 9/11 Recommendations Act, H.R.10 and the 
Intelligence Reform Act, S.2845.
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Chapter 3 - Methodology
3.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter concluded that, while the public inquiry literature has made 
significant contributions to the understanding of how organisations and society make 
sense of, and attempt to recover from disaster-events, the post-reporting phase of the 
public inquiry process has received scant attention.  Appropriately, the focus has been 
on how public inquiries attempt to construct a dominant narrative to aid sensemaking, 
organisational change, strengthen damaged institutional legitimacy and apportion 
blame.  However, the subject matter of these studies has tended to focus on the earlier 
phases of this process.  As such, there is little focus within the literature on the post-
reporting phase of the public inquiry process.  The 9/11 Commission provides a 
particularly rich post-reporting phase for examination.  There is a clear and timely link 
between the publication of the Commission’s recommendations and the implementation 
of many of its suggested reforms in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act, 2004.
The Congressional legislative reform debates in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate provide for a sizeable and untapped set of data.  If we are to link the re-
legitimation role of the public inquiry process with theories of legitimacy and 
contemporary Organisation Studies literature on rhetorical sources of legitimacy, as we 
have done in the previous chapter, we can study what has been said about the 
Commission’s recommendations and the argument supporting and opposing such 
reforms.  A substantial dataset can be assembled by focusing on key debates in Congress 
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to discover the rhetorical strategies employed to legitimise and de-legitimise legislative 
actions during the post-reporting phase of this particular public inquiry process.
Section 3.1 of this chapter will provide a brief overview of the research project, 
including the historical contexts and a re-statement of the central research question.  
This will provide background and focus the justification for the selection and 
structuring of the research design.  The chapter will explore relevant philosophical 
considerations which underpin subsequent methodological choices and the suitability of 
the chosen methods to this research project will be explained and justified.  Next we 
will provide an overview of both the selection of data and the method of their 
collection.  Finally, before concluding, the chapter will provide a discussion of the 
procedures for coding and analysing the data.   However, first a brief summary of the 
post-reporting phase of the public inquiry process under examination will follow.  The 
structure of this chapter, and of the research process is presented in an organised and 
linear fashion.  This is done for the sake of clarity and to meet the general expectations 
of a Methodology Chapter in a research project of this kind.  As those familiar with the 
grounded theory approach to methodology will understand, the process of theory 
generation through an iterative process, moving between the dataset and emergent 
conceptual categories is necessarily less tidy and straightforward than presented in the 
following sections.
3.1 An Overview of the Research Project
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This chapter will explain the rationale for the research design decisions that led to a 
grounded theory approach to the investigation of the rhetorical strategies employed in 
the reform debate of the post-reporting period of the 9/11 Commission inquiry process.  
What is a research design?  Yin (1994) provides an instructive definition:
“Colloquially, a research design is an action plan for getting from here to there, 
where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there 
is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions.  Between “here” and 
“there” may be found a number of major steps, including the collection and 
analysis of relevant data” (p. 19).
The ‘major steps’ to which Yin eludes consist of a clear statement of the ontological and 
epistemological foundations of the research project, a justifiable methodological 
approach and the selection of appropriate research methods to be used for the 
‘collection and analysis of the relevant data’.  Each of these elements must be chosen on 
the basis of coherence, appropriateness and utility and when done correctly, together 
they will provide the researcher with a powerful research design able to answer the 
relevant research questions.  This research design engages a large textual dataset drawn 
from the major legislative debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s 
public inquiry process.  Specifically, the data originates from Congressional transcripts 
of the debates of S.2845 and H.R.10.  The goal in assembling and analysing such a 
dataset is to provide the researcher with an understanding of the rhetorical strategies 
employed by those involved to legitimise or de-legitimise the proposed intelligence 
reform legislation.
3.1.1 The historical context
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The commercial jetliner hijackings of American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines 
Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77 and United Airlines Flight 93 set in motion a 
string of events, which together have had an historic impact.  The attacks set in motion a 
series of events that led to the creation of the National Commission on the Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States.  The Commission, as outlined in the preface of its final 
report, was mandated to:
“ [...] investigate facts and circumstances [...] relating to intelligence agencies, law 
enforcement agencies, diplomacy, immigration issues and border control, the flow 
of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional 
oversight and resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the 
Commission” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 
2004b: xv).
Nearly twenty months after its constitution, the Commission published its findings in 
the form of a 567 page volume containing a comprehensive narrative and a series of 
recommendations.
The timeframe of this study is clearly bounded.  It focuses on the post-reporting phase 
of the 9/11 Commission’s inquiry process.  This period begins with the release of the 
Commission’s final report on the 22nd of July 2004 and ends with the Presidential Bill 
signing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 on the 17th of 
December, 2004.  This piece of legislation contained a majority of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations for change.  During this time, the Senate and the 
House of Representatives introduced, debated and passed their respective reform 
legislation.  Congress negotiated a compromise between the House and the Senate Bills, 
debated the compromise and jointly passed the amended legislation to be sent to the 
President for his signature.  For what has been called the largest re-organisation of the 
American intelligence community since the start of the Cold War, a seventy-six day 
 
Page | 63
interval, replete with recesses in the Congressional calendar and in the midst of a 
politically charged Presidential election year, it was a remarkable amount of 
organisational reform in a limited period of time.
The 9/11 Commission was a significant public inquiry and provides fertile ground for 
researching the re-legitimation process after the failure of state institutions.  The post-
reporting phase of this public inquiry is clearly bounded and dominated by the 
legislative processes of the United States Congress.  In exploring the re-legitimation 
process of a public inquiry it is appropriate to explore various sources of legitimacy, 
including those of rhetorical origin.  The transcripts of these reform debates contain 
more than 800,000 words of discursive action and rhetoric and, within these debates, 
legislators employed rhetorical strategies in order to either legitimise or de-legitimise 
the continuation of a process that originate with the 9/11 Commission’s work.  
(Transcripts of these legislative reform debates, the textual dataset for this investigation, 
can be found in the Congressional Record of the United States Congress, Volume 150., 
Nos. 118 to 125, 127 and 138 to 139.  Electronic versions of which can be found online 
at: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/index.html.  These transcripts provide an 
excellent opportunity to explore the under-researched post-reporting phase of the public 
inquiry process, as well as the under-research rhetorical contribution to the larger public 
inquiry re-legitimation process.  As such, this thesis is focused on answering the 
research question: what rhetorical strategies were employed in the legislative reform 
debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process?
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Having reiterated the central research question, the remainder of this chapter will 
provide a thorough explanation of the research design.  This will involve a discussion of 
the philosophical assumptions, both ontological and epistemological, that underpin this 
study, a detailed justification for the selection of a methodological approach, an outline 
of the dataset and an explanation of the coding and analytical procedures employed.
3.2 Philosophical Considerations
While a majority of this chapter will focus on the consideration of a suitable 
methodological approach and the selection and deployment of particular research 
methods, it is appropriate to set first both the ontological and epistemological context 
for this thesis.  The consideration of epistemological issues and the articulation of the 
chosen epistemological orientation underpins and justifies the methodological choices 
taken in this study.  However, before a discussion of the epistemological foundation of 
this study, the underlying ontological perspective and the relationship between ontology 
and epistemology will be considered.
3.2.1 Ontology
A clear statement of ontological beliefs provides an important context to the decisions 
taken in designing a successful research project.  
“To ensure a strong research design, researchers must choose a research paradigm 
that is congruent with their beliefs about the nature of reality. Consciously 
subjecting such beliefs to an ontological interrogation in the first instance will 
illuminate the epistemological and methodological possibilities that are 
available” (Mills, et al. 2006: 26).
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Ontology is the study of the nature of reality.  “[It] refers to our views as to what 
constitutes the social world and how we can go about studying it” (Barbour 2008: 20).  
While there are many perspectives on the nature of reality, in the social sciences, there 
are three broad and dominant categories and they can be imagined as being set along a 
continuum: Representationalism, Relativism and Nominalism.  
Adherents to the Representationalist perspective understand truth to be discoverable 
through the verification of predictions and that facts are concrete, but not directly 
accessible.  The second view is Relativism and it asserts that the truth ‘requires 
consensus between different viewpoints’ and that facts are dependent on the ‘viewpoint 
of the observer’.  The third view is Nominalism and it asserts that ‘truth depends on 
who establishes it’ and facts are all human creations (Easterby-Smith, et al. 2003).  
As an ontological position, the author sympathises most strongly with a hybrid 
ontological view that incorporates elements of both Representationalism and 
Relativism.  This may appear problematic given the need to adopt an epistemological 
view that favours social constructionist, rather than positivist research methodology.  
However, despite their differences these ontological and epistemological choices can be 
reconciled.  This reconciliation “[...] is based on the assumption that social reality is 
independent of us and exists regardless of whether we are aware of it.  Therefore, the 
ontological debate of ‘What is reality?’ can be kept distinct from the epistemological 
question of ‘How do we obtain knowledge of that reality?” (Collis and Hussey 2003: 
52).  Having stated the author’s Representationalist/Relativist hybrid view of Ontology 
–and thus acknowledging potential, pre-existing bias on the nature of reality, facts and 
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truth– the next section will examine briefly the basic epistemological debate and the 
epistemological position employed with this particular research project.
3.2.2 Epistemology
Whereas ontology focuses on our view of the nature of reality, epistemology deals with 
our assumptions of how knowledge of reality is obtained and used.  From a research 
perspective, epistemology is vital as it:
“[...] assumes some vantage point, one step removed from the actual practice of 
science itself.  At first sight this promises to provide some foundation for 
scientific knowledge: a methodological and theoretical beginning located in 
normative standards that enable the evaluation of knowledge by specifying what 
is permissible and hence the discrimination of warranted belief from the 
unwarranted, the rational from the irrational, the scientific from the 
pseudoscience” (Johnson and Duberley 2006: 3).
Epistemological perspectives within management studies can be imagined –in a most 
general sense– along a continuum, which includes the following groupings: Positivism, 
Interpretivism and Constructivism.  These classifications correspond roughly to the 
ontological designations described above; however, these epistemological views are not 
necessarily tied to their respective ontological counterparts: Representationalism, 
Relativism, and Nominalism.  As previously stated, one’s views on the nature of reality 
and one’s views on the nature of knowledge can be independent.
While successfully applied to the Social Sciences, positivism has its roots in the natural 
sciences and favours the quantitative methods of scientific investigation as the only 
legitimate investigative approach.   It is an approach that “[...] has the elements of being 
reductionistic, logical, and [with an] emphasis on empirical data collection, [is] cause-
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and-effect oriented, and deterministic based on a priori theory” (Creswell 2007: 22).  
This epistemological orientation is partial to research methods such as experiments, 
surveys, quantitative data and statistical analysis (Thietart, et al. 2001).  
A positivist epistemological approach to the current study suits neither the author’s 
views nor the preferred treatment of text.  Given the qualitative nature of the dataset, the 
lack of investigator control over past events, and the preference for an inductive, theory-
building research design, a positivist epistemological approach will not be chosen.
The second major epistemological paradigm within management studies is 
Interpretivism.  Unlike the adherence of positivism to the principles of natural scientific 
inquiry, interpretivism sees a fundamental difference between the subjects of study in 
the natural sciences (molecules, plants, animals, etc.) and the subjects of study in the 
social sciences (people, organisations, societies, etc.).  This fundamental difference 
between the natural and social sciences is explained by Laing (1967), as he stresses the 
need to “[...] realise that there is an ontological discontinuity between human beings and 
it—beings [...]  Persons are distinguished from things in that persons experience the 
world, whereas things behave in the world” (p. 53).  The acknowledgment of human 
experience adds a new complexity to the study of the social sciences.  Lee (1991) 
elaborates on the implications of the unique nature of persons when he writes that, “[...] 
the same physical artifact, the same institution, or the same human action, can have 
different meanings for different human subjects, as well as for the observing social 
scientist” (p. 347).  Therefore, facts and meaning have a distinctly subjective nature 
based on a multiplicity of perspectives.  As explained by Thietart, et al. (2001), 
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paraphrasing Guba and Lincoln (1994), “ [...] there is not one sole reality –which would 
be possible to apprehend, however imperfectly– but multiple realities; the product of 
individual or collective mental constructions that are likely to evolve over the course of 
time” (p. 113).
The possibility of evolving multiple meanings of realities and facts provides a unique 
challenge for the researcher who must:
“[...] interpret this empirical reality in terms of what it means to the observed 
people.  In accepting these intersubjectively created meanings as an integral part 
of the subject matter the researcher [...] is studying, [he] must collect facts and 
data describing not only the purely objective, publicly observable aspects of 
human behavior, but also the subjective meaning this behavior has for the human 
subjects themselves” (Lee 1991: 347).
This undertaking requires different methodologies and methodological tools.  Therefore, 
in opposition to the preference for quantitative methodologies and techniques in a 
positivist approach, qualitative methods of inquiry tend to populate the interpretivism 
epistemological approach.  Interpretivism is relevant with respect to this project in that 
it recognises that both observable objects and phenomena, such as social interaction, 
power relationships and social institutions, are real and can be studied given an 
appropriate methodological approach. 
Finally, at the other end of the epistemic spectrum is the social constructivist paradigm.  
While positivism recognises an external and true reality and interpretivism asserts a 
multiplicity of realities based on different observers, constructivism advocates that there 
is, in fact, no independent reality and that all facts and notions of reality are human 
constructions.  Easterby-Smith, et al. (2003) outline the primary assignment of a 
researcher within the constructivist epistemological paradigm:
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 “In starting from a viewpoint which does not assume any pre-existing reality, the 
 aims of the researcher are to understand how people invent structures to help 
 them make sense of what is going on around them.  Consequently, much 
 attention is given to the use of language and conversations between people as 
 they create their own meaning” (p. 34).
It should be noted that in addition to the view that reality and facts are human 
constructions, they are also in a constant state of revision and reinvention as a result of 
ongoing social interactions (Bryman and Bell 2007).  While the constructivist attention 
to social phenomena is encouraging, the fact that it assumes absolutely no objective 
reality is perhaps epistemologically extreme.  This research project is an examination of 
real events with very real implications.  There is a practical, public-policy orientation to 
this work and while it will necessarily deal with many socially constructed phenomena, 
to embrace the more radical elements of a relativist/constructivist approach is not 
desirable.  
The three paradigms (positivism, interpretivism, social constructionism), described 
above, represent rigid embodiments of epistemological orientations; however, in 
practice researchers often hold less dogmatic views.  As such the boundaries amongst 
the paradigms can be crossed in instances when it is both practically useful and 
logically coherent to do so.  Tsoukas (2000) makes a strong argument for bridging these 
paradigms in order to access the truth.  To this end,  he suggests that:
“Realists [positivists] are right in saying that there is a social world outside our 
heads.  Constructivists are right in claiming that the social world is constituted by 
language-based distinctions which are socially defined and established.  Both 
sides can be reconciled if it is accepted that social reality is causally independent 
of actors (hence realist have a point) and, at the same time, what social reality is 
depends on how it has been historically defined, the cultural meanings and 
distinctions which have made it this reality as opposed to that reality (hence the 
constructivists also have a point)” (p. 531).
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Tsoukas’ attempt to bridge elements of differing epistemological paradigms is helpful in 
accommodating both the researcher’s ontological leanings and the epistemological 
needs of this research project.  This compromise between two otherwise rigid and 
oppositional paradigms leads to, a viewpoint known as Critical Realism.
Critical Realism retains ontological elements of positivism, hence the term realism, 
while acknowledging that study within the social sciences can benefit from a more 
Interpretivist/Constructivist epistemological approach thus providing a broader range of 
methodological tools than would otherwise be available to a strict Positivist.  As 
Easterby-Smith, et al. (2003) explain:
“[c]ritical realism makes a conscious compromise between the extreme positions: 
it recognizes social conditions (such as class or wealth) as having real 
consequences whether or not they are observed and labelled by social scientists; 
but it also recognizes that concepts are human constructions” (pp. 32-33).
The foci of this study are key rhetorical strategies employed during the legislative 
reform debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission inquiry.  These 
rhetorical acts, and the texts in which they are recorded, are socially constructed 
artefacts.  An examination of these artefacts leads to a discussion of social constructs 
such as sensemaking, hegemonic narrative, legitimacy and authority, none of which can 
exist outside the boundaries of the social world.  As such, Critical Realism’s 
acknowledgement that social constructions have a consequential impact on the material 
world is epistemologically relevant to this research project.  Simply because these social 
constructs do not have physical characteristics that can be easily measured or quantified 
through a positivistic approach does not mean that they do not exist.  In the same way, 
that our inability to observe some natural scientific phenomena does not diminish the 
reality of their existence (Miles and Huberman 1994).  Having outlined the 
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philosophical foundations of this research project and reconciled these ontological and 
epistemological influences, the next section of this chapter will concentrate on the 
selection and justification of a methodologically grounded theory approach.
3.3 Methodological Approach: Grounded Theory
The previous discussion of philosophical assumptions in Section 3.2 is not undertaken 
in isolation; rather, it has an important role in the selection of an appropriate research 
methodology and, in turn, is influenced by the needs and the nature of the research 
project.  Therefore, the previous rejection of a positivist epistemology and the embrace 
of a more phenomenological epistemic approach, encompassing both Interpretivist and 
Constructionist views, have informed the following choice of research methodology.
The selection of an appropriate methodological approach is vital to the success of any 
research project.  There are three primary considerations that must be explored prior to 
choosing an effective and well-suited methodology.  These considerations focus on: 
ensuring that the chosen methods are compatible with the epistemological beliefs of the 
researcher and the epistemological grounding of the research project, that the chosen 
methods are compatible with the dataset to be analysed, and that the methods engage the 
data in the most appropriate manner for accomplishing the aims of the research and for 
answering the research question.  The purpose of this section is to introduce the chosen 
methodological approach and explain why this decision is a justifiably appropriate 
match with the epistemological grounding, the data and the research question.  First, 
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however, an introduction to grounded theory, the chosen methodological approach, is 
needed. 
3.3.1 Introduction to grounded theory
Grounded theory is an initially inductive qualitative research method used by 
researchers to develop theory from data of particular social phenomena (Martin and 
Turner 1986).  Researchers engage in an iterative process that moves back and forth 
between data and the emergent theory.  Corbin and Strauss (1998) define theory as “ [...] 
a set of well-developed categories (e.g., themes, concepts) that are systematically 
interrelated through statements of relationship to form a theoretical framework that 
explains some relevant social [...] phenomenon” (p. 22).  This theory is generated from 
the data rather than being applied in an a priori fashion (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
Grounded theory was formally introduced by sociologists Glaser and Strauss (1967), as 
a response to an academic context that was dominated by positivistic, quantitative 
approaches to research.  Grounded theory was an attempt to provide a methodology 
which was better equipped to understand the individuals and phenomena under 
examination (Creswell 2007; Babchuk 2009).  The grounded theory approach contrasted 
“with the logico-deductive approach, by arguing that, in principle, theory testing 
through hypothesis setting alone ignored the whole process of theory generation, and 
that variable-focused analysis was truly insensitive to the real-life problems” (Eriksson 
and Kovalainen 2008: 155).  In summary, the aim of grounded research was to ”[...] 
construct theories in order to understand phenomena. A good grounded theory is one 
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that is: (1) inductively derived from data, (2) subjected to theoretical elaboration, and 
(3) judged adequate to its domain with respect to a number of evaluative criteria” (Haig 
1995: 1-2).  With the publication of The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967), and 
through their subsequent collaborations, Glaser and Strauss were able to generate a 
considerable following in qualitative research circles.
3.3.2 Development of grounded theory
Despite their landmark collaboration, Glaser and Strauss eventually developed 
divergent views of grounded theory.  While Glaser (1978; 1992; 1998; 1999) is 
considered to have kept more closely to the classic approach to grounded theory (Heath 
and Cowley 2004), Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1994; 1998) evolved their approach to 
grounded theory creating a number of differences between Glaser and Strauss.  These 
differences include, but are not limited to: an acceptance of the role of a researcher's 
prior knowledge of self and the literature (Strauss), limited pursuit of the literature until 
after theory has emerged (Glaser), embrace of a more rigorous coding framework 
(Strauss), concern that such a framework threatens the emergence of theory (Glaser), an 
increased focus on deduction (Strauss), maintaining the preeminence of induction 
(Glaser).  (A complete assessment of the divergence of the Glaserian and Straussian 
approaches to grounded theory can be found in Heath and Cowley (2004)).  
An important point of divergence was Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) development of a 
rigorous set of procedures for researchers to follow.  Their approach has been criticised 
as being overly prescriptive (Glaser 1992; Creswell 2007).  In particular, Glaser (1992) 
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was critical of what he considered Strauss’ overly-structured approach to grounded 
theory which he thought would force “data and analysis into preconceived categories 
and, thus, contradict fundamental tenets of grounded theory” (Charmaz 2006: 8).  
However, Strauss and Corbin (1998) have since clarified that their intention was never 
to impose a rigid procedure that would interfere with the emergence of theory from the 
data (Heath and Cowley 2004).  It would suggest that, despite the development of a 
more specific coding rubric, Strauss remained supportive of the principle of flexibility.    
Therefore Strauss and Corbin’s approach, while more prescriptive, is not intended to be 
so driven by procedure that it jeopardises the emergence of theory grounded in the data, 
as intended by the classic grounded theory approach.  The procedural differences 
between Strauss and Corbin and Glaser are outlined in Table 3.0 below.
TABLE 3.0 - Data analysis: Glaser and Strauss compared
Strauss and Corbin Glaser
Initial coding Open coding
   Use of analytic technique
Substantive coding
   Data dependent
Intermediate 
phase
Axial coding
   Reduction and clustering of 
categories  
   (paradigm model)
Continuous with previous phase
   Comparisons, with focus on data, 
become 
   more abstract, categories refitted,   
   emerging frameworks
Final 
development
Selective coding
   Detailed development of categories, 
   selection of core, integration of 
categories
Theoretical
   Refitting and refinement of 
categories 
   which integrate around emerging 
core
Theory Detailed and dense process fully 
described Parsimony, scope and modifiability
Source: (Heath and Cowley 2004: 146)
The more structured approach of Strauss and Corbin can be seen above in Table 3.0, as 
their method calls for three discrete phases of coding: open, axial and selective.  
Whereas, Glaser provides a more flexible approach with less distinction between the 
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stages of coding and analysis.  This divergence of approach between Glaser and Strauss, 
was foreseeable.  As Charmaz (2006) notes, each researcher made unique contributions 
to their collaborative efforts.
“Glaser imbued grounded theory with dispassionate empiricism, rigorous codified 
methods, emphasis on emergent discoveries, and its somewhat ambiguous 
specialized language that echoes quantitative methods. [...] Strauss brought 
notions of human agency, emergent processes, social and subjective meanings, 
problem-solving practices, and the open-ended study of action to grounded 
theory” (p. 7).
While the division of Glaser and Strauss was the most significant development during 
the initial evolution of grounded theory, there have been subsequent attempts to 
reinterpret and reorient this methodological approach.  More recently, some researchers 
have attempted to direct grounded theory in a more phenomenological direction (see: 
Brant 2003; Charmaz 2005, 2006; Clarke 2005).  Charmaz (2005, 2006), one of the 
most prominent advocates for this approach, has developed what is referred to as a 
‘constructivist grounded theory’.  
“Constructivist grounded theory, according to Charmaz (2006), lies squarely 
within the interpretive approach to qualitative research with flexible guidelines, a 
focus on theory developed that depends on the researcher’s view, learning about 
the experience within embedded, hidden networks, situations, and relationships, 
and making hierarchies of power, communication and opportunity” (Creswell 
2007: 65).   
While there has been attempts to move grounded theory in a more phenomenological 
direction, others have sought to direct it on a more positivist course (see: Haig 1995).
3.3.3 Chosen grounded theory approach
The grounded theory approach of Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1994; 1998) has been 
chosen for this thesis.  This more prescriptive approach to coding is appropriate given 
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the circumstances of this research project.  First, given the volume of textual data under 
examination the structured approach of Strauss and Corbin will assist in managing the 
data in a more systematic manner (Heath and Cowley 2004; Creswell 2007).  Second, 
the more structured and prescriptive approach of Strauss and Corbin is preferred, given 
that the approaches of Glaser (1978; 1992; 1998; 1999) and Charmaz (2005; 2006) are 
less structured and therefore better suited to researchers with prior experience with 
grounded theory (Heath and Cowley 2004; Creswell 2007).  For these two reasons, this 
study will employ a Straussian grounded theory approach.   With the particular 
approach selected, the following section will establish the further justification of this 
methodological choice, by outlining how a grounded theory approach fits with the 
epistemological orientation, the data and the central research question.
3.3.4 Epistemological fit
While grounded theory’s introduction by Glaser and Strauss (1967), as discussed above, 
was an attempt to bolster qualitative research at a time when positivist, quantitative 
methodologies were dominant, the epistemological underpinnings of grounded theory 
contain elements of objectivism (Guba and Lincoln 1994).  Glaser (1978, 1992) 
remained closest to positivist epistemology, with “assumptions of an objective, external 
reality, a neutral observer who discovers data, reductionist inquiry of manageable 
research problems, and objectivist rendering of data” (Charmaz, in Denzin and Lincoln 
(eds.) 1998: 248).  Similarly, Corbin and Strauss’ (1990, 1998) position “assumes and 
objective external reality, aims toward unbiased data collection, proposes a set of 
technical procedures, and espouses verification” (Ibid.: 248).  As discussed above, in 
 
Page | 77
Section 3.2, this research project’s epistemological underpinnings are of a critical realist 
nature.  Therefore a qualitative methodological approach, informed by grounded theory, 
is epistemologically consistent and appropriate given the nature of this study. 
3.3.5 Appropriate for the data
Having outlined the epistemological appropriateness of a grounded theory approach to 
this research project, the focus turns to the justification based on the suitability of 
grounded theory to the nature of the data at the core of this study.  The textual dataset 
for this research project is significant, with over 800,000 words of Congressional debate 
contained in verbatim transcripts.  As Strauss and Corbin (1998) note, “One of the 
advantages of grounded theory is that it provides researchers with analytic tools for 
handling masses of raw data” (p. 13).  The prescriptive coding framework of a 
Straussian grounded theory approach allows for the initial disaggregation of large texts 
into emerging and comprehensible categories (open coding), the identification of 
relationships between these categories (axial coding) and the eventual integration of 
these categories to produce a model or theory (selective coding) (Saunders, et al. 2003).  
As such, a grounded theory approach is appropriate given the volume of the textual 
dataset under examination.
3.3.6 Appropriate for answering the research question
Within the academic literature there has been little attention paid to the process of re-
legitimation during the post-reporting phase of a public inquiry process.  The legitimacy 
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of governments, institutions, agencies and organisations that fail to prevent, or provide 
an inadequate response to, a crisis-event is damaged as their failures become evident.  
As the public inquiry literature suggests, one role of a public inquiry is to regain public 
trust and repair damage done to legitimacy.  A recent development in the legitimacy 
literature in the area of organisation studies is a focus on the rhetorical sources of 
legitimacy.  It can be argued that both literatures (public inquiries and rhetorical sources 
of legitimacy) are under-explored.  Certainly, in the context of the post-reporting phase 
of the 9/11 Commission inquiry, no conceptual models or theories have been developed 
to explore the rhetorical strategies employed during this phase of the re-legitimation 
process.  Creswell (2007) explains the appeal of a grounded theory approach in 
situations were there are no off-the-shelf theories or models available:
“Grounded theory is a good design to use when a theory is not available to explain 
a process.  The literature may have models available, but they were developed and 
tested on samples and populations other than those of interest to the qualitative 
researcher.  Also, theories may be present, but they are incomplete because they 
do not address potentially valuable variables of interest to the researcher” (p. 66).
While a number of academics have examined the re-legitimation role of public inquiries 
(see, for example: Gephart (1992); Brown (2000); Topal (2009)), their research has been 
focused either on the public inquiry process or the public inquiry reports which were 
produced by these inquiries.  There is no academic work that explores the post-reporting 
phase of the inquiry process and therefore no available models to apply to this particular 
research project in an a priori manner.  
In addition to a lack of empirical research on the post-reporting phase of a public 
inquiry process, the literature which examines the rhetorical sources of legitimacy in 
instances of significant organisational change focus on very different practical contexts 
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(e.g.: Multi-disciplinary professional firms or corporate mergers).  While potentially 
related and informative, these conceptual models were not constructed with the 
legislative change process, during the post-reporting phase of an enormously significant 
public inquiry process in mind.   As such, it is appropriate to leverage the iterative, 
process of grounded theory to explore this extensive and rich dataset with the aim of 
constructing a relevant conceptual model of rhetorical strategies in the context of the 
post-reporting phase of a public inquiry process. 
This section defined and explored the development and use of a grounded theory 
approach to qualitative research.  It outlined the justifications of this methodological 
choice by explaining how grounded theory is epistemologically consistent with the 
views of the researcher and the philosophical underpinnings of this research project and 
that grounded theory has a number of practical benefits given the nature of this research 
project’s data and central research question.  The following sections of this chapter will 
address the questions of ‘what’ and ‘how’:  What data are to be examined?; and How 
was this analysis of the data conducted? 
3.4 Data Source and Collection
The primary data for this research project focuses on key texts that record the rhetorical 
reform debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s inquiry process.  
This includes the official transcripts of the legislative debate of both Houses of 
Congress.  This source of data will be explained and quantified below.
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3.4.1 Source of data
Congressional efforts to act on the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, legislating the 
largest reorganisation of  America’s intelligence community since the start of the Cold 
War, is contained in the official record of the debate and proceedings of the United 
States House of Representatives and United States Senate.  This official source is 
referred to as the Congressional Record.  These transcripts provide a verbatim record of 
the legislators’ rhetorical strategies both in support and in opposition to the legislative 
embodiment of the Commission’s recommendations.  This includes debates in the 
Senate of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (S.2845) and the House of 
Representatives debates of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act (H.R.10).  
The breakdown of the legislative debate schedule for these two pieces of legislation, 
and the respective debate transcript lengths are outlined in Table 3.1 below.
TABLE 3.1 - Schedule of Congressional Debates: H.R.10 & S.2845
Legislative Activity Date (2004) Transcript 
Length(words)
US Senate
   Introduction: S.2845 23 September ---
   Day 1: Senate Debate on S.2845 27 September 32,286
   Day 2: Senate Debate on S.2845 28 September 38,576
   Day 3: Senate Debate on S.2845 29 September 59,833
   Day 4: Senate Debate on S.2845 30 September 70,559
   Day 5: Senate Debate on S.2845 1 October 79,523
   Day 6: Senate Debate on S.2845 4 October 91,010
   Day 7: Senate Debate on S.2845 5 October 44,571
 
Page | 81
Legislative Activity Date (2004) Transcript 
Length(words)
US Senate
   Day 8: Senate Debate on S.2845 6 October 60,801
   Day 9: Senate Debate on S.2845.  
   Senate passes amended S.2845 8 December 99,128
US House of Representatives
   Day 1: House Debate: H.R.10 6 October 182,198
   Day 2: House Debate on S.2845.  
   House passes amended S.2845 7 December 52,137
   Total Congressional Debate                                                   810,622
There are two elements of the information contained in Table 3.1 that require 
explanation.  First there is a dramatic difference in the amount of debate on the 
respective bills between the House of Representatives and the Senate.  This is due to the 
way each chamber conducts business and the different rules and procedures that 
regulate debate, as will be discussed in the following chapter. The second is the time 
between the second last and last days of debate in both Houses.  At the end of Day 8 of 
Senate Debate, S.2845 and at the end of Day 1 of the House Debate, H.R.10 there is a 
considerable time gap.  During this time a conference committee met to negotiate a 
compromise between S.2845 and H.R.10, as the bills contained significant differences.  
The conference committee process is explained in greater detail in the next chapter as 
well.
These debates represent a lengthy series of rhetorical actions on behalf of legislators 
either supporting or opposing the changes recommended by the Commission.  These 
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rhetorical acts are captured in text in the form of verbatim transcripts.  These transcripts 
are freely accessible by the public and the lawmakers are aware that their comments are 
public and can be scrutinised.  Filler (2001) identifies three functions of legislative 
debate.  First the rhetoric employed during a debate can act to persuade other legislators 
to take or change a position on the particular item of legislation.  Second, the debate can 
persuade a legislator not to change his opinion on the issue, but rather that voting in a 
particular manner would be politically advantageous.  In this instance the debate can 
reflect public opinion or shape public opinion in such a way as to indirectly influence 
the votes of other representatives.  Filler (2001) notes that “[i]n Congress particularly, 
where legislative debates are nationally televised, legislative rhetoric is particularly 
capable of capturing public attention and captivating voter interest” (p. 324).  Finally, 
these debates are educational opportunities for the media and the public, as legislators 
are expected to understand and articulate the details of the particular public policy 
option under discussion.  As such, the speeches of legislators are rhetorical in nature, in 
that their intent is persuasion.  Legislators engage in these rhetorical acts to persuade 
others that their view of the issue is legitimate and it is these rhetorical sources of 
legitimacy that are of particular interest to this research project.
3.4.2 Characteristics of the data
The body of textual data derived from the transcripts of the Senate debate on S.2845 
was different from the body of textual data derived from the transcripts of the House 
debate in two important ways.  First, the debate in the Senate was significantly longer 
than the debate in the House.  As outlined in TABLE 3.2  above, the Senate debate 
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generated approximately 576,287 words of transcription; whereas, the House debate 
generated only 234,335 words.  Second, the number of opponents to the legislation in 
the Senate was quite small.  This is reflected in both the first Senate vote on S.2845 in 
which only two Senators (Byrd, Hollings) voted against the legislation as well as the 
second vote of the Conference Report S.2845 in which again only two Senators (Byrd, 
Inhofe) voted against the compromise legislation.  With such a small number of 
opponents, the researcher sought out Senators who resisted the legislation initially, 
analysing their rhetorical strategies for de-legitimating the reform-agenda, if only 
temporarily.  In the House of Representatives, Speaker of the House, Representative 
Dennis Hastert was the sponsor of the Bill and there was a total of twenty-six co-
Sponsors.    Numerically, there was considerably greater opposition in the House than in 
the Senate.  The final votes on HR.10 and S.2845 were 282 ‘For’-134 ‘Against’-17 ‘Not 
voting’ and 336 ‘For’-75‘Against’-22 ‘Not voting’ respectively.  This section of the 
chapter has detailed the source and scope of the dataset.  Next, Section 3.5 details the 
coding and analysis of this dataset.
3.5  Data Coding and Analysis
In the previous section the source and scope of the textual dataset was quantified.  The 
transcripts were downloaded from the Federation of American Scientist’s Intelligence 
Resource Program website.  The Federation of American Scientist is an independent, 
nonpartisan think tank and registered 501(c)(3) non-profit membership organization. 
This website was chosen for it’s clear and chronological organisation of full 
Congressional Record transcripts of Congressional debates relating to issues of national 
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security and intelligence activities.  The resources are made available in a commonly 
compatible, and unprotected, html format.  This allows for the straightforward, 
wholesale copying and pasting of text into a wide variety of documents or programs.  
(The 2004 archive of this online database can be accessed at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/index.html) 
Given the considerable size of the dataset, it was decided that the use of computer 
software would be helpful in facilitating its management.  NVIVO 8, a textual analysis 
software programme was selected for its ability to assist with the organisation and 
analysis of large amounts of textual information.  However, the utility of this software 
programme, did not reduce the need for the researcher to read and analyse the data.  
Emersion in the data is important whether it is on the page or on the screen.  Likewise, 
all coding and analysis closely followed the prescriptions of a grounded theory 
approach and all of the coding was done manually on a computer (i.e. coding and 
analysis were not automated).  While NVIVO 8 was an immensely helpful tool, it did 
not create a separation between the researcher and the data.
Setting up the software
Like many computer programmes, the capabilities of the software far outstripped the 
needs of the researcher.  As such, only the most basic functions of organisation and 
analysis within NVIVO were necessary for this research project.  Data was copied and 
pasted from the FAS Intelligence Resource Programme website into folders in NVIVO 
according to ‘Date’ and by ‘House of Congress’.  For example, top level folders were 
created in NVIVO: ‘Senate’ and ‘House’.  Then in each folder a file was created for 
each day of debate.  As such the ‘House’ folder contained two documents: ‘Oct 8’ and 
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‘Dec 7’.   In the ‘Senate’ folder a documented was created for  each of the nine days of 
debate and these documents were labeled in the above manner according to date.  The 
transcripts from the FAS website were copied and pasted into their respective 
documents.  With this basic procedure, the entire 810,622 words of the Congressional 
intelligence reform debates were available for organisation and manipulation within 
NVIVO.  At this point, the researcher began the process of understanding the landscape 
of these debates.
3.5.1 The pre-coding phase: Organising the data
Identifying the discursive actors
As the researcher read the transcripts, passages would be tagged with a case identifier 
that attributed the text to the speaker.  For example, any discursive action by Senator 
Collins, the sponsor of the Senate legislation (S.2845), was coded according to the 
specific case identifier of ‘Collins’.  The entire transcripts were coded in this manner, 
according to speaker, and NVIVO then allows the researcher to view the text according 
to speaker.  By selecting a given legislator, one had access to an entire transcript of 
every contribution they made to the debates in question. In this way it was possible to 
identify and track the most prolific speakers, to identify those who had proposed key 
amendments, or those who were reluctant to support these legislative reforms.  
Regardless, for any given individual one was able to read their comments in their 
entirety and understand how their position developed over the course of the debate and 
identify any rhetorical strategies which they employed.  This initial sorting and labeling 
exercise not only organised the data according to source, it allowed for the identification 
 
Page | 86
of actors’ positions on particular issues and provided the researcher with an 
understanding of the general structure and dynamics of the rhetorical activity 
underpinning the reform debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s 
inquiry process.  While this organisation and coding of the data could have been done 
without computer assistance, it was significantly faster and the ability to save copies of 
queries (e.g.: everything that Senator McCain said during Senate debate on October 6) 
was extremely valuable. 
Identifying the source’s position with regard to the debate:
The House of Representative’s debates on H.R.10 and S.2845, were analysed to identify 
each speaker’s position on the legislation containing the Commission’s 
recommendations.  The goal was to identify if the speaker was in favour or opposed to 
the respective legislation.  Three coding categories emerged from this analysis: ‘Pro’, 
‘Con’, and ‘Pro with reservations’.  In some instances it was clear that a particular 
legislator expressed strong support for the legislation.  For example, Representative 
Dennis Hastert introduced H.R.10.  As such, it would be appropriate to assume that, as 
Sponsor of the legislation, he would strongly support the Bill and that his statements 
during the debate would reflect this bias and that analysis would support the 
categorisation of this particular actor as ‘Pro’ throughout the coding process. Other 
legislators, were less supportive of the legislation and their statements during the 
debates reflected a bias against the legislation and, as such, their comments were coded 
as ‘Con’.  As the number of speakers that were coded in this manner grew, a picture 
began to emerge as to the strength of different positions that were adopted within the 
debate.
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It was clear from this analysis that there were legislators who were broadly supportive 
of the Commission’s recommendations, but they expressed concern with the way in 
which the legislation was written.  Some of these speakers offered amendments of their 
own that sought to address particular aspects of the legislation or they supported such 
amendments from others.  While these individuals expressed reservations about the 
legislation in its current form, they were clear that, if these perceived weaknesses could 
be corrected, they would be in support of the legislation.  From an analytical 
perspective, it was valuable to understand their reservations to the proposed legislation, 
but it would not be correct to interpret their resistance as complete opposition to either 
the process or the legislation.  As such, a purely binary coding choice of ‘Pro’ or ‘Con’ 
would not properly capture these individuals and therefore they were identified and 
sorted into an additional category during the coding process.  This third category was 
named ‘Pro with reservations’.  While this sorting exercise involved the application of a 
priori categories, it was not intended as part of the open coding process.  Rather it was 
intended as a pre-coding exercise that provided an opportunity for the researcher to 
engage in a close reading of the text and to structure the data in such a way as to 
facilitate the subsequent open, axial and selective coding phases of the chosen grounded 
theory approach. With the text having been sorted by both speaker and predisposition 
towards the dominant narrative for change, the process of open coding could begin.
3.5.2 The coding process
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Strauss and Corbin (1998) identify five objectives to their grounded theory coding 
procedures.  They are:
“1. Build rather than test a theory;
2. Provide researchers with analytic tools for handling masses of raw data;
3. Help analysts to consider alternative meanings of phenomena;
4. Be systematic and creative simultaneously;
5. Identify, develop, and relate concepts that are the building blocks of theory” 
(p. 13).
More generally, “[c]oding is the central method in the transformation of the data to a 
theory.  Coding is defined as the analytic process through which data are fractured, 
conceptualised, and integrated to form theory” (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 3).  The 
fracturing of the data, during the first phase of coding is called ‘open coding’.  As these 
groupings are formed, the researcher observes relationships amongst these categories 
and makes relevant connections amongst them.   This second phase of coding is called 
‘axial coding’.  Finally, the process of ‘selective coding’ focuses on the identification of 
a core concept around which the single narrative storyline can develop.  It should be 
noted, however, that although these phases of coding appear to form a linear process in 
the above description, they in fact occur in more of a concurrent manner than a 
consecutive way (Goede and Villers 2003).
Once the data was pre-coded for attribution and to identify the speakers’ orientation 
towards the reform legislation, a line-by-line disaggregation of the data was started.  
Broadly, the goal was to understand what was being said, what rhetorical strategies were 
being employed, and through the open coding process thematic categories began to 
emerge.  As new themes were identified new categories were created; however, a 
conscientious effort was made to allow categories to emerge naturally from the text.  At 
the end of a coding session, the categories would be reviewed.  Categories were 
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exported in spreadsheet format and were manipulated and hierarchies were arranged and 
re-arranged to facilitate the visualisation of the emerging themes.  Guided by Strauss 
and Corbin (1998), memos and diagrams were employed to facilitate the coding 
process.  Table 3.2 contains an example of the categorising and coding process as 
explained thus far:
TABLE 3.2 - Example of categorisation and open coding
Original 
Text 
Excerpt
“Today, we continue debate on a bill to overhaul the intelligence community of 
the United States Government. [...] But nothing less than the security of the 
United States of America is at stake.  We have determined enemies who will use 
any means available to take the lives of as many Americans as possible. They 
cheered when the Twin Towers fell. They dream of even larger calamities.  They 
must be stopped. And that requires an intelligence system that finds them, before 
they harm us.”
Position Position on Commission’s work: Pro
Emerging 
Theme How problematized: Need to reform to protect
In the example above, the speaker emphasises the scope of the threat faced by the 
United States and suggests that it is an effective intelligence system that is required to 
protect from harm.  This analysis was done repeatedly to identify any new categories as 
they emerged from the data.  Working with NVIVO, passages from the legislative 
transcripts were coded with a descriptive category identifiers.  In the initial stages of the 
open coding process, no limitations were placed on the creation of new category codes.  
Some examples of these thematic codes, as seen in Appendix F, were: anti-bureaucratic, 
need to protect, endorsement based on hard work/expertise, need to modernise, need for 
accountability, unprecedented/historic.  Despite the volume of initial coding categories 
during the open coding phase of the grounded theory analysis, NVIVO allowed a 
significant number of options of how the researcher could view the data.  Figure 3.0 
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shows a snapshot of the rhetorical themes identified in the congressional speeches of 
Senator Robert Byrd part way through the open coding process.  The themes are listed 
in column one and the number of times a passage of his congressional speeches was 
coded with a particular category.  While this is simply a snapshot taken during the open 
coding process, it seem clear that Senator Byrd is concerned with the rushed pace of the 
legislative process.    
FIGURE 3.0 - Results of an NVIVO Query (Byrd + Rhetorical themes)
A : Byrd
27 : Rushed 47
2 : Abuse of power 29
3 : Accountability 12
8 : Commission 12
12 : Expertise 11
5 : Bipartisanship 7
20 : Power 7
26 : Right past failures 6
1 : 9.11 Families 5
4 : Anti Bureaucratic 5
32 : To protect 5
15 : Historic 4
7 : Civil liberties 3
13 : Flawed recommendations 3
6 : Change for the sake of change 2
9 : Concerned about reform 2
22 : Quotes Posner 2
23 : Real Threat 2
30 : System is broken 2
33 : Too focused on 9.11 2
11 : Example of Nonrelated policy debate 1
14 : Hard work 1
17 : NYT Reference 1
36 : Weakness 1
37 : WSJ reference 1
10 : Enemy 0
16 : Miller on Kerry 0
18 : Opponent support in the end 0
19 : Position on the Commission's work 0
21 : Pro military 0
24 : Reid on Kerry 0
25 : Resolution of the Wyden Ammendment 0
28 : Specter Amendment 0
29 : Strawman 0
31 : Thank you 0
34 : Urgent 0
35 : Warn-Coll-Lieb 0
This provides an example of the utility of NVIVO as a tool of organisation and analysis. 
This query would have taken seconds to execute and it very quickly gives the researcher 
an overview of a) the rhetorical themes employed; b) the reliance on, or avoidance of, 
particular rhetorical themes; c) some impression of the degree to which the speaker 
participates in the debate.  This, of course, would be a relative measure and would only 
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be evident once the researcher had the opportunity to execute a similar query for other 
legislators.
Once it was clear that certain initial categories were similar in nature some were merged 
during axial coding.  As noted earlier, grounded theory analysis is abductive rather than 
linear.  The researcher moved between the data and the emerging thematic groupings.  
The researcher also moved between open and axial coding, coding new sections of text, 
then merging and ordering categories before returning to the text and building the 
amended categories.  The goal of the axial coding was the identification of a few key 
themes.  As these thematic categories became apparent the open coding process 
continued and the researcher look for both confirmation of, and possible exceptions to, 
these themes.
As the continued analysis of the data persisted in confirming the key categories of the 
axial coding phase, the researcher moved the the selective coding stage.  During 
selective coding, core categories from the axial coding, with strong explanatory power, 
were used as the core to construct the story of what rhetorical strategies of legitimation 
were being employed, as reflected in the data.  As will be presented and explored in the 
findings chapter, the data revealed that supporters of the reform legislation were 
employing key rhetorical strategies to legitimise the overall legislative narrative and a 
distinct, but complimentary, set of rhetorical strategies to legitimise the legislative 
content.  At the same time, opponents of the legislation employed particular rhetorical 
strategies to de-legitimise the legislative process.
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3.6 Chapter Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to establish and justify a research design suitable to 
answering the central research question of: what rhetorical strategies were employed in 
the legislative reform debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s 
public inquiry process?  The chapter began with an introduction and overview of the 
research project, including a description of the historical context of this study.  A 
discussion of the primary philosophical considerations was outlined, comparing and 
contrasting competing ontological and epistemological views.  Based on this discussion, 
as well as the preferences of the author and the demands of the research project, a 
determination was made on both the ontological and epistemological orientations of this 
thesis.  Once these had been established, a grounded theory approach was selected as an 
appropriate methodological fit for the philosophical and practical needs of this project.  
An overview of grounded theory, including a description, its history and its variants was 
provided.  The justification for selecting grounded theory was based on its fit with the 
choice of epistemology and a large textual dataset of Congressional debate transcripts.  
As well, it was deemed to be a suitable method for answering the research question of 
this thesis.  With the philosophical and methodological decisions made, attention was 
given to the question of data.  The type, source and method of collection of data was 
outlined in the following section of the chapter.  Once the dataset was established, focus 
was directed to what would be done with the data: the method of analysis.  The specifics 
of a grounded theory approach were described, including open, axial and selective 
coding.  The final section, provided a summary of the entire research design discussion, 
before supplying a preview of the context chapter.
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The following chapter provides a discussion of the contextual backdrop of this research 
project.  Divided into three phases: phase one will provide a brief overview of the 
September 11th attacks and their immediate aftermath, phase two will outline the key 
milestones in the creation of the 9/11 Commission and its public inquiry process.  The 
third phase details the post-reporting phase of the inquiry process, including an in depth 
account of the legislative reform process, the debates of which are at the focal-point of 
this thesis.
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Chapter 4 - Context
4.0 Chapter Introduction
This chapter will outline the events that led to the creation of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), provide a brief account 
of the Commission’s activities and chronicle the events during the period after the 9/11 
Commission Report was released, but before the resultant legislation was signed into 
law.  The context relevant to this thesis stretches from the initial crisis-event, September 
11, 2001, to the culmination of the legislative reform efforts with the Presidential bill 
signing of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act on December 17, 2004. 
This period of three years, three months and six days will be divided into three distinct 
phases.  These phases will provide the structure of this chapter and will provide a clear 
and chronological accounting of the history of the 9/11 public inquiry process.  The first  
phase contains the attacks and their immediate aftermath.  The second phase 
encompasses the creation of the Commission and its investigation and the third phase is 
comprised of the post-reporting, legislative reform process.
This descriptive account will provide an important contextual overview of the entire 
public inquiry process, in general, and detailed clarification of the opaque and 
potentially confusing timeline of the legislative process of the post-reporting phase in 
particular.  A clear understanding of the post-reporting phase and its place within the 
broader inquiry process is important, as the thesis focuses on the rhetorical legitimation 
strategies of the Congressional reform debates.  Lastly, this chapter will conclude by 
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summarising briefly the phases of the inquiry process thus setting the context for the 
findings chapter of this thesis which will follow.
4.1 Phase I: The Attacks “We have some planes.” 
4.1.1 An overview of the crisis-event
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were the paradigm-altering catalyst for the 
creation of the 9/11 Commission and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.  On this morning, 19 hijackers took control of four passenger 
aircraft and used them as missiles to attack targets within the United States of America.  
On the morning of September 11, two flights, American Airlines Flight 11 and United 
Airlines Flight 175, departed from Logan International Airport in Boston.  Both flights 
were bound for Los Angeles, California.  Further south, two more Los Angeles bound 
planes, United Airlines Flight 93 departed from Newark, New Jersey and American 
Airlines Flight 77 departed from Dulles International Airport in Washington DC.  Early 
in each flight, these four aircraft were commandeered by teams of hijackers.  
The first two airplanes, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, 
were crashed into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in New York 
City at 8:46:40 and 9:03:11 respectively.  Approximately 35 minutes later, at 9:37:46, 
American Airlines Flight 77 was crashed into the west block of the Pentagon building, 
in Arlington, Virginia.  At 10:02:23. the final aircraft, United Airlines Flight 93 crashed 
into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.  The aircraft was on a direct flightpath back to 
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Washington DC, approximately 20 minutes flying time from the capitol.  The 9/11 
Commission concluded that the aircraft was intentionally crashed by the hijackers, as 
the passengers were attempting to gain access to the cockpit to retake control of the 
plane (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 2004b: 14).  
The hijackers’ target was deemed to be either the Capitol Building or the White House 
in Washington, DC (Ibid.).
4.1.2 Institutional failures
The immediate impact of these attacks in terms of the loss of civilian lives was 
significant, as “[m]ore than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Center; 125 died at the 
Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon The United States 2004b: 1).  The attacks were unprecedented, in an historical 
context.  This was the first instance when the United States of America had been 
attacked on its home soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and this was 
the first time the American mainland had come under attack.  The hijackers’ targets 
were chosen for their symbolic significance with the World Trade Center representing 
American financial power, the Pentagon a symbol of American military power and 
either the Capitol Building (The Congress) or the White House (The President) 
representing American political power.  Although the intended destination of United 
Airlines Flight 93 cannot be verified, it is widely assumed that the attack would have 
been reserved for a target of extraordinary symbolic significance.  During the trial of 
Salim Hamdan, Osama Bin Laden’s former driver, he testified he had overheard that 
United 93 was headed for ‘the dome’.  This has been interpreted to mean the Capitol 
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Dome a part of the structure housing the United States Congress (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 2004b).   Even the method of attack was 
intended to be dramatic and create intensely public scenes of devastation which would 
be captured by the media thus creating indelible images that would be replayed ad 
nauseum (Weimann 2007).  Combined, these factors created a crisis-event which had a 
very strong psychological impact on the American people.
Even without a clear and detailed accounting of what had transpired, it was evident that 
there had been a catastrophic failure of institutions and government agencies.    While 
the failure to prevent    the attacks was significant, the true extent of this failure is 
amplified when one considers that this was a failure of the central role of the United 
States Government.  As Senator Jim Talent, former member of both the House and 
Senate Armed Services Committee, highlights:
First, the framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned national defense as the 
priority obligation of the federal government. The first power granted to the 
president in Article 2 is “Commander-in-Chief of the Armies and Navies of the 
United States, and of the Militias of the Several States.” Of the 17 powers granted 
to Congress in Article 1, six relate specifically to defense, and the Constitution 
grants Congress the full range of authorities necessary to establish the defense of 
the nation (as it was then understood).
The other powers granted to Congress are permissive in nature; Congress can 
choose to exercise them or not. But the federal government is constitutionally 
obligated to defend the nation. Article 4, Section 4 states that the “United States 
shall guarantee to every State a republican form of government and shall protect 
each of them against invasion” (Talent 2010).
These Government institutions, which are constitutionally charged with the roles of 
national defence and the protection of the citizenry, had failed.  In the aftermath of the 
September 11th attacks there was a growing chorus of voices calling for an independent 
investigation to determine what had happened and who was responsible.  As the 
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literature confirms, a disaster-event of this nature and scope creates a circumstance 
fertile for the creation of a public inquiry (Turner, 1976).  In fact, it was not long after 
September 11th that a chorus of support for the establishment of a Commission charged 
with investigating the terrorist attacks began to grow.
4.1.3 Calls for investigation 
There were two main sources of vocal support for the creation of a public commission 
to investigate the attacks of September 11th and the related systemic failures.  In the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks there was a general consensus amongst lawmakers 
that what the intelligence community needed to prevent further attacks was support and 
not recrimination.  However, by mid-October opinions began to change as a small group 
of Senators and Representatives began publicly voicing their support for an independent 
inquiry.  This group of legislators included Senators Joseph Lieberman and John 
McCain, Congressmen Timothy Roemer, Chris Shays and Chris Smith.  Support began 
to grow within Congress and by May the Democratic leadership of both Houses was 
openly advocating for the creation of a public inquiry (CNN 2002).  Despite the 
growing support for creating a Commission, however, the White House remained 
opposed to the idea.  The President’s position was that the Congressional Joint Inquiry 
was already operating and should be allowed to finish its investigation.  The Joint 
Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001 conducted its work between February and December 2002.  The 
Congressional Inquiry was made up of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.  The Joint Inquiry’s final report 
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runs 832 pages and sets out both a narrative and recommendations that focus 
specifically on the intelligence failures that led to the 9/11 attacks.  Additionally, the 
Administration was concerned that such a large public inquiry would consume time and 
resources and distract from the immediate priority of fighting the War on Terror 
(Firestone and Risen 2002). 
The second major driving force behind the creation of the 9/11 Commission was the 
families of the victims.  Family members of the victims of the September 11th attacks 
had created Families of September 11th, a not-for profit entity in October of 2001.  The 
organisation was created as a resource for family members and as a point of contact for 
the multitude of 9/11 charities which were created in the aftermath.  Families of 
September 11th,  reflecting the frustration of many family members at the lack of 
definitive answers regarding details of the attacks, began meeting with these members 
of Congress and publicly supporting the creation of a Commission (Kean, et al. 2007: 
16).  “In June 2002, the families held a large rally in Washington, D.C.-- where their 
interest in a commission converged with the efforts of certain members of Congress.  
Immediately, the issue of the 9/11 Commission gained prominence” (Ibid.: 19).  The 
families leveraged this momentum and began regular meetings with members of 
Congress advocating for the creation of the Commission.  While this effort was building 
momentum for a public inquiry, there remained resistance to the idea within both 
Congress and from the White House.  Central to this resistance was the view that any 
September 11th investigation should be dealt with by the Intelligence Committees in the 
Senate and the House of Representatives.  The Administration’s view of the matter, as 
reported in the media in May 2002, was that “[...] the investigation should be confined 
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to Congress because it deals with sensitive information that could reveal sources and 
methods of intelligence. Therefore, [President Bush] said, the congressional 
investigation is "the best place" to probe the events leading up to the terrorist 
attacks” (Brush, 2002).   
By September 10th, 2002, however, the single most significant obstacle to the creation 
of a Commission, opposition from the White House, was eliminated.  In fact, the 
President’s Press Secretary gave credit to the families for helping to change the 
President’s position on the matter.  “The administration has met with some of the 
families of the 9/11 groups, who have talked about the need for a commission to look 
into a host of issues, and they have made compelling arguments” (Firestone and Risen 
2002).  This shift in White House policy cleared the way for Congressional legislation 
to begin on the creation of a public Commission and within weeks, the legislative 
process began.
4.2 Phase II: The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States
4.2.1 Creating the Commission
Introducing the legislation to create the 9/11 Commission, Senators Joseph Lieberman 
(D) Connecticut and John McCain (R) Arizona introduced the Terrorist Attacks Bill: A 
bill to establish the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
and for other purposes (S.1867) on December 20, 2001.   Announcing their intentions in 
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bringing this bill to the Senate floor both sponsors of the legislation articulated their 
aims.  Senator Lieberman stressed that:
"[...] [the] Commission to be nonpartisan and independent [...] [and that] [i]t must 
be a hunt for the truth, not a witch hunt. [...] and with many perplexing questions 
left unanswered - this is the right time to begin in earnest the process of finding 
answers to our questions” (Lieberman 2001).
Senator McCain stated that “[t]o prevent future tragedies, we need a thorough, 
nonpartisan, independent inquiry into what happened on September 11th, and what we 
can do to protect our people and our institutions against the enemies of freedom in the 
future [...]” (Ibid).  Upon its introduction to the Senate, S.1867 was referred to the 
Government Affairs Committee, debated by the Committee and and reported back to the 
Senate on March 21, 2002.  However the bill was never brought to a vote in the Senate, 
as the session ended prior to the scheduling of a vote on the matter.  Any proposed 
legislation that has not passed by the end of a session is cleared from the books, but can 
be re-introduced by its sponsor during the next legislative session.
A subsequent agreement was struck between the Democratic and Republican leadership 
in the Senate on October 10th that the Senate would include the text of S.1867, the 
enabling legislation for the creation of a Commission to investigate the attacks of 
September 11th, 2001,  in the upcoming intelligence authorisation bill.  Included as 
TITLE VI to An Act To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
System, and for other purposes (Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003), 
the creation of the Commission was ensured with the passing by both Houses of 
Congress and its subsequent approval by the President (Bash 2002).  On November 27, 
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2002, the Intelligence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2003 was signed by 
President Bush creating Public Law 107-306 which allowed for the establishment of the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission).
4.2.2 Structuring the Commission
Contained within the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 is TITLE VI - 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES.  TITLE VI outlines the mandate, membership, powers and responsibilities of 
the 9/11 Commission.  Additionally, the legislation covered an assortment of 
administrative matters including legal exemptions and funding.  (For a full listing of 
Sections 601 to 611 of TITLE VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 see Appendix A.)  This enabling legislation is divided into ten sections (Section 
601 to Section 611); however, for the purpose of this chapter, it is necessary to focus 
only on the following sections: Purposes (Section 602)  Functions (Section 604), 
Composition of Commission (Section 603), and Reports of Commission; Termination 
(Section 610).   
Section 602 & 604: Purpose and Functions of the Commission
‘Sec. 602. Purposes.’ provides an overview of the mandated responsibilities of the 
Commission.  The Commission is charged with five main responsibilities with the first 
two being investigatory in nature.  The legislation required that the Commission was to:
“examine and report upon the facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, occurring at the World Trade Center in New York, New 
York, in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon in Virginia;
 
Page | 103
(2) ascertain, evaluate, and report on the evidence developed by all relevant 
governmental agencies regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
attacks;” (U.S. Congress 2003: Section 603(1)(2)).
Further direction was provided in subsection (a) (1) of ‘Sec. 604. Functions of 
Commission’.  This subsection, outlined potential sources of evidence, “including any 
relevant legislation, Executive order, regulation, plan, policy, practice, or procedure.”  
Secondly, Section 604 outlines the broad scope of the Commission’s investigatory 
mandate.  It is suggested that the focus of the Commission:
“may include relevant facts and circumstances relating to— (i) intelligence 
agencies; (ii) law enforcement agencies; (iii) diplomacy; (iv) immigration, 
nonimmigrant visas, and border control; (v) the flow of assets to terrorist 
organizations; (vi) commercial aviation; (vii) the role of congressional oversight 
and resource allocation; and (viii) other areas of the public and private sectors 
determined relevant by the Commission for its inquiry;” (U.S. Congress 2003: 
Sec. 604 (a)(1)(B)).
The mandate of the Commission was sweeping and the Commissioners were 
empowered to look into other, unenumerated areas as they deemed appropriate.  Clearly 
there was a significant amount of new investigative territory to be covered by the 
Commission; however, lawmakers wanted to ensure that previous investigative efforts 
into the September 11th attacks and existing terrorism and national security studies, in 
general, would be utilised to inform the Commission’s work.  As such a specific 
directive was included in Sec. 603 (3).  The Commission was directed to:
“build upon the investigations of other entities, and avoid unnecessary 
duplication, by reviewing the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of--
(A) the Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
(hereinafter in this title referred to as the “Joint Inquiry”); and
  (B) other executive branch, congressional, or independent commission 
investigations into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, other terrorist 
attacks, and terrorism generally;” (U.S. Congress 2003: Section 602(3)(a)(b)).
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Once the Commission had completed their investigation into the precipitating factors 
and the events of the September 11th attacks it was directed to construct an accurate and 
exhaustive picture of what had happened.  The Commission was to: “make a full and 
complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks, and the extent of the 
United States' preparedness for, and immediate response to, the attacks;” (U.S. Congress 
2003: Section 602(4)).  It was from this comprehensive narrative that the Commission 
was required to draw conclusions and create recommendations that would form the 
basis of a national preventative counter-terrorism strategy.  As such, the Commission 
was required to “investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to prevent 
acts of terrorism” (U.S. Congress 2003: Section 602(5)).  The legislation both 
empowered and directed the Commission to investigate, to construct a comprehensive 
narrative of events and to provide solutions to strengthen defences and minimise the 
risks of a repeat attack.  It was this narrative and these recommendations that would 
have a dramatic effect on the subsequent legislative debates, and impact significantly 
the rhetorical strategies for legitimation, as will be explored in the finding chapter.
Section 603: Composition of the Commission
The legislators ensured that the Commission was politically balanced.  ‘Sec. 603. 
Composition of Commission’ outlines the equal distribution of Commission 
membership along two political dynamics.  Half of the members would be appointees of 
the Democratic Party and the remaining half of the members would be appointed by the 
Republican Party.  In addition to this partisan balancing, appointees would come from 
both political branches of Government.  The Republican President would be given the 
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right to appoint the Commission’s Chairman and the Vice-Chairman would be 
appointed by the Democratic Leadership of both Houses of Congress.  The remaining 
eight appointments would be apportioned equally between the US House of 
Representatives and the US Senate (See Appendix B).  This deliberate balancing of 
appointment powers was intended to foster a sense of bi-partisanship and reflected the 
interests of both parties that individual and political blame be avoided in the pursuit of 
broad institutional failings (Kean, et al. 2007).
Sec. 610. Reports Of Commission; Termination.
The Commission draws two of its primary mandates from this section of the legislation. 
The first, Sec. 610 (b) states that the Commission must issue its report within 18 months 
of the enactment of this Law.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Commission 
sought and was granted an extension that placed the release of its Final Report in the 
midst of the politically pressurised context of a Presidential election campaign, thus 
causing the legislative phase of this inquiry process to fall during a challenging late 
autumn period.  Scheduling can be a challenge, given the nature of the Congressional 
calendar during an election year.  In addition to the regular summer and Thanksgiving 
recess breaks, Congress also recesses in the week around election day in early 
November.  This reduces the time and flexibility available to the Congress for 
legislative work.  Secondly, Sec. 610 (c)(1) requires that the Commission will terminate 
within 60 days of submitting its Final Report.  Section 610 (c)(2) outlines what these 
administrative activities might entail.  “The Commission may use the 60-day period [...] 
for the purpose of concluding its activities, including providing testimony to committees 
of Congress concerning its reports and disseminating the final report.”  (U.S. Congress 
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2003)  As will become clear later in this chapter, the Commission pursued its 
administrative duties of dissemination in a very energetic manner.  The Commissioners 
undertook a very aggressive promotion and lobbying campaign with the hope of 
creating sufficient momentum in public opinion that Congress would legislate the 
Commission’s recommendations.
4.2.3 The Commission’s work
With the enabling legislation in place, Congress and the President were free to make 
their Commission appointments.  The first two members of the Commission to be 
appointed were the chairman and vice chairman.   President Bush selected former 
National Security Advisor, Secretary of State and Nobel Peace laureate, Henry 
Kissinger and the Democratic Congressional leadership appointed former US Senator, 
former Senate Majority Leader and US Special Envoy for Northern Ireland, George 
Mitchell.  Both Kissinger and Mitchell were well-respected public figures and both had 
very prominent and lengthy records of public service; however, neither appointee, after 
initially accepting these positions, was ultimately able to discharge their duties due to 
potential conflicts with their private sector careers.   After this brief setback, both posts 
were filled with prominent American public figures.  President Bush appointed Thomas 
H. Kean and the Congressional Democrats chose Lee Hamilton.  While the new 
chairman and vice chairman were not as prominent as the initial appointees, they 
nevertheless, had respected careers in public service.   The appointment of Kean and 
Hamilton, the President and the Democratic Congressional leadership was in keeping 
with requirements of Sec. 603(b)(3) of TITLE VI that:
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“It is the sense of Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission should 
be prominent United States citizens, with national recognition and significant 
depth of experience in such professions as governmental service, law 
enforcement, the armed services, law, public administration, intelligence 
gathering, commerce (including aviation matters), and foreign affairs” (U.S. 
Congress 2003).
With an appropriate Chairman and vice-Chairman in place, the remaining eight 
Commissioners were appointed in the manner directed by the legislation.  These 
individuals were: Richard Ben Veniste, former Senator Bob Kerry, former White House 
Council Fred F. Fielding, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, former Deputy 
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, former Congressman Timothy Roemer, former 
Senator Slade Gorton, and former Governor James Thompson (For further details see 
Appendix C).  These individuals each have accomplished records of public service and 
amongst the Commissioners there was a significant level of experience in many of the 
areas of expertise outlined within the legislation.  As required by the legislation, the 
appointment of Commissioners was completed by December 15, 2002.  
With the Commissioners in place, the Commission began the process of assembling a 
staff and at the first meeting of the Commission on January 27, 2003, the 
Commissioners announced Philip Zelikow as the Commission’s executive director.  
Within two months, the Commission’s offices were staffed and operational and the 
Commission began its work.  On March 31, 2003, the Commission held its first public 
hearing in New York City.  The Commission established a schedule of public hearings 
to receive testimony on a number of relevant topics and to attempt to engage the public 
with their work (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 
2004b: xv).  The Commission would go on to hold twelve public hearings over nineteen 
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days in the period from March, 2003 to July 2004.  Each public hearing focused on an 
aspect of the Commission’s investigatory mandate.  The following table outlines the 
topics and dates of each public hearing.
TABLE 4.0 - The 9/11 Commission’s public hearing schedule
Hearing Topics Dates
1 Inaugural Hearing: New York City 31/03 to 1/04/2003
2 Congress and Civil Aviation Security 22&23/05/2003
3 Terrorism, al Qaeda, and the Muslim World 09/07/2003
4 Intelligence and the War on Terror 14/10/2003
5 Private/Public Partnerships for Emergency Preparedness 19/11/2003
6 Security and Liberty 08/12/2003
7 Borders, Transportation, and Managing Risk 26-27/01/2004
8 Counterterrorism Policy 23-24/03/2004
9 Condoleezza Rice and President Bill Clinton 08/04/2004
10 Law Enforcement and Intelligence 13-14/04/2004
11 Emergency Response 18-19/05/2004
12 The 9/11 Plot and National Crisis Management 16-17/07/2004
Summarised from 9/11 CR, Appendix C
Testimony from the Public Hearings were not the only evidence the Commission and its 
staff were collecting.  During the process of the investigation, the Commission 
interviewed more than 1,200 people in ten countries and reviewed more than 2.5 million 
pages of documents (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 
2004b: xv).  Among these interviews, were almost every senior official from both the 
Bush and Clinton administrations (Ibid.)  While the September 11th attacks took place 
nearly a year into President Bush’s first term, the planning of the attacks and the 
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precipitating events and influences stretched back years and well into the Clinton 
administration (1992-2000).  With the 18 month deadline approaching, imposed on the 
process by its enacting legislation, it was clear that the Commission would require more 
time.  As such, the Commissioners requested a six-month extension to complete their 
work.  This gave the Commission more time, but it moved the initial March 2, 2002 
release date to late July and deeper into the heated election process. 
4.2.4 The final report 
The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States was released to the public at a press conference on July 22, 2004.  It is 
monological, meaning with a single line of reasoning, in its presentation of the facts and 
unanimous in the proposal of its recommendations.  As Commission Chairman, Thomas 
Kean highlighted at the release of the Final Report “[we] file no additional views [...]  
We have no dissents. [...]  We will [...] work together in support of the recommendations 
of this report” (Kean, et al. 2007: 203).  The Final Report itself is 567 pages, including 
appendices and endnotes, and draws upon the extensive work of the Commission 
detailed above.  The majority of the Report’s thirteen chapters (See Appendix C) are a 
retrospective construction of past events.   Following their legislative mandate, the 
Commission investigated “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United 
States 2004b: xv).  This included both a nearly minute-by-minute reconstruction of the 
timeline of the 9/11 attacks and also a narrative that traced the planning and origins of 
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the attacks.  A broader context was explored through a chronicling of al Qaeda’s past 
attacks on American interests including, but not limited to, the USS Cole and the US 
Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  However, the Report does not focus solely 
on the attacks and the threat of attack. It examined the institutional limitations and 
failures that allowed the attacks to succeed.  The Report is structured in such a way as to 
move its focus from the terrorist threat to America’s response and counter-terror efforts 
a number of times: focusing on threats and then shifting to deterrence before shifting 
back again.  Through both a better understanding of the threat, and an identification of 
the relevant security failures, the Commission was able to make a series of 
recommendations for significant and sweeping change.  It was these recommendations 
that formed the basis for the Congressional reform legislation and it is the rhetorical 
strategies employed in the debates of this reform that is the focus of this research 
project.  
4.2.5 Releasing the report
It was not the goal of the Commission, to simply hand over their report to decision-
makers and the publisher.  Rather, the Commissioners believed that they should have a 
sustained role as active promoters of the report and its recommendations and their 
commitment to this role extended beyond their legislated mandate.  Once the 
Commission was disbanded, the Commissioner’s founded the 9/11 Public Discourse 
Project.  In a description provided on their website, this organisation was a privately 
funded vehicle which sought to “initiate a nationwide public education campaign for the 
purpose of making America safer and more secure” (9/11 Public Discourse Project, 
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2010).  Therefore, the first post-reporting activity of the Commission was to create a 
momentum in support of their recommendations that could withstand the arduous 
legislative process.  Chairman Kean and vice-Chairman Hamilton acknowledged that 
their “ [...] first task [...] would be to seize the momentum at [the] rollout.  [...]  [From 
their perspective] “[...] for one day, the commission had to use its moment of maximum 
attention to stress the necessity of action, and the country’s desperate need to move 
beyond partisan politics” (Kean, et al 2007: 299).  As such, they viewed the rollout of 
the report as incredibly important in that it was the single opportunity they would have 
to present the report and the recommendations on the commission’s terms, unblemished 
by critique (Ibid.).  Such momentum could not be accomplished through a passive 
release or publication of the Commission’s Final Report.  The release of the Final 
Report would require a carefully planned and executed public relations effort.  To this 
end, the Commission hired a major public relations firm, the Edelman Group, to 
orchestrate the release of the Report and manage the ensuing media relations campaign 
over the subsequent weeks and months during which the Commissioners would spend 
significant time and effort promoting the Commission’s work. 
The day on which the Commission released the Final Report and its recommendations, 
July 22, 2004, was carefully choreographed.  First, Chairman Kean and vice-Chairman 
Hamilton, visited Capitol Hill to meet with and brief the Congressional leadership of 
both Houses on the Commission’s findings.  Their second meeting of the day was at the 
White House where they presented President Bush with a copy of their report, engaged 
in a brief discussion and joined the President in the Rose Garden for a statement to 
reporters.  From the White House, Kean and Hamilton joined their fellow 
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Commissioners to meet with the families of the victims of the September 11th attacks, 
which was already in progress, to discuss their findings.  After their meeting with the 
families, the main press event for the official public release of the report was 
held at the Andrew W. Mellon Hall in Washington D.C.  This impressive neo-classical 
hall has hosted a number of important events including the 1949 signing of the 
international agreement that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
Immediately following the public announcement of the Final Report, Kean and 
Hamilton returned to Capitol Hill to hold a joint press conference with a bi-partisan 
group of high-profile Senators, including John McCain, Joseph Lieberman, Evan Bayh 
and Arlen Specter, all of whom supported Congressional action on the Commission’s 
recommendations.  Finally the remainder of the day saw Commissioner’s conducting 
high profile, back-to-back media interviews to disseminate the message of the 
Commission’s findings.
The reception of the Commission’s work was strongly positive and there was significant 
public interest in the Commission’s findings.  Within the first week over 350,000 copies 
of the Report had been sold to the public and on the day that the Report was released, 
the commission website where the report was made available for free, had over 1 
million hits.  The Commissioners were pleased that the public seemed to be interested in 
their Report and they were optimistic that this would create additional pressure on 
Congress to act.  “We were also pleased at the prospect that Americans might ask their 
representatives and senators, home for the August recess, what action they were taking 
on our recommendations” (Kean, et al. 2007: 307)  While Congress was scheduled to 
take its annual August recess the following day, the Commission did secure a pledge 
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from the leadership that they would convene committee meetings over the break and 
report back to their respective chambers with legislation to move forward with the 
implementation of the Commission’s recommendations for the fall.  With these 
commitments the legislative process would begin.  The post-reporting phase had begun, 
and by all accounts, it appeared as if the Commission would be successful in creating 
the momentum necessary for Congress to adopt their reform agenda.  Appropriately, this 
is the point in the historical record at which our enquiry begins.  Congress did introduce 
legislation based on the Commission’s recommendations, and it is this Congressional 
debate with which this thesis is concerned.  More specifically, the central research 
question is: what rhetorical strategies were employed in the legislative reform debates 
of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process?
4.3 Phase III: The Post-Reporting Phase (July 2004 to December 2004)
4.3.1 An election year
The Commission’s Final Report was not released in a contextual vacuum.  By July of 
2004 the US Presidential campaign season, including the Democratic Party’s primary 
processes, had been ongoing for nearly twenty-six months.  The Democratic National 
Convention, at which presidential candidate Senator John Kerry was to accept his 
party’s nomination to challenge Republican President George W. Bush, took place in 
Boston, MA from the 26th to the 29th of July, less than a week after the release of the 
Final Report.  (The Report was scheduled to be released on July 26th, but it was 
released earlier to avoid conflicting with the Democratic National Convention.)  A 
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month later, President George W. Bush would accept his party’s second nomination at 
the Republican National Convention in New York City.  Officially, the Presidential 
election campaign would begin and for the next two months, national security would be 
one of the prominent issues of the campaign (Crotty 2005).  Both presidential 
candidates endorsed the work and recommendations of the Commission on the day that 
the Report was released.  At the morning Rose Garden ceremony with Commission 
Chairman Kean and Vice-Chairman Hamilton, immediately following a private meeting 
in the Oval Office, President Bush spoke positively of the Commission and its work and 
thanked those involved in the process.  However, as is evident in the following passage 
of his remarks, the President was providing general support and not an immediate and 
unqualified acceptance of the Commission’s findings:  
“They've done a really good job of learning about our country, learning about 
what went wrong prior to September the 11th, and making very solid, sound 
recommendations about how to move forward. I assured them that where 
Government needs to act, we will. [...]
And the report that they are about to present to me puts out some very 
constructive recommendations. And I look forward to studying their 
recommendations and look forward to working with responsible parties within my 
administration to move forward on those recommendations. [...]
As well, we look forward to working with the Congress on the implementation of 
ways to do our duty. And the most important duty we have is the security of our 
fellow countrymen” (Bush 2004a).
While complimentary of the Commission’s work and expressing a willingness to act in 
the defense of the country, as highlighted in the quotation above, the President used 
cautious language that did not convey an immediate or indiscriminate commitment to 
implement the Commission’s reforms. 
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By contrast, Senator John Kerry gave a wholesale endorsement of the recommendations 
contained in the Commission’s Final Report immediately upon its release.  Three days 
later, Senator Kerry reiterated his strong approval for the Final Report and its 
recommendations by stating:
“If I were president today, or yesterday, I'd be appointing one person in the White 
House responsible for liaison with the Congress and the agencies immediately to 
implement immediately the vast majority of the recommendations of the 9/11 
commission [...] I regret that many of these have not been put in place over the 
course of the last few years. [...]  They would have made America a great deal 
safer'' (Nagourney 2004).
Kerry’s immediate and enthusiastic support for the Commission and its 
recommendations is clear.  Certainly, the dynamics of the election campaign played a 
role in Kerry’s position.  An element of Kerry’s election strategy was to focus on his 
past as a decorated war veteran to present an image of a strong and decisive leader on 
issues of national security and foreign affairs.  Public opinion, in recent decades, had 
consistently favoured the Republican Party on these issues while Democratic Presidents 
were often viewed as less strong on their commitment to the military and in their 
execution of foreign affairs.  A less enthusiastic endorsement from the Kerry campaign 
could have eroded his favourability in these areas (Halbfinger 2003). With the 
endorsement of the de facto leadership of both political parties, the next steps were to be 
taken by the US Congress.  If the recommendations of the Commission’s report were to 
be enacted, it would need to be done through legislation and this legislation would need 
to garner the majority support of both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
before being sent to the President for his signature.             
4.3.2 The legislative process
 
Page | 116
The Congress of the United States is a bicameral institution of the federal government 
and is made up of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of 
Representatives is comprised of congressional members from each state.  A state’s 
population determines the number of representatives it sends to Washington DC and 
there are 435 members of congress in the House.  The membership of the Senate is 
made up of two Senators from each state, regardless of a state’s population.  As such 
there are 100 United States Senators in total.  In attempting to legislate the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, separate pieces of legislation were 
introduced in each House of Congress.  The Senate Bill, entitled the National 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (S.2845) was introduced in the Senate by Senators 
Susan Collins (R-Maine) and Joseph Lieberman (D-Connecticut) on September 23rd, 
2004.  The legislation in the House of Representatives, entitled the 9/11 
Recommendations Implementation Act (H.R.10) was introduced by the Speaker of the 
House, Representative Dennis Hastert (R-IL) on September 24th, 2004.  (In the 
American system the Speaker of the House is the leader of the majority party in the 
House of Representatives and is unlike the non-partisan Speaker found in legislatures 
within the Westminster parliamentary tradition.)  When both Houses of Congress 
consider and pass legislation on the same issue, an ad hoc House-Senate Conference 
Committee is formed to negotiate compromise where there is disagreement between the 
two bills.  If this process is successful, a harmonised bill is sent back to both Houses for 
a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote without the opportunity for further amendment.  If the 
differences between the legislation are significant and an agreement cannot be reached 
by House and Senate Committee representatives a harmonised bill, with the approval of 
both Houses of Congress, cannot be sent to the President for his signature and therefore 
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does not become law.  It was these differences between the House and the Senate 
versions of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations for reform, and the challenges in 
finding compromise, that occupied much of the latter part of the legislative period 
during October and November of 2004.  The entire legislative period, from the release 
of the Commission’s report in July to the Presidential bill signing of the IRTPA, 2004 
can be seen below in Figure 4.0. 
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4.3.2.1 Legislating the Report
With strong public interest in the Commission's recommendations and the support of 
both party's presidential candidates, the focus shifted to Congress.  When would they 
begin the legislative process that would allow for the debate of the Commission's 
recommendations?  A midsummer release of a  report that required the immediate 
attention of the House and the Senate would pose significant problems given the typical 
Congressional calendar, as both houses close down for the month of August while 
legislators return to their districts.  The 2004 congressional calendar was further 
complicated by the election process.  Congress was forced to adjourn for both the 
Democratic and Republican Conventions and then again in late October for the election. 
Scheduling time for such significant legislative debates during this particular time-
frame was problematic.  On August 2nd both Houses of Congress shut for the summer 
recess, and while there was some discussion that Congressional leaders would 
reconvene a special session to deal with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations this 
did not occur.  The House of Representatives and the Senate returned from their August 
recess on the 3rd and the 6th of  September respectively. Not long after, both houses 
introduced legislation and began the deliberative process to enact the recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission.
4.3.2.2 The Senate bill
On the 23rd of September 2004 the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (S.2845) 
was introduced by Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) (Chair of the Government Affairs 
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Committee) and Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT).  The bill was co-sponsored by an 
additional nine Senators from both parties.  These group of co-sponsors included 
Senators Carper, Clinton, Coleman, Durbin, Feinstein, McCain, Mikulski, Rockefeller 
and Voinovich.   The legislative debate of S.2845 was scheduled to take place over the 
course of eight days during the period of the 27th of September to the 6th of October, 
with the vote scheduled at the end of the final day.  
Senate rules are more flexible and the structure of debate is less formal when compared 
with the rigidity and formality of the procedural rules in the House of Representatives 
(Grant 2004: 33-34).  These factors required that the Senate allocate significantly more 
time for debate than than the House of Representatives.  The Senate bill S.2845, adhered 
closely to the 9/11 Commission’s proposed reforms and included all of its forty-one 
recommendations.   Led by Senators Collins and Lieberman, proponents of the 
legislation framed the debate.  As will be presented in the following chapter, a pro-
action narrative was created and proponents employed various rhetorical strategies in 
creating this narrative and strengthening the legitimacy of their proposed reforms.
However, the more lengthy debate schedule and the close adherence to the 
Commission’s recommendations did not shield the legislation from opposition.  A small, 
but vocal minority employed rhetorical strategies that attacked the process as too rushed 
thus attempting to de-legitimise the proposed reforms.  Ultimately, these opponents 
were unsuccessful as the initial version of S.2845 passed the Senate by a vote of 96 to 2. 
This coincided with the first, and only, day of debate for the House reform legislation 
H.R.10.
 
Page | 121
4.3.2.3 The House bill
The House of Representatives introduced the 9/11 Recommendations Act 2004 (H.R.10) 
on the 8th of October, 2004, the same day that the Senate passed companion legislation 
in the form of S.2845.  The House legislation focused heavily on immigration and 
border control issues and was skeptical of diverting too much authority from the 
Secretary of Defense to the proposed Director of National Intelligence, over concerns 
that this would jeopardise the military’s ability to supply their troops with timely and 
accurate battlefield intelligence.  Despite the title of H.R.10, the House bill addressed 
fewer Commission recommendations than the Senate legislation.  The House legislation 
focused on fully implementing eleven of the Commission’s forty-one recommendations 
and partially addressed another fifteen.  With a Republican majority in control in the 
House, the pursuit of contentious issues such as immigration reform was harshly 
criticised by opponents of the legislation.  As presented in the next chapter, this 
accusation of partisanship was key to the rhetorical strategy of opponents in their 
attempts to de-legitimise the legislative reform process in the House of Representatives.  
Additionally, the time allowed for debate in the Senate, the closer adherence to the 
Commission's recommendations and the nearly unanimous vote meant that the Senate 
process was elevated as an example of bipartisanship.  Irrespective of the objections of 
the legislation’s opponents, it enjoyed a relatively wide margin of success.  With a final 
vote of 282 to 134, H.R.10 was passed as well and the reconciliation process for these 
two pieces of legislation could begin.
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4.3.2.4 The conference committee process
Before a bill can be sent to the President to be signed into law, it must first be passed by 
a majority in both Houses of Congress.  However, the bills that pass the Senate and the 
House of Representatives must be identical and this was not the case with H.R.10 and S.
2845 which were very different pieces of legislation.  In these situations, the bills must 
be sent to a conference committee.
“These are, simply, ad hoc bodies created to reconcile the differences that occur in 
the House and the Senate versions of the same piece of legislation.  Membership 
is drawn from those members in each House who have been most closely 
involved with the legislation [...] who then vote en bloc so as to represent the 
wishes of their chamber” (McKay 2005: 170-171).
A conference committee was struck to work out a compromise on H.R.10 and S.2845.  
The committee was comprised of an equal number of Senators and Representatives and 
Republicans and Democrats.
Reflecting the significant differences in the legislation, the conferees failed to reach an 
agreement at their first meeting on October 27th.  The Conference Committee met again 
on November 20th, but again failed to reach an agreement.  With the elections passed 
and the end of the 108th Congress approaching, both the Commission and the White 
House attempted to encourage a compromise that would result in an intelligence reform 
package that could be passed and signed before the end of the year.  On November 30th 
Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton held a press conference at which they 
publicly urged the Congressional leadership to reach an agreement.  On December 3rd, 
President Bush issued a letter to the Congressional leadership expressing his support for 
the quick reconciliation and passage of the intelligence reform legislation.  On 
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December 6th the conference committee reached an agreement and sent Conference 
Report S.2845 to the House of Representatives and the Senate for approval.
4.3.3 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004
With compromises in place, the House of Representatives approved an amended version 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004, containing TITLE VII 
the 9/11 Commission Implementation Act of 2004 on the 6th of December.  Once the 
legislation had passed the House, it was sent to the Senate and on the following day, 
December 7, the Senate approved the harmonised version of the bill.  The IRTPA, 2004 
was sent to the President for his signature on the 15th of December and two days later, 
on the 17th of December, President Bush signed the legislation into law.  At the 
Presidential bill signing ceremony, flanked by members of Congress and 
Commissioners, President Bush noted the significance of the occasion.  “In a few 
minutes, I will sign into law the most dramatic reform of our nation’s intelligence 
capabilities since President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 
1947” (Bush 2004b).  Upon receiving the President’s signature, Public Law 108-458 
was created and many of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations became law.
4.4 Chapter Summary
The acts of terrorism perpetrated against the United States on September 11th, 2001 
were unique in both method and scale.  Layers of defences were penetrated resulting in 
great surprise and loss.  This disaster-event laid bare significant institutional failings of 
multiple government agencies.  Failures in intelligence gathering, transportation 
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security, law enforcement and a myriad of other governmental responsibilities were 
revealed by this disaster-event.  As with many such dramatic and public institutional 
failures, pressure began to build in support of an investigation into the circumstances 
surrounding the attacks and the requisite institutional failures.  As is clear from the 
academic literature, a public inquiry process is a common response to sufficiently 
catastrophic disaster-events.  With the strong support of some members of Congress and 
the advocacy role of the families of the victims, momentum began to build for the 
creation of an independent inquiry into the attacks of September 11th.  Eventually, the 
momentum was sufficient to persuade both Houses of Congress and the President that 
an inquiry should be established.
Legislation was brought forth to create a bipartisan commission, appointed jointly by 
the President and the Congress.  The Commission would have a broad mandate to 
investigate the events leading up to the September 11th attacks, to reconstruct a timeline 
and create an accurate narrative of what had transpired and to investigate and report on 
its findings, conclusions and preventative measures that should be taken to avoid similar 
attacks in the future.  After an extensive investigation, the Commission released its 
findings in the form of a 567 page Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States (9/11 Commission Report).  The report 
contained both a comprehensive timeline of the events of September 11th, a lengthy 
history of the circumstances leading up to the attacks and a series of recommendations 
for specific changes.  The 9/11 Commission Report was released in the midst of a 
politically pressurised election season.  The Report gained the very public support of 
both party’s presidential candidates and a high-profile, bi-partisan group of legislators 
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from both Houses of Congress.  The media coverage was largely uncritical and public 
support for the Commission and its recommendations was high (Kean, et al. 2007). 
Within a relatively short period of time, given various recess obstacles of the 
Congressional calendar, legislation was introduced into both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate to implement the Commission’s recommendations.  The 
legislation was delayed as a result of differences between the House and the Senate bill 
and the inability of the Conference Committee to reach agreement.  This was the result 
of a small number of differences on specific aspects of the legislation, rather than a 
fundamental or broad opposition to the adoption of the recommendations of the 
Commission.  Despite these disagreements and the multiple recess interruptions in the 
Congressional calendar, the timeframe for legislating the Commission’s 
recommendations took less than three months, a portion of which Congress was not 
even in session, given it recessed for both the election in late October and early 
November and then again for the Thanksgiving holiday a month later.  Once Congress 
reached agreement and passed the Conference Report, S.2845, President Bush signed 
into law the largest re-organisation of the intelligence community, based on the 
recommendations of the Commission,  since the end of the second world war.  From the 
release of the Commissions recommendations in late July to the signing of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 in mid-December, four and a 
half months had passed.
This chapter has focused on the key timelines and significant events that led to the 
creation of the 9/11 Commission, the production of its recommendations and the 
subsequent legislative process that sought to enact the Commission’s recommendations.  
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With this understanding of the context and timeframe, the next chapter will focus on the 
Congressional reform debates of this post-inquiry period.  Specifically, this thesis seeks 
to answer the question: what rhetorical strategies were employed in the legislative 
debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process?  
The following chapter answers this question and presents the findings of the grounded 
theory analysis of the complete transcripts of Congressional debate for H.R.10 and S.
2845.
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Chapter 5 - Findings
5.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter explained the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process and, more 
importantly, the post-reporting phase into which the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendations were published and during which the legislative reform debate 
occurred.  Having established this more detailed contextual understanding, this chapter 
will present the findings from the analysis of the rhetorical themes of this legislative 
debate.  Before outlining this Findings chapter, it is helpful to provide a brief reminder 
of how the dataset was analysed, reiterating the grounded theory approach that was 
employed for this research project.
These findings are the result of the grounded theory process, as detailed in Chapter 3.  
This was an inductive process that followed the guidance of Corbin and Strauss (1998).  
In the first stage of open coding, the data was deconstructed and allocated to categories 
according to theme.  These themes emerged from the data and the number of categories 
grew as the open coding progressed.  The process of open coding allowed for the 
development of insight into the data and, as similar categories began to emerge from the 
data, the second phase of axial coding was initiated in tandem with the open coding.  As 
themes were identified, the initial categories of the open coding process were 
consolidated and organised to reflect these emerging themes.  As these were organised 
and, in some cases, merged, categories from the axial coding process were tested 
through the addition of new data.  Once it became clear that the process was focusing on 
the appropriate dominant themes from the data, moving between the data and the 
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emerging models, main themes were identified and prioritised.  These main themes, and 
their supporting data, provide the content for this chapter.
Prior to a presentation of the findings, a brief re-statement of the central research 
question is included in Section 5.1.  This provides a reminder of the purpose of this 
research project and helps to provide a context for the findings, as presented below.  The 
findings portion of this chapter is structured as follows:  Section 5.2 examines the 
rhetorical strategies employed in the legislative narrative.  Proponents of the legislation 
sought to cast the reforms as a once in a generation challenge of tremendous importance 
and historic proportions.  The scale of these proposed reforms was the largest since the 
end of the Second World War and proponents argued that by passing this landmark 
reform legislation, the legislators would be avoiding the mistakes of past leaders.  They 
argued that past inaction to implement appropriate legislation and maintain effective 
institutional capabilities led to an institutional failure that allowed the attacks of 
September 11th to occur.  If historic opportunity failed to motivate action on reform, 
then the proponents focused on the moral and constitutional duty of Congress to protect 
the citizenry and secure the nation from attack.  Finally, proponents sought to highlight 
the danger that was faced from terrorism.  This was done by providing examples of 
recent terrorist attacks, focusing on the lethality of terrorist tactics and using language 
and imagery that focused on the hostile and lethal nature of the threat.  These were the 
dangers against which Congress was duty-bound to protect the nation.  The implication 
of these dominant themes: historic moment for action, the real and present danger of the 
threat and the obligation of Government to protect the nation, was that action must be 
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taken and taken immediately. The proponents argued that the only immediate and 
feasible course of action was to approve the reform bills that were before the Congress.
While the pro-reform narrative was dominant in Congress, there was a minority of 
legislators who attempted to resist the wholesale adoption of S.2845 in the Senate and 
H.R.10 in the House of Representatives.  If the proponent’s narrative was that heroism -
defined by supporting and passing these bills- was required, those who resisted the 
legislation attempted to redefine the idea of heroism.  Interestingly, opponents of the 
legislation did not attempt to refute the mission narrative.  They agreed that it was their 
obligation to act to protect the nation.  They agreed that the threat of terrorism was very 
real.  They even conceded that this was in fact a once in a generation opportunity to 
make historic reforms to America’s intelligence system.  However, they attempted to 
reframe what was the logical and correct course of action.    They argued that the 
pending legislation was either partisan and incomplete, a significant objection in the 
House of Representatives, or that Congress was rushing through such vitally important 
reforms -the most often voiced point of opposition in the Senate.  Whereas proponents 
called for immediate action, opponents called for further deliberation.  Whereas 
proponents sought to cast action as heroic, opponents sought to cast the rush to reform 
as cowardly.  Opponents countered the dominant heroic rhetoric by arguing that the 
heroic course was to withstand the growing, unthinking momentum of the reform 
legislation.
Section 5.3 ‘Rhetorical Strategies for Legitimising the Legislative Content’ examines 
the content-specific rhetoric of proponents of the reform legislation in both Houses of 
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Congress.  Proponents sought to assign complimentary attributes to both the content and 
the process of the policy and the personal attributes of the supporters of the legislation.  
These complimentary attributes were bipartisanship and hard work.  Through a 
persistent reference to these attributes, proponents sought to further the case for the 
legislative reform agenda.
Section 5.4 ‘Rhetorical Strategies for Legitimising the Legislative Process’ examines the 
oppositional rhetorical strategies for resisting the proponents’ narrative.  In contrast to a 
focus on positive character attributions, opponents focused on issues of process.  In the 
House of Representatives, opponents criticised the legislative process on the basis of 
partisanship, accusing proponents of H.R.10 of prioritising personal and party political 
interests over the national interest.  In the Senate, opponents seized on the accelerated 
legislative timeline to assert that S.2845 was being rushed to a vote with insufficient 
study and debate.
Section 5.5 ‘Rhetorical Strategies for Legitimising and Resisting: Appropriating 
Authority’ examines how both sides in the legislative debate frequently invoked 
references to both the 9/11 Commission and the families of the victims of 9/11 to 
support their respective narratives.  The authority which both the Commission and the 
victim’s families possessed within the reform debate of the post-reporting phase of the 
public inquiry process and the reverence with which both proponents and opponents of 
the legislation afford to them is evident.  Given that the opponents of the legislation are, 
in practice, opposing legislation to implement reforms recommended by the 
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Commission and endorsed by the families of the victims, it is interesting to note the 
unanimity with which these two groups received deferential treatment from legislators.  
Finally, Section 5.6 ‘Chapter Summary’ will provide a brief conclusion which 
summarises the findings contained in this chapter.  In the following chapter, Chapter 6, 
these findings will be discussed in the broader context of the literature and relevant 
theory.
5.1 Restatement of the Research Question
This research project focuses on the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s 
public inquiry process.  This period begins with the release of the Commission’s final 
report on the 22nd of July 2004 and ends with the presidential bill signing of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 on the 17th of December of the 
same year.  Over the course of this time period, a majority of the Commission’s 
recommendations were adapted into legislative bills that were introduced and debated in 
the United States’ Senate and House of Representatives.  It is these debates on which 
the research project focuses to answer the central research question of what rhetorical 
strategies were employed in the legislative debate of the post-reporting phase of the 
9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process.
As noted in previous chapters, a central role of the public inquiry process is to 
rehabilitate the damaged legitimacy of a State, and its institutions, after its failure to 
prevent, or protect against, a major disaster event (Brown 2003).  However, the re-
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legitimation process does not end with the production of an inquiry report, rather it 
extends into a post-reporting phase of a public inquiry process.  Central to 
implementing the reforms of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process was 
Congressional action.  This action generated legislative debate and during this debate 
legislators employed persuasive rhetoric to make authority claims and legitimate their 
preferred course of action.
Recent Organisation Studies scholarship on legitimacy asserts that discursive and 
rhetorical actions can act to create and maintain legitimacy (see: Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2005; Vaara, et al. 2006; Van Leeuwen 2007; Erkama and Vaara 2010).  By 
exploring the rhetorical themes employed during the post-inquiry legislative debates, it 
is the aim of this study to gain insight into the process of re-legitimation in the context 
of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry exercise.  As such, the role of this chapter is to 
identify and organise the key rhetorical themes uncovered during a grounded theory 
analysis of the data.
5.2 Rhetorical Strategies for Legitimising the Legislative Narrative
This section of the Findings Chapter will examine the central rhetorical themes that 
contributed to the narrative which defined the reform mission and motivated the 
legislators to action.  This reform mission is the legislation of the recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission and, as a result, the institution of a wholesale reorganisation of the 
intelligence apparatus of the United States.  This was a significant legislative venture 
and proponents of reform focused on this significance in their rhetorical strategies to 
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define the mission in near-epic terms.  While there were no explicit, self-congratulatory 
claims of heroism by members of Congress during this reform process, the proponents 
of this legislation employed a rhetorical strategy that drew attention to the extensive 
scope, importance and historic nature of the reform.  The challenge emphasised the need 
to protect the American people and was framed as an opportunity to right past failures 
and, in doing so, rise to an historic opportunity.  This rhetorical strategy challenged 
fellow legislators to be decisive, rise to the occasion and take action to support these 
reform efforts.  Passing the legislation was framed as a success.  Resisting this 
legislation, resulting in further delay or failure, was framed as unnecessary, 
unreasonable and dangerous.  This was the basis of a heroic narrative: an epic 
legislative mission which cast supporters of the reforms in a heroic light, while 
opponents of the legislation would, it was implied, be caught on the wrong side of 
history.
Although dominant, the rhetorical narrative of the proponents did not go unchallenged.  
Despite the relatively small size of the minority opposition in this legislative debate, a 
counter-narrative emerged in which opponents attempted to co-opt the heroism narrative 
as their own.  For those lawmakers who opposed the legislation, or at least provided 
initial resistance to it, they sought to re-frame the heroic narrative, ironically casting the 
proponents as easily swept-up in the momentum of the process and unwilling to show 
the courage to slow down, allow for more debate and take the time to ensure that the 
‘correct’ course of action was taken.  In this counter-narrative, heroism was framed as 
having the bravery to stem what was determined to be an unnecessary and reckless rush 
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to action.  On both sides of the debate, legislators appeared eager to, albeit implicitly 
and with outward humility, claim the mantel of heroism.
5.2.1 An opportunity for change
Proponents of the reform legislation had a natural advantage in that the terrorist attacks 
of September 11th created an atmosphere that was receptive to change.  Changes in 
public policy are either incremental in nature, or they are preceded by a catalytic event 
that forces significant revisions to the status quo (Jones and Baumgartner 1991; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Dodd 1994).  Such events, as the 9/11 attacks, alter the 
public’s perception of reality so that current approaches become untenable and 
significant reform is demanded.  The September 11th attacks caused intelligence and 
counter-terrorism related issues to rise on the public agenda and provoked a deep 
questioning of existing policy therefore maximising the public’s openness for change 
and setting the stage for dramatic reform efforts which culminated in these 
Congressional legislative reform activities.  This receptiveness for change was sweeping 
in its scope, encompassing diverse areas of government remit, including intelligence, 
transportation, foreign policy and law enforcement.  The scale of the public demand for 
action and the scope of the proposed reforms, created a potential opportunity of heroic 
proportions.
It was this exceptional opportunity for reform that set the basis for the heroism narrative 
during congressional debate and was framed by proponents of the legislation as a 
monumental task to which legislators needed urgently to respond.  As articulated by 
Senator Collins, sponsor of the Senate’s reform bill S.2845, “This legislation will 
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implement the most sweeping significant reforms of our intelligence community in 
more than 50 years.  The reforms are long overdue, and they will help to make our 
Nation more secure” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11941).  While Senator Collins notes the 
significance of the reforms by placing them in an historic context of the last half 
century, she speaks also of the purpose of the reforms which is to ‘make our Nation 
more secure’.
5.2.2 To protect and secure
Prioritising the security of the nation and the protection of the American people was the 
first element of the heroic narrative.  Repeatedly, legislators noted that the primary 
reason for reform was to prevent future attacks and that this responsibility was 
fundamental to their role as leaders.  As noted in Chapter 3, the requirement of 
government to protect the populous from enemies both foreign and domestic has its 
roots in the United States’ Constitution.  Central to the role of governing is the role of 
protection.  As noted by Senator Collins:
“[This legislation] recognizes that the fundamental obligation of government is to 
protect its citizens and that those protections must evolve along with the threats.  
It reorders the priorities of an intelligence structure that was devised for a 
different time and a different enemy” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No. 118, p. S9700).
This observation was not given in isolation.  In fact, many of the proponents of the 
legislation, in both Houses of Congress, acknowledged that the protection from future 
attacks was central to the need for legislative action.  During the Senate debate Senator 
Lieberman, sponsor of the reform legislation, used phrases such as “the security of our 
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Nation depends upon [action]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 
2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11942), and “In this Congress, this President 
[Pro Tempore of the Senate] fulfills our constitutional duty to provide for the common 
defense of our Nation” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11944).  Senator John McCain, a co-sponsor of S.
2845, noted that:
“We have come a long way since 2001 in enhancing this country's ability to 
prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, but, as the 9/11 Commission said in its 
final report, we are not yet safe. Increasing our safety against terrorist attack 
requires new strategies, new ways of thinking, and new ways of organizing our 
Government. That is what this legislative debate will be all about” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
118, p. S9709).
Senator Coleman expressed Congress’ obligation in a slightly different way, 
highlighting the importance of national security and suggesting that legislative action 
was necessary to achieve this priority: 
“There are a lot of important achievements--Medicare reform, tax cuts-- but in the 
end you can’t have economic security without national security.  Americans 
cannot live if they live in fear.  The threat of terrorist attack is the greatest threat 
that faces America, and we have now taken substantial steps in making America 
safer” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.139, p. S11952).
Securing the nation against attack marked a shift in contemporary congressional 
priorities from domestic, social issues (e.g Medicare and tax reform) to protection and 
security (Grant 2004), and this shift was echoed in the rhetoric of the proponents of 
legislative reform in the House of Representatives.  Representative John Conyers was 
explicit in his rationale for reform when voicing his support for the House bill:
“The choice today is clear. We can either choose the status quo--a broken system 
of competing intelligence bottlenecks or a positive and promising reform. I urge 
my colleagues to vote for this bill. Our number one priority is to protect the 
American people and this bill is a step in the right direction” (U.S. Congress. 
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Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. 
H11028).
Emphasising the protection of the American people as Congress’ primary responsibility, 
Representative Conyers justifies the need for the legislation to fix a broken system that 
allowed the attacks of September 11th to take place.
In affirming his support for the compromise legislation before the House, 
Representative Cunningham employed the justification of protection when he stated: 
“ [...] I rise in support of the conference report on S.2845, the National 
Intelligence Reform Act. Included in this legislation are important reforms that 
will ensure better coordination among national intelligence agencies, and protect 
our Nation against future threats [...]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11020).
Likewise, Representative Jackson-Lee explained the rationale for the creation of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, a central aim of the legislation:
“The real reason for this bill is to get a Director of National Intelligence to be able 
to give to the American people and all of those who provide for homeland security 
the human intelligence to have us thwart terrorists and protect ourselves against 
attacks . . .” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 
2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11000).
Protecting the nation and ensuring an acceptable level of safety and security was the 
focus of Representative John Linder when he, speaking in support of the legislation, 
echoed the rhetorical theme of protection stating:
“As the 9/11 Commission concluded, we are safer today than we were 3 years 
ago, but we are not safe enough. As such, great changes and reform are needed. 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 before us today 
will do much to keep America safe, and it is important that we act to enact this 
legislation now. Protecting the American people is the number one priority of this 
President and the United States Congress” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H10995).
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Focused both on the country as a whole, and his district in particular, Representative 
Kind of Wisconsin expressed his support for the final legislation specifically because he 
determined that it would improve safety and security, causes which he argues must 
supersede partisan interest and party loyalty.
“The security of the people of western Wisconsin is of an utmost priority, and I 
am supporting this measure to make changes necessary to protect our homeland.
 [...] because when the safety of our country is at hand we need to be able to cross 
the aisle and work with our colleagues to protect our country” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. 
H11022).
Finally, the necessity of securing the homeland and protecting the citizenry was 
employed as a rhetorical device to minimise opponents’ criticism of the legislation.  For 
example, Senator Lieberman admonished: “The 9/11 Commission report is an 
indictment of the status quo.  Those who pick and try to look for loopholes in this 
reform have to remember that the status quo failed to protect the American people on 
9/11 [...]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.139, p. S11942).  Senator Coleman, challenging the assertion of opponents, 
that the Congress should defer action until the January 2005 opening of the newly 
elected 109th Congress argues:
“There are some who may say we could walk away from this bill and hope for 
something better next year. That would be irresponsible. This bill makes America 
safer. Passage of intelligence reform will only become more difficult as time 
passes--unless, God forbid, there is another terrorist attack. In that case, of course, 
there will be another call for reform. But I submit that Congress will have failed in 
its duty to the American people if it waits until then to do anything” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
139, p. S11953).
Senator Collins, in a similar manner, suggested that delaying the passage of reform 
legislation would carry unnecessary and unacceptable risks for the American people.  
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“Yes, we can wait. We can wait until the day when we know everything we 
possibly can know, when there are no more threats, when the American people do 
not expect their leaders to lead. We can wait until the day another attack leaves us 
all wondering once again why we did not see it coming. [...] That first day will 
never come. If we do not act, the second surely will” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. 
S9703).
By maintaining a persistent emphasis on the moral and constitutional duties of Members 
of Congress to keep the country safe and to protect Americans from future terrorist 
attacks, proponents of the legislation strengthened the rationale for Congressional action 
on intelligence reform.
The rhetorical theme of the security of America and the responsibility of government to 
protect the American people, adds an initial and important layer to the heroic narrative.  
Not only is this reform legislation a response on a very large scale, the central purpose 
of the reform is to make America safe.  In addition to the obvious appeal of protecting 
the vulnerable, it is argued that this is at the very centre of government responsibility.  
The implication?  Not supporting legislation that is intended to protect the American 
people is an abdication of a legislator’s fundamental, constitutional responsibilities.  
Establishing the role of protector, proponents defined the threat against which America 
required protection.  By establishing the existence of a real and present danger to the 
country, reform advocates reenforced the need for action to ensure security and 
established a degree of urgency for these legislative actions.  The following section 
presents this next element of the call to action narrative.
5.2.3 A real and present danger
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The objective of securing the populous from attack was not expressed in a contextual 
vacuum.  Alongside the rhetorical focus on security and protection was supporting 
rhetoric which focused on the nature of the threat and the enemies who jeopardised 
national security and from which the citizens required the protection of the Government. 
The use of this menace rhetoric manifested in the narrative in three particular ways.  
First, legislators sought to define and illustrate the threat.  Second, threats were linked to 
the need to reform.  Third, the lethality and immediacy of the threat was employed to 
stress the requirement for urgent action.  With often graphic descriptions of the terrorist 
threat, the assertion that reform was required to minimise these dangers and with no 
other immediate reform remedies available, aside from the proposed legislation under 
debate in Congress, proponents constructed a forceful and effective narrative. 
5.2.3.1 Defining the threat
This section will present data to illustrate the manner in which proponents of the 
legislation defined the threats to the nation.  The threats provide a context for the duty to 
secure and protect, as discussed above.  The following excerpts from the data, use 
different methods of illustration.  In some the threat is descriptive, in others, the 
statements are declarative and, at times, proponents of the legislation use examples of 
prominent terrorist attacks on other nations to illustrate that the threat remains active, 
towards the United States.  Regardless, most statements employ evocative, perhaps 
provocative, language to further the threat narrative.  Words such as ‘murder’, ‘mass-
murder’, ‘slaughter’, ‘cruelty’, ‘depravity’ and ‘evil’ are deployed.  One proponent of 
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the legislation speaks of a terrorist’s wish to ‘kill American children’ and employs 
analogies that equate terrorists to ‘rapists’, ‘pedophiles’ and ‘rattlesnakes’.
Supporters of the legislation were keen to use examples of recent terrorist attacks as 
proof that the enemy remained active.  Senator Collins listed the sites of several recent 
terrorist attacks, including the hostage taking of 1,300 at a school in Beslan, North 
Ossetia, to accomplish this goal.
“Our committee work neared its conclusion as terrorists murdered once again, this 
time at a schoolhouse in Russia.
These terrible events, combined with the slaughter we have seen in Bali, Istanbul, 
Madrid, Jerusalem, Jakarta, and so many other places, leaves no doubt that the 
enemy we face has both a global reach and an unlimited capacity for 
cruelty” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 
2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9702).
The attack in Russia had occurred recently, in September of 2004, and gained 
significant attention in the American media, due in part to the targeting of children.  
While Senator Collins did not take the time to describe each attack, the use of the term 
slaughter and the citation of multiple locations of terrorist attacks allowed her to present  
the threat as ongoing and the enemy active and determined.
One descriptive and provocative statement in the legislative debates of the reform 
proposals was delivered by Representative Roy Blunt, as he focused on a bomber who 
sought children as targets:
“There is a great example of a Jordanian who was convicted in Jordan of 
conspiracy to bomb a Jordanian school for American children. He is convicted of 
a conspiracy where his goal, his target, was to kill American children. He 
somehow got to this country [and] under the current interpretation of the courts, 
we cannot send him back to Jordan because he might be tortured, but we also 
cannot detain him.  [...]
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If one catches a rattlesnake on one's farm, they do not look at it and say, this is 
definitely a rattlesnake, let us go up and release it in the front yard. [...]  We are 
not going to let this criminal who was, in this case, targeting American children, 
in other cases might be a murderer, in other cases might be a rapist, in other cases 
might be a pedophile, we are not going to let this person go and release him in our 
community simply because we have no place to send him back to [...]” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
127, p. H8888).
While this is one of the most provocative speeches of the legislative debates, it is also 
one of the few to utilise analogy to characterise the enemy.  More commonly, 
descriptions of actual attacks were employed to illustrate the nature of the threats 
against which the Government needed to protect America.  For example, Representative 
Capito used the case of the March 2004, Madrid train bombings to highlight the 
vulnerability of American infrastructure:
“Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, as well as the recent 
bombing of four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, the need for stronger criminal 
laws to deal with terrorists and other violence has never been stronger.  
Intelligence reports last spring indicate that some terrorists might try to bomb U.S. 
rail lines or buses in major U.S. cities. We have also heard reports of so-called 
``dirty bombs'' that can be easily transported over our extensive mass 
transportation system.
Mr. Chairman, I do not have to remind anyone in this body of the potential loss of 
life and disruption to our economy and way of life from this modern new threat”
(U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.
150, No.127, p. H8872).
In this section of his floor speech, Representative Capito raises the threat of a mass-
casualty attack using a radiological device.  Other characterisations of the threat were 
less descriptive in nature, but nevertheless, still used specific language to emphasise the 
dangers that were faced.  Such as “Hardly a day passes in which we do not see new 
evidence of terrorism's depravity” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9703); or “9/11 was a horrible 
tragedy. We saw the face of evil. We learned the desperate measures people will take to 
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stamp out our way of life” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11952).   
While other descriptive accounts of the threat from the nation’s enemies were perhaps 
less dramatic; they, nevertheless, contained similar persuasive elements.  Senator 
Lieberman identified the enemy as brutal and inhumane, but continued to describe their 
targeting and adaptability before suggesting that current intelligence structures are 
insufficient in countering the threat, thus linking the threat to the need for reform:
“Terrorists working across national boundaries are brutal. They are inhumane.  
They strike, most of all, undefended targets, and they adapt to meet new 
circumstances. They are not going to be defeated solely, or perhaps even largely, 
in the end by military power or with the help of an intelligence system and 
community that were organized to fight the Cold War and helped win the Cold 
War” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.118, p. S9703).
Representative Sessions, spoke for the need to reform the intelligence structures using 
fact-based examples of the capabilities of a large number of terrorist groups.   
“Given the terrorist threats that we currently face in the United States, weak 
punishments for the possession or use of these weapons is simply unacceptable in 
light of the fact that we know that 26 terror groups already have shoulder-fired 
missiles in their possession” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No. 127, p. H8866).
While not relying on emotive language, in this instance, the factual assessment of 
enemy capability has alarming implications for American security.  Proponents used 
factual material to describe the nature of the threat.
As with previous examples, descriptions of the threats facing the United States were 
implicitly linked with the need to protect and subsequently the need to reform in order 
to have the capacity to protect.  This was implicit in the many references to the threat 
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which America faced and occasionally made explicit as in the two examples from 
Senator Lieberman and Representative Sessions, immediately above.  These were not 
the only attempts to link the threat with the need for reform, however.  This link, 
between the threat and the need to implement reforms to protect, played a key role in 
the development of the call to action narrative.
5.2.3.2 Linking the threat to the need for reform
As illustrated above, legislators provided purely descriptive accounts of the nature of 
threats which faced the United States.  One could conclude that the rationale for these 
descriptive accounts was to establish the case for reform.  This conclusion draws further 
support when one considers the numerous statements during the congressional debates 
that make an explicit link between terrorist threats and the need to reform to protect 
against these threats.
This link is articulated clearly by both sponsors of the bill in the Senate.  Senator 
Lieberman addresses the American response to its enemies: “I call this transformational 
reform because transformational reform is exactly what is necessary to face the enemy 
of today” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.118, p. S9703).  Senator Collins links the need for the reform legislation 
under debate in order to respond to terrorism:  “Our response must be far reaching, 
and it must unleash America's capacity to meet any challenge. This legislation is an 
essential part of that response” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 
2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9702).
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Senator Dorgan, notes that the reform process must ‘work’ in order to protect innocent 
Americans and that this legislation is the way to stop the enemy:
“My only point is, all of us want exactly the same thing. We want this [legislative 
process] to work. If there is anybody in here who does not want this to work, they 
do not belong in this Chamber. We want this to work. Why do we want it to work? 
Because we know people want to murder innocent Americans. They want to 
commit acts of terror in this country and we need to stop them” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.123, p. 
S10313).
The task of modernisation, which Senator Carper suggest the legislation will achieve, is 
necessary to confront what he refers to as a ‘clear and present danger’:
“Accordingly, we approached this task with a real sense of urgency, a grave and 
growing sense of urgency because we know we face a clear and present danger 
from terrorists.
The bill before us today is a landmark achievement because, as others have said 
and will say throughout the day, for the first time in over half a century we are 
going to modernize our national intelligence structure to meet the new challenges 
we face in today's world” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 
2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11942).
Representative Sessions sees the legislative reforms as an opportunity to provide tools 
for defending against terrorism:
“Mr. Chairman, to make sure that we provide the tools necessary to the Attorney 
General and other U.S. attorneys who may be prosecuting these cases, to give to 
the frontline agents and investigators those abilities to find and stop those people 
who are perpetrators of crime, mass murder against the United States of America.  
Most of all, I would remind this body how important it is to make sure that we 
keep terrorism away from our doorsteps” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, p. H8869).
While providing one of the more realistic assessments of what the reform legislation can 
and cannot accomplish, Representative Watson, nevertheless, highlights the need for 
updated policy to address a new and dangerous threat.
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“Whether at Pearl Harbor or the World Trade Center, surprise is everything 
involved in a government's failure to anticipate effectively. The events of 9/11 
defined a generation and laid bare our nation's lack of preparation and a national 
strategy to deal with the new threat of terrorism.
Passage of the 9/11 bill cannot by itself defeat the terrorist threat. A vote in 
Congress will not capture Osama bin Laden or stop the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction. But today we have given the U.S. Government new tools to deal with 
a new enemy who, as enemies of old, threatens our liberty and way of life” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
138, p. H11002).
In addition to the description of immediate and deadly threats and utilising the threat 
narrative to push the need for reform, proponents also sought to stress the urgent need 
for reforms.  The nature of the threat was so pressing, proponents argue, that the only 
way to protect from these threats is by making changes to the intelligence system by 
supporting the reform legislation that was currently before Congress.  Delaying even 
two months, until the start of the new Congress in January of 2005, was unacceptable 
and would leave the American people vulnerable to attack it was argued.  As Senator 
Coleman asserted:
“There are some who may say we could walk away from this bill and hope for 
something better next year. That would be irresponsible. This bill makes America 
safer. Passage of intelligence reform will only become more difficult as time 
passes--unless, God forbid, there is another terrorist attack. In that case, of course, 
there will be another call for reform. But I submit that Congress will have failed in 
its duty to the American people if it waits until then to do anything” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
139, p. S11953).
With the end of the legislative session approaching, proponents of the reform bills in 
both Houses of Congress constructed a narrative that allowed for only one correct 
option: accept the reform legislation as debated and vote to pass these reforms into law.  
To do so, proponents argued, was the only effective way to confront the threats that 
faced the country.  This theme of urgency was woven throughout the proponents’ 
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narrative.  Those legislators who were skeptical of the proposed reforms did not accept 
the urgency for action and repeatedly criticised proponents of the legislation as rushing 
the process. (The opponents’ counter-narrative will be examined in Section 5.4 of this 
chapter and later in Section 5.5.2 of this chapter which explores the opponents’ critique 
of the legislative process.)
Raising the spectre of a new terrorist attack, Representative Weldon encouraged 
immediate action in the House of Representatives as well:
“The 9-11 terrorists exploited our immigration system in order to carry out the 
murder of over three thousand Americans.  [...]  Does anyone think that our 
enemies will cease to look for and exploit weaknesses in our defenses? Does 
anyone think they will not look to continue exploiting the loopholes in our 
immigration laws? Does anyone think it makes us safer to keep the status quo?
Today, is the day we should be passing these reforms, not next year, and not after 
the next terror attack” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11019).
By defining the nature of the threat and arguing that reform was essential protection 
against these threats, proponents of the legislation sought to justify the need for reform 
in general, and the need to  support S.2845 and H.R.10 in particular.   This rhetorical 
strategy also sought to stress the need for immediate action and this expeditious need 
for reform was a helpful defence against criticism that the reform process was too 
rushed.
5.2.3.3 Threats require urgent action
Urgency was a consistent message from proponents of the legislation in both the Senate 
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and the House of Representatives.  Senator Lieberman explains, as he seeks to 
rationalise the pace of the legislative process:
“But what was the cause for our haste? Our enemies, our terrorist enemies, al-
Qaida and their ilk, are not waiting, as we know. They are here. They are 
planning. We are at peril. Accordingly, we approached this task with a real sense 
of urgency, a grave and growing sense of urgency because we know we face a 
clear and present danger from terrorists” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11942).
Representative Larson finds fault with what he views as delays in the legislative reform 
process, noting that terrorist attacks are ongoing and the implementation of reforms is 
necessary to protect against such attacks:
“While we waited for Republicans to be able to say they passed the intelligence 
reform bill themselves without needing any Democratic support, another U.S. 
Consulate office, this time in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia was attacked by terrorists, 
killing five people and wounding thirteen others. I fear how many more such 
attacks our enemies have been able to organize while we have delayed enacting 
intelligence reform needed to combat their activities” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. 
H11019).
Representative Menendez, raises the possibility of an imminent threat when he quotes 
Chairman Kean and then highlights the need to pass the reform legislation so that 
America can protect against an impending attack:
“As Governor Kean, the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, said recently, ``The 
question is whether it will pass now or after a second attack.'' Because we know 
the enemy seeks to attack again. We just do not know when and where it will 
occur. [...]
This conference report that we have before us today secures America [...] 
[and]addresses the key intelligence failures that allowed the 9/11 attacks to 
succeed” U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 
2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11007).
Repeatedly, legislators spoke of the pending nature of the next terrorist attack and the 
urgent need for action.  In presenting the case that there was a real and present danger 
facing America, legislators sought to define the nature of the threat, link the threat to the 
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need for reform and to assert the immediacy of the danger and therefore the urgent need 
to enact intelligence reform through legislation.  This, the real and present danger facing 
America, was the second element of the call to action narrative.  The first element, 
discussed in the previous section was the obligation for Congress to protect the 
American people and secure the nation.    The third element to the call to action 
narrative, an historic opportunity, will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
5.2.4 An historic opportunity
In establishing the legislative narrative, not only are rhetorical strategies based on the 
need for Congress to act in order to protect the people from a real and present danger, as 
discussed above, but the necessity to act is re-enforced through the framing of 
circumstances in an historic context.  This historic motivation manifests in a number of 
ways, but the common theme is the repeated emphasis on the historic opportunity for 
reform and is an attempt to strengthen the ‘Call to Action’ legislative narrative and 
encourage ‘heroic’ legislators to rise to the landmark challenge of their generation.
This rhetorical strategy was employed by the proponents of the legislation in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate.  Senator Snowe, emphasises the importance 
of the reform legislation by highlighting the significance of the attack and the proposed 
reforms: “Mr. President, I rise today to speak to the monumental issue before us, the 
most profound, sweeping reform of our entire intelligence community in nearly 60 
years, 3 years after the worst attack ever on American soil” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9756).  
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Representative Menendez, highlights the importance of stoping future attacks and 
places the scope of the proposed reforms in context: 
“That is why we as a Congress pledge to do everything possible to make sure the 
tragic events of 9/11 were never repeated. That is why the Commission was 
created to investigate what went wrong. Nothing is more important than that 
mission. In fact, the work on this bill and conference report is the most important 
of the entire 108th Congress.  [...] This will be the first comprehensive overhaul of 
our intelligence apparatus since 1947, updating it from the Cold War to the war on 
terror” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.138, p. H11007).
There were a number of legislators in both Houses of Congress who linked the historic 
nature of the September 11th attacks with the 1941 Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour.  
Representative Larson noted the historic anniversary on which the final House floor 
debate occurred, as he draws parallels between the two attacks:
“[...] we are here debating this legislation today, December 7, on the anniversary 
of another day of infamy, which like 9/11 forever changed the future course of this 
country and generations of Americans. As we honor and discuss those who were 
lost on 9/11 today, I would like to take a moment to also remember those lost 
today at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the sacrifices made by so many families and 
Americans since then to defend this Nation” (U.S. Congress. Congressional 
Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11019).
Drawing parallels between the loss of life and the inability of Government to prevent 
both the Pearl Harbor attacks and those of September 11th, Representative Smith states:
“It is fitting and appropriate that we consider this legislation on December 7th 
because prior to 9/11, Pearl Harbor represented the largest single day loss of 
human life to an attack on American soil.  [...] Today's historic bill addresses and 
responds to the Commission's major recommendations, and will bring much 
needed reforms to our intelligence funding, gathering, sharing, and analytical 
processes. Anyone who questions whether or not these reforms are needed should 
read the Commission's report. [...]  Mr. Speaker, on December 7th, 1941 
Americans said `never again' will we be caught so unprepared for a sneak attack. 
But it did happen again. It happened on September 11th, 2001, and nearly 3,000 
men, women, and children lost their lives because of it” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. 
H11011).
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Without mentioning Pearl Harbor by name, Senator Lieberman, nevertheless, invokes 
its memory by making reference to both the date of those attacks and the ‘day that will 
live in infamy’ phrasing, borrowed from President Roosevelt’s 1941 Pearl Harbor 
Address to the Nation, when discussing the historic nature of September 11th and the 
proposed reforms before Congress:
“[The 9/11 Commission's] 587-page report did not close the book on September 
11. It will never be closed. The legislation does not close the book on September 
11. It will live alongside December 7 as a day that will live in infamy throughout 
American history and America's future” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, pp. S11944-S11944).
Senator Durbin notes the significance of the reforms and the rare opportunity to enact 
such reforms.  He equates the scope of this legislation to the US Government’s 
mobilisation of resources to develop the atomic bomb:
“This is an historic moment. It is rare, if ever, that the Congress rises to the 
occasion as it has with this legislation. It is rare, if ever, that we can find a 
bipartisan consensus on an item of such controversy.  [...] For well over two years, 
I have urged that we do something profound and historic. I thought about the 
Manhattan Project.  [...] On that date, the President said we were shifting into a 
new approach. We want to know if we can use this new research in science to 
create atomic bombs, weapons that we may need in this war” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. 
S11948).
In the dramatic statement contained in the last line of this excerpt, Senator Durbin 
emphasises the historic nature of the struggle in which he sees America engaged: A 
struggle of such historic significance that America could be required to deploy nuclear 
weapons.
Representative Skelton notes that Congress would be making history if it were to pass 
such a large-scale restructuring of the nation’s intelligence community:
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“Mr. Speaker, we are making history today. This conference report represents the 
most profound government reform to date for meeting the unique and daunting 
security challenges existing in this era of terror. This bill fundamentally overhauls 
the structure of our Nation's intelligence community [...]  Mr. Speaker, 
opportunities in this body to effect fundamental and indeed historical changes are 
rare. We have such an opportunity today.  [...]  [This legislation] is significant, 
necessary, and unprecedented . . .” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, pp. H1105-H11006).
Finally, Senator Feinstein focuses on new and future threats and enemies that will 
confront America.
“What is the bottom line? It is that, with the passage of this bill, we will have 
taken a critical concrete step towards equipping our Nation to defend against the 
enemy of the 21st century--terrorists, rogue states and others who would do us 
harm.  [...] We recognize that what worked in 1947 does not necessarily work 
today.
I thank my colleagues in this and the other [legislative] body who worked so hard 
to bring us to where we are today, prepared to pass a truly historic law which will 
make everyone safer in an unsafe world” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11986).
Throughout the Congressional reform debates of H.R.10 and S.2845, proponents of the 
reform legislation employed a rhetorical strategy that stressed the historic nature of the 
September 11th attacks, the threats that faced the nation.  The need and opportunity for 
reform and the chance for legislators to take a role in making history, together, were 
used to strengthen the legislative ‘Call to Action’ narrative, encouraging legislators to 
take heroic and decisive action by implementing the proposed reforms.
5.3 Rhetorical Strategies for Legitimising the Legislative Content 
As discussed in the previous section, a pro-reform narrative dominated the debate in 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives.  This is not to suggest absolute 
unanimity or that this dominant account went completely unchallenged.  As explored in 
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the previous section, some legislators did seek to dispute elements of the pro-reform 
narrative.  Additional attention will be given to the opponents’ focus on the legislative 
process in Section 5.4 of this chapter.  First, however, this section will examine the 
character-based rhetorical themes employed by proponents of the legislation to 
strengthen their pro-reform justification.  Frequent application of the venerable 
characteristics of bipartisanship and hard work to describe the proponents, their actions, 
the legislation and the legislative process sought to reinforce the pro-reform legislative 
narrative and to defend it against criticism.  
5.3.1 Bipartisanship
Proponents of the reform legislation repeatedly referenced the bipartisan nature of both 
the legislation and the behaviour of the pro-reform legislators.  In a similar way to 
which the 9/11 Commission highlighted that their report and its recommendations were 
the unanimous product of a bipartisan exercise with no dissenting opinions, legislators 
were keen to underline the fact that not only was the Commission’s inquiry process 
bipartisan, but that S.2845 and H.R.10 were the product of bipartisanship at the 
Committee levels where they were written, that they were introduced with the support 
of both Republicans and Democrats, and the the subsequent negotiation process 
between conferees of both parties from both the House and the Senate produced a 
bipartisan Conference Report, which after passing both Houses, became the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004.
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The opening lines of the 9/11 Commission Report reenforce that the inquiry process and 
its results were intended to be the product of bi-partisanship.  “Ten Commissioners -- 
five Republicans and five Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nation’s capital 
at a time of great partisan division -- have come together to present this report without 
dissent” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States 2004b: 
xv).  The importance of emphasising bipartisanship is presumably to assert that the 
process is, not tainted by political considerations and therefore better able to produce 
credible results and fulfil the Commission’s designated mandate, a central feature of 
which was to investigate “[...] the facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001” (Public Law 107-306. 107th Congress 2002).  The 
Commissioners, later in the Preface of the report, stress that they “[...] have sought to be 
independent, impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan.  [...]  Our aim has not been to assign 
individual blame.  Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of the events 
surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned” (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon The United States 2004b: xv-xvi).
Proponents of the legislation returned to the theme of bipartisanship repeatedly, perhaps 
to strengthen the credibility of the reforms contained in the legislation, even going so far 
as to point to the bipartisan work of the Commission as a model for the legislative 
process in Congress.  Senator Durbin, praising the work of the Commission, said:
“It is rare, if ever, that we can find a bipartisan consensus on an item of such 
controversy. Yet we have achieved it.  The bipartisan 9/11 Commission gave us an 
excellent blueprint, a sense of urgency, and a constant reminder that we had to rise 
above our partisan differences. [...]  Governor Kean of New Jersey [and] 
Congressman Lee Hamilton of Indiana put together an extraordinary panel of 
Democrats and Republicans who brought us this report. And this report was our 
blueprint, as we sat down to write this historic legislation” (U.S. Congress. 
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Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. 
S11948).
In the House of Representatives too, the bipartisan bone fides of the 9/11 Commission 
were singled out as a desirable model for emulation.  Complimenting the Commission, 
Representative Meehan noted that its work was “[...] a landmark achievement. [The 
Commission] is a model for bipartisan cooperation that Congress must continue to 
follow” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol. 
150, No.138, p. H11023).  Representative McCarthy presented the Commission and the 
Senate as acting in a bipartisan manner and urged that both be seen as examples of how 
the House of Representatives should act:
“The five Republicans and five Democrats on the panel put aside their partisan 
differences and made 41 recommendations, which if made law, would make this 
country safer. The Senate on Wednesday embraced these recommendations with 
the 96-2 passage of the Collins/Lieberman National Intelligence Reform Act.  I 
encourage the House to act in the same bipartisan manner as the Senate” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
127, p. H8909).
These repeated references to the Commission as a bipartisan example suggest either that  
the Commission achieved its aim of bipartisanship, or at least its aim of presenting itself 
and its work as bipartisan, or that the view of a bipartisan effort was a useful rhetorical 
device in the Congressional debate.  A commitment to bipartisanship was not linked 
solely to the 9/11 Commission, however.  The sponsors of the Senate legislation ensured 
that a theme of bipartisanship helped to frame their presentation of the legislation.  In 
his opening speech, upon the introduction of S.2845 for debate, Senator Lieberman 
spoke of the Committee work involved in the writing of the legislation:
“So Senator Collins and I understood from the beginning that we had to work 
together to do what was best for the country as we saw it. There would be 
differences of opinion, but we would do everything we could to make sure they 
were not partisan. That is exactly the tenor of the markup our committee 
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conducted for 2 days last week. It was one of the best 2 days of my 16 years as a 
Senator. When it was over, we had more than 40 amendments filed with the 
committee. Not a single amendment was decided on a partisan vote. One 
particular Democratic colleague said to me: For 2 days it was actually like we 
were legislating, the reason we came here in the first place” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. 
S9703).
In emphasising the co-operative work of the Senate, Government Affairs Committee, 
under the leadership of Chairwoman Collins (Republican) and the Committee’s most 
senior member of the minority party, himself a Democrat, Senator Lieberman stressed 
that this was not a partisan exercise.
Later in the Senate debate, Senator Collins explained the role that bipartisanship played 
in the writing of the legislation at her Senate Committee (Governmental Affairs).
“[...] [W]e pledged to work together and to recognize that when it comes to 
matters of national security, there is no place for partisanship. We worked from 
the very beginning to forge a bipartisan bill, and I am very pleased that the 
conference agreement we bring before the Senate today is a bipartisan agreement. 
I am confident that later today it will receive a strong bipartisan vote” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
139, p. S11940).
Throughout debate on S.2845, proponents of the legislation sought to frame their 
rhetoric with reassurances of bi-partisanship.  Senator Levin noted that:  
“The managers deserve great credit as the conference agreement represents a 
significant achievement in regard to those issues. Their work, the work of 
Senators Collins and Lieberman, is a model of bipartisanship, and I heartily 
commend them for it” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11955).
Bipartisanship appears to have intrinsically worthwhile qualities that reflect positively 
on the legislative reform process.  This can be seen in the repeated complimentary 
statements in which bipartisanship is listed alongside other positive terms such as: 
‘strength’, ‘wisdom’, ‘making America safer’, ‘important legislation’, ‘good answers’,  
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‘best resolution’.  Without knowing the precise reasons that legislators viewed 
bipartisanship as desirable in every situation, it is clear that regardless of their rationale 
that they viewed bipartisanship in a positive way and intended its use to bolster their 
pro-reform rhetoric.  For example, Senator Durbin employs bipartisanship to urge 
support of S.2845:
“The path that led us to this point has not been without obstacles. We had to make 
major compromises in order to move the legislation forward. But this conference 
report proves that Congress could work in a bipartisan manner to bring together 
strength and wisdom and produce this significant bill.  [...]  As we have done on 
the Senate side, we have demonstrated that this kind of bipartisan cooperation 
makes America a safer place” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11950).
Senate Minority Leader, Tom Daschle was complimentary of the legislative effort, 
including its bipartisan nature, when he states:  “I am especially grateful to Senators 
Collins and Lieberman, the managers of this important legislation.  [...]  They have 
managed to grasp the details of this complicated bill and produce strong bipartisan 
support for their bill” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.125, pp. S10529-S10530).
Gratitude, which focused on bipartisanship, was repeatedly expressed in the House of 
Representatives as well.  Speaker of the House and the sponsor of H.R.10, 
Representative Hastert, expressed his appreciation for the work of the senior committee 
members from both parties involved in crafting the House bill:
“I want to thank the chairmen and [the senior members of the minority party] of 
the committees of jurisdiction in this House of Representatives. They have done 
an incredible job. They have come together. They have worked hard and, by and 
large, on a bipartisan basis to find good answers to tough problems. They have 
worked hard to provide us with their best ideas on how to implement these 
recommendations” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, p. H8906).
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Finally, bipartisanship appears to be used as a theme which suggests that partisan 
pursuits are undesirable and in opposition to a greater good.  Therefore, individuals, 
processes and policy which are seen to be bipartisan are seen as rising above selfish and 
petty motives to promote the greater good and to serve the nation.  This use of 
bipartisan rhetoric links closely with the rhetorical themes explored in Section 5.2 of 
this chapter.  Themes of protection against dangerous threats and rising, above party 
politics, for a larger historic purpose. 
Senator McCain references the ‘good of the Nation’ and the ‘national interest’ while 
applauding Senators Collins and Lieberman:
“[...] I again express my profound and deep appreciation to Senator Collins and 
Senator Lieberman who have displayed adequately for all Americans as well as 
Members of this body that if there is a cause great enough and people good 
enough that we will act in a bipartisan fashion for the good of this Nation.
I have been in this body for only 18 years, but this is one of my prouder moments 
because of the way this entire body has acted in the national interest” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
125, p. S10537).
During the House debate on the legislation Representative Watson acclaimed the 
bipartisan process, that resulted in the production of the Conference Committee report, 
which overcame the ‘narrow interests of a few’:
“Mr. Speaker, the success of the 9/11 bill (S.2845) is a great victory for America.  
The bill's success also demonstrates that our democratic process works and that 
Americans can come together in a bipartisan way to overcome the narrow 
interests of a few and meet the greatest challenge of our age head-on.  [...] There 
were fights about almost every issue. We worked it out as best we could. We 
worked it out on a bipartisan basis [...]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11014).
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Recalling the bipartisanship in the wake of the September 11th attacks, Representative 
Maloney invokes the bipartisan refrain of ‘united we stand’ to emphasise the focus on 
national rather than partisan interests.
“Right after 9/11, the Congress had never been more united and determined to 
work together in a bipartisan way to keep America safe from further attacks. We 
got a great deal done in a short period of time. It was a proud moment in this 
body's history. Unfortunately, it did not last long enough. But today, the last act of 
this session of Congress, passing this intelligence reform and anti-terrorism bill, 
will be a heartening reminder to the American people that the two parties can 
work together and live up to the ideal that was so often repeated after 9/11: united 
we stand” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 
2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H10998).
Proponents of the reform legislation utilised the rhetoric of bipartisanship to support the 
idea that the legislative reforms were an opportunity for legislators, through their 
support of the bills, to express a high-minded, patriotic and sacred duty to work in the 
interests of the American people.
This section has explored the use of bipartisanship as a rhetorical theme within the 
legislative debate to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission during 
the post-reporting phase of that public inquiry process.  Universally, proponents of the 
legislation understood bipartisanship to be a positive phenomenon and sought to use its 
claim to their advantage.  First, legislators championed the 9/11 Commission as a model 
of bipartisanship to which Congress should aspire.   Asserting a shared bipartisan 
approach, proponents of  the legislation used this rhetoric as a way of linking the reform 
bills to the work of the 9/11 Commission, thereby strengthening the credibility of the 
legislation.  Second, bipartisanship was used more generally, in conjunction with other 
laudatory terms, as a way to compliment the process.  The implication was that because 
the legislative process and the resulting policy was bipartisan it was intrinsically good.  
 
Page | 160
Finally, working in a bipartisan fashion was used as a proxy for high-minded, selfless 
work.  If legislators would set aside petty, partisan self-interest, they could work 
together to serve the Nation.  Having focused on the rhetorical theme of bipartisanship, 
the following section will deal with the rhetorical theme of hard work and its use in 
furthering the pro-reform narrative.
5.3.2 Hard work 
One manner by which proponents conveyed the extent to which legislation was the 
product of a significant amount of hard work was to link the current legislation with its 
origins.  Senator Collins linked the bill before the Senate with the work of the 9/11 
Commission:
“This legislation is not, however, merely the product of 2 months’ work by our 
committee.  It is based upon the work of the 9/11 Commission and the inquiry that 
spanned 20 months, with 19 days of hearings and 160 witnesses, the review of 2.5 
million documents, and interviews of more than 1.200 individuals in 10 countries.  
The new intelligence structure we propose in our legislation is built upon a rock-
solid foundation of inquiry and information” (U.S. Congress. Congressional 
Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, pp. S9700-S9701).
This reenforces not only the considerable work of the Commission, but also helped to 
deflect the criticism that the legislative process for S.2845 had been rushed.  Later in the 
debate, Senator Collins makes her point more explicit and traces the origins of reforms 
in S.2845 even further back:  
“As I have indicated, this legislation is the product of a concerted effort by the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, It reflects the recommendations of other 
committees and it builds upon the work of the 9/11 Commission.  But it is 
important to know that the 9/11 Commission did not start from scratch, either.  Its 
work takes into account nearly a half century of studies on intelligence reform 
dating back to the Eisenhower administration” (U.S. Congress. Congressional 
Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9702).
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A fellow sponsor of the legislation, Senator Lieberman sought to make a similar point 
by emphasising the significant effort of the 9/11 Commission, before going on to link 
their work with the proposed Senate bill.
“The Commission spent a year and a half studying the weaknesses in our national 
defenses that left us vulnerable on September 11, 2001. They interviewed more 
than 1,200 witnesses, reviewed literally millions of documents, held 12 public 
hearings, and produced a compelling narrative, chilling in its details and 
implications.” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 
2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9703).
Proponents of the legislation sought to emphasise that the proposed reforms had not 
originated during the relatively brief legislative process.  Senator Graham, focused on 
what was described as the lengthy development period extending into the past and well 
beyond the current process:  
“This is an accomplishment which did not happen beginning this summer but 
rather has been underway for at least the 15 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
I am extremely pleased we have now arrived at the point we may be in a position 
to enact serious intelligence reform for the first time in over 50 years” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
139, p. S11954).
Senators repeatedly referenced the amount of work that was involved in developing the 
legislation even during the legislative period.  Senator Rockefeller stated that he was 
“ [...] pleased to be here at long last to speak in support of the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act.  After 5 months of endless work [...] we are poised to achieve 
what people thought was impossible (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11958).   Likewise, Senator Roberts 
referenced the work that was involved in bringing this legislation forward, 
acknowledging: 
“ [...] Senator Collins and Lieberman and their staff for their efforts to get a bill 
which will have a positive impact on our intelligence community.  They have put 
 
Page | 162
in a tremendous amount of hard slugging, sometimes very contentious and very 
difficult work, and overtime, since they began [...]” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. 
S11953).
Senator McCain was effusive with his praise of the amount of work that was necessary 
for the legislative reform:
“Mr. President, I came here to applaud the enormous efforts of my two colleagues, 
Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. This has been a task that has been, in the 
view of many, insurmountable. This piece of legislation was declared dead on 
numerous occasions. It was through their tenacity, hard work, and willingness to 
compromise that we now have perhaps one of the most significant and important 
reorganizations of the Federal Government certainly since 1947 when we created 
the Department of Defense [...]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S12007).
Senator Lieberman sought to convey the amount of pre-debate work that had been 
conducted at the Governmental Affairs Committee:
“During August and early September, in fact beginning at the end of July, the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held, as Senator Collins said, eight 
hearings on the Commission's recommendations and drafted a bill on their work. 
Last week we held a 2-day markup, considered more than 40 amendments, and 
voted the measure out of committee unanimously, with amendments adopted, 
good give and take, thoughtful discussion, negotiation on wording that in the 
end strengthened the authority and the position of national intelligence 
director” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 
2004. Vol.150, No.118, pp. S9703-S9704).
Repeatedly, Senators sought to emphasise the work that was required in the creation of 
the pending legislation.  This theme of hard work was also frequently present amongst 
proponents of the legislation in the House of Representatives.  Representative Linder 
linked the theme of hard work with the quality of the legislation in his statement before 
the House:
“I would also like to commend the Members of the House on both sides of the 
aisle who worked so hard to put forth a really good bill and then fought to keep 
most of it in the final draft” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11002 ).
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Likewise, Representative Hoekstra, acknowledges the work that the creation and 
management of the reform legislation required, predicating the production of quality 
legislation on the amount and quality of effort expended:
“The staff has worked incredibly hard to make this possible over the last 7 weeks. 
They have worked long hours every day to get this bill to where we are today. 
Without them, this simply could not have been possible.
Mr. Speaker, the conference report on S.2845 is a good piece of legislation. It is 
necessary. We need to support it, and we need our colleagues to vote yes” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
138, p. H11003  ).
Representative Conyers highlights his colleagues’ determination and hard work, he 
compliments individuals from both parties for coming together, emphasising that they 
have ‘worked so hard’ as if to reassure skeptics that hard work is a proxy for quality:
“The product we have before us is the product of extensive negotiations, that 
included all parties Democrats and Republicans.  My Democratic colleagues on 
the conference deserve credit for their determination and hard work.  [...]  I want 
to offer particular praise across the aisle to my Republican colleagues who have 
worked so hard on this bill [...]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11028).
Finally, sponsor of H.R.10 and Speaker of the House, Representative Hastert uses the 
term ‘craft’, which implies substance and quality, and acknowledges the significant 
effort undertaken by his fellow legislators.  He equates effort to the production of 
quality policy and ‘best ideas’:
“I want to thank the 9/11 Commission for their recommendations and the stellar 
work of both the chairman and the vice chairman of that committee over a long 
period of time to take the interest of this Nation at heart, to try to craft 
recommendations that make this country safer against terrorists.
I want to thank the chairmen and ranking members of the committees of 
jurisdiction in this House of Representatives. They have done an incredible job. 
They have come together. They have worked hard and, by and large, on a 
bipartisan basis to find good answers to tough problems. They have worked hard 
to provide us with their best ideas on how to implement these 
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recommendations” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, pp. H8905-H8906 ).
These examples are indicative of the rhetorical employment of the theme of hard work 
during the H.R.10 and S.2845 debates in the House of Representatives.  Hard work is 
often associated with quality and highlighting the hard work that has been invested in 
the legislation implies that the resultant legislation is too of high quality.  Additionally, 
hard work is widely viewed as a positive characteristic and frequently associated with 
trustworthiness and honesty.  These are important personal attributes and it can be 
inferred that policy produced by such hard working individuals is to be taken seriously.  
Finally, the assertion that this legislation was the result of hard work helps to negate 
concerns about the compressed nature of the legislative timelines.  One could argue that 
progress was swift, but that quality has not suffered because many talented individuals 
have worked very hard to craft this legislation.
5.4 Rhetorical Strategies for Resisting the Legislative Process
A central rhetorical theme, among both opponents and initial skeptics of the reform 
legislation, was a concern with the process.  While these individuals questioned the 
substance of some of the reforms, more so in the House than in the Senate, a common 
point of argumentation was that a flawed process undermined the credibility of the 
proposed reforms.  A critical focus on process, consistent in both the House and the 
Senate debates, was adapted to fit the differences in the legislative process in each 
House of Congress.
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In the House of Representatives, as detailed in Chapter 4, a number of Republican 
Representatives focused on issues of immigration reform, a highly contentious issue in 
American politics.  Given the polarising nature of this issue and the fact that, with a 
majority position in the legislature, Republicans were able to include elements of 
immigration reform in their Intelligence Reform Bill, H.R.10, the legislative process in 
the House had a more contentious complexion than the legislative process in the Senate.  
This created party-line divisions in the House that were not present in the Senate.  
Therefore, those resisting H.R.10 were inclined to criticise the process as lacking 
sufficient bipartisanship.  For example, Representative Levin declared that:
“There have been two distinctly different approaches followed in the House and 
Senate on the critical issue of implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. In the Senate, there has been an open and bipartisan process used to 
develop a bill that truly reflects the recommendations of the Commission. The 
Collins-Lieberman legislation in the Senate [...] was the product of extensive 
deliberation and bipartisan cooperation” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, pp. H8913-H8914).
It is evident from the data that rhetorically, opponents of H.R.10 repeatedly employed 
the lack of bipartisanship as a part of a flawed-process narrative to challenge the 
proponents of the legislation.
The Senate debated a bill which reflected more closely the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission and omitted potentially partisan issues such as immigration reform.  As 
such, those resisting the reform legislation in the Senate did so on largely processual 
grounds.  While there were points of policy disagreement in the Senate, they were 
smaller and more limited in scope and were concentrated primarily around the 
introduction of the Byrd and Spector amendments.  This less contentious debate allowed 
for a more bipartisan process. As such, the criticism of opponents was not centred on a 
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lack of bipartisanship, rather opponents in the Senate defined the rhetoric of ‘flawed 
process’ in two ways.  First they argued that the entire reform process was rushed and 
that key changes to the legislation were negotiated ‘behind closed doors’ during the 
protracted Conference Committee process that produced the harmonised legislation 
which was returned to the House and the Senate in the form of Conference Committee 
Report S.2845.
5.4.1 Partisanship in the House
An analysis of the rhetorical themes employed during the legislative debate of the 9/11 
Commission’s reforms, reveals that the principle of bipartisanship was employed by 
both sides.  As discussed in Section 5.3.1 of this chapter, proponents of the reforms 
sought to reenforce that the legislative process had been bipartisan, that the reform 
legislation was written with contributions from both political parties and that the reform 
bills enjoyed broad-based bipartisan support amongst legislators.  Additionally, 
bipartisanship was invoked repeatedly as a complement to fellow proponents of the 
legislation, suggesting that those supporting the legislation were setting aside petty 
political interests and embracing a greater good.  The implication was that opposition to 
the legislation was an act of partisanship with all its negative associations.
This was one manner in which bipartisanship was employed as a rhetorical device.  
However, critics of H.R.10 and its respective legislative process employed the 
bipartisanship theme as well, specifically in the form of explicit accusations of 
partisanship.  Opponents of H.R.10 criticised the legislative process in the House as 
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partisan and these critics admonished the House leadership to adopt a more bipartisan 
approach.  Some critics highlighted the practices of the 9/11 Commission and the 
Senate’s work on S.2845 as examples of bipartisan processes which the House could 
emulate.  The theme of bipartisanship, and by extension partisanship, was employed 
rhetorically by both sides.  However, proponents employed bipartisanship primarily as 
an attribute of character, whereas, opponents in the House employed partisanship as a 
critique of process.
Representative Green, a proponent of H.R.10, challenges such critiques of process when 
he states “Mr. Chairman, I think what is interesting to listen to today are the arguments 
on the other side. Where they cannot win on the merits, they choose to throw up a 
smoke screen of process, no matter how far off point it may be” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, p. H8886).  
It is clear that the central focus of the rhetorical strategies employed to oppose H.R.10 
and S.2845 was to criticise the process. This was done in the House of Representatives 
by arguing that the process was overly partisan.
Opponents of the reform bill, H.R.10, sought to contrast the legislative process in the 
House with previous (9/11 Commission) and concurrent processes (S.2845) on 
intelligence reform.  Representative Schakowsky attempts to contrast the work of the 
House with the work of the Commission when she states:
“Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to H.R.10, the so-called 9/11 
Recommendations Implementation Act. At a time when our national security is at 
risk and our brave troops are fighting overseas, it is shameful that the Republican 
leadership has chosen to present a partisan bill that does not effectively implement 
the recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission” (U.S. Congress. 
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Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, p. 
H8914).
Likewise, Representative McCarthy sought to contrast the process in the House with 
what she views as a superior bipartisan process in the Senate:
“I encourage the House to act in the same bipartisan manner as the Senate. H.R.
10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, was written behind closed 
doors and fails to fully implement 30 of the 41 Commission recommendations.
[...]  It is disappointing that the House failed to do its job today” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, pp. 
H8909-H8910 ).
Representative Udall, highlights bipartisanship in the Senate by pointing out that not 
only was the Senate able to reach an agreement between both Republicans and 
Democrats, but the legislation that was produced also enjoyed the support of the 9/11 
Commission and the families of the victims of 9/11: 
“Mr. Speaker, nearly two months ago this House passed a bill that failed to 
address many of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, while including 
objectional provisions regarding immigration, civil liberties, and other issues. 
While the Senate was able to reach agreement on a bill that reflected the views of 
both parties, the Commission, and the 9/11 families, House leaders did not work 
in a similarly bipartisan way to reach agreement on the best way to implement the 
recommendations” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11022).
Representative Markey underlines the bipartisanship and success of the Senate process, 
while providing specific examples of the partisan issues that damaged the House’s 
efforts and injected partisanship into its reform debate, including immigration reform 
and the ability of the Department of Defense to retain control over key, real-time 
intelligence assets:
“Although the Senate put together a bipartisan bill that was true to the spirit of the 
9/11 Commission recommendations, the House version catered to anti-
immigration groups' agendas and to Donald Rumsfeld's struggle to keep all of his 
Department's intelligence turf intact” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11018).
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Finally, Representative Millender-McDonald speaks of the Menendez substitute which 
would have replaced the wording of the House bill, H.R.10 with the wording of the 
Senate bill, S.2845.  Clearly preferring what she sees as the bipartisan legislative 
process in the Senate over the partisan approach in the House she states:
“We had a clear choice before us to have passed the Menendez substitute, a 
bipartisan approach that followed the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
[...] [or] pass a partisan House Republican bill that was slapped together in a 
matter of months to address immediate political measures.  Unfortunately, this 
Republican led Congress chose the quick fix.  It is important to note that the 
Senate took these same nonpartisan recommendations to heart and passed a 
bipartisan bill overwhelmingly 96-2” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, p. H8913).
As illustrated above, the opponents of H.R.10 in the House, employed a rhetorical 
strategy that focused on the legislative process.  These criticisms concentrated on the 
perceived lack of bipartisanship in the House and elevated the Senate process and the 
public inquiry process of the 9/11 Commission as exemplars of bipartisanship. 
5.4.2 Rushed in the Senate
While the central focus of the critique in the House of Representatives was the charge 
that the process was overly partisan, the Senate critique, more concentrated but not less 
vocal, was focused on the assertion that the process had been rushed not allowing for 
adequate study and debate.
The most vocal opponent of the reform legislation considered by the Senate was Senator 
Byrd of West Virginia.  Elected in 1959, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), at the age of 87, 
was the longest serving member of the Senate at the time of the S.2845 debate and the 
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longest serving member in the history of Congress.  As the most senior member of the 
legislative body, Senator Byrd held the position of President Pro Tempore of the Senate 
and by virtue of that role was third in line of Presidential succession.  In his opposition 
to S.2845, he prioritises a focus on process over a focus on content.  He goes as far as to 
defer to the sponsors of the bill regarding its substance when he says:
“I do not claim to know as much about this legislation as the managers of the bill. 
But I do know about process. And it galls me that the Senate has allowed itself to 
be jammed against a time deadline time and time and time again--and in this 
instance, jammed against a time deadline in considering this conference 
report” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.139, p. S11960).
Byrd expresses concern over his inability to scrutinise the legislation more thoroughly, 
blaming the rush to legislate:
“This is the perfect example of how we are rushing through this intelligence bill 
without fully understanding what we are doing. I do not understand what we are 
doing, and I need to understand what we are doing. To properly represent the 
people from West Virginia, I need to understand what we are doing.  [...]  How can 
we be certain as to what we are doing when we are rushed and pressured into 
passing legislation as major as this legislation in such a limited time, which is 
hours? We are being pressured to pass this legislation before we adjourn sine die. 
This is massive legislation. It is far-reaching legislation. The Congress should not 
have to operate under a hammer, as we are being driven here” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.122, p. 
S10205).
Senator Byrd draws upon a significant and recent example in which he claims that the 
Congress was rushed to make a decision and he links the intelligence reform process to 
the process in which Congress’ authorised President Bush’s use of force against Iraq:
“Iraq was a rushed mistake: We saw, Madam President, the unwisdom of being in 
a hurry when it came to the invasion of Iraq. Our Government invaded.  [...]  And 
now look at what is happening. Look at the terrible cost, the terrible price this 
Government is paying--paying with the blood of the sons and daughters of our 
country. Think of it.  Let's don't be in such a big hurry. Let's take more time” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
122, p. S10207).
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Repeatedly, Senator Byrd led the opposition to the legislation with a single rhetorical 
theme.  The rushed and reckless nature of the legislative process: 
“Why not take more time? What is all the rush? Why not take time? That is all I 
am asking for is take time.  [...] Why do we not take time and try to work this out? 
There are many other questions. That is what I am asking. Let us have more time. 
We are being forced to operate under the gun here and that does not lend itself to 
very wise legislation. That is what I am asking: How about more time” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
123, p. S10313)?
Responding directly to proponents of the legislation by questioning the veracity of their 
claim: that to delay the legislation would jeopardise the safety and security of the 
American people, Senator Byrd states:
“Now, a terrorist attack may happen, but it won't happen because this conference 
report would have been put over until next year. If it is going to happen, it will 
happen and nothing in this conference report would stop it if it happened next 
week or the next month or the next several weeks or months.  That is nonsense. 
Don't believe it.
I have heard even some comments from people who ought to know better on the 
TV saying, What I am concerned about, if we don't pass this report, I just hope we 
don't have another terrorist attack--as though passage of this conference report 
will make any difference to any terrorist who may be planning an attack next 
week or 10 days or the next month or the next 2 or 3 months. No legislation alone 
can forestall a terrorist attack on our country” (U.S. Congress. Congressional 
Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11962).
While Senator Byrd was the most prominent and verbally prolific opponent to the 
reform legislation in the Senate, he was not the only one concerned with a rush to 
action.  Senator Inouye a Democrat representing the State of Hawaii, encouraged 
Senators to proceed with caution.    Conveying the advice of expert witnesses who 
testified  before his Committee he explained:
“Last week, the Appropriations Committee received testimony from seven 
witnesses, all of whom are experts in the field of national security and 
counterterrorism. [...]  I do not believe I would be overstating their views to say 
they were quite concerned with the legislation being proposed by the 
Governmental Affairs Committee.  Their counsel was to be cautious. 
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Dr. [Henry] Kissinger recommended that Congress study this issue more carefully. 
He urged us to take another 6 months before we moved forward on what is the 
most significant Government overhaul since the National Security Act of 1947.
[...]  I know some of my colleagues worry that if we do not act now we will lose 
the opportunity for significant change. I recognize this concern. But enacting bad 
legislation in haste because there is a popular demand to act is not the proper way 
for this body to respond” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 
2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.120, p. S9907).
Senator Hollings, who joined Senator Byrd in voting against the first iteration of S.
2845, notes what he views as political pressure moving the legislative process forward 
at an accelerated rate.
“As we consider this bill under great political pressure and with the election 
looming, we have considerable analogous precedent to reference. Recent hasty 
Congressional enactments of Homeland Security legislation and the Patriot Act 
show the need for more measured action. Collins-Lieberman is thrown together in 
a matter of weeks. Surely most of us agree that at least some of its provisions are 
problematic.  [...]  A hastily thrown together conference resolving differences in 
the House and Senate versions will not be conducive to finding and fixing these 
inevitable problems. 
My friend Senator Stevens says, ‘Do no harm'’. Whatever comes back from 
conference will have a tremendous head of steam behind it. By acting too fast on 
Collins-Lieberman, the Senate may get stuck with House provisions in a 
conference report that are unpalatable. Once reform is enacted, fixing missteps is 
extremely difficult. Experiences of homeland security legislation, passed right 
before an election, and the Patriot Act, prove that hasty restructuring results in 
confusion, mistakes and paralysis” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.121, pp. S10034-S10035).
Concerned with avoiding policy mistakes, which can be difficult to undo or amend, 
Senator Hollings also references the contemporary examples, as Senator Byrd did with 
Iraq, of the Homeland security legislation and the US Patriot Act.
Senator Inhofe, who joined Senator Byrd in voting against the Conference Report, 
S.2845 (This was the final legislation that, once passed, became the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004.) echoed the concerns that political considerations 
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were unnecessarily accelerating legislative process.  Senator Inhofe questioned why 
when the 9/11 Commission requested an extension to complete their work Congress was 
willing to accede, yet when fellow legislators made requests for more time they were 
ignored.
“This process has been hurried and rushed from the beginning. It has been tainted 
ever since the decision was made to tie its consideration to a political schedule.
When the 9/11 Commission needed more time to conduct its investigation into the 
September 11 attacks, the Congress acted magnanimously in granting a 2-month 
extension. Senators said at the time:
It would be counterproductive to deny the commission the extra 2 months it 
now says it needs to complete its investigations.  . . .
Mr. President, the Founding Fathers would be ashamed of the notion that time is a 
luxury reserved for the unelected members of independent commissions. What 
about the Senate? What about the elected representatives of the people who serve 
in this body?  The Framers of the Constitution conceived a Senate that would 
resist the forces that urge us to bend with each change in the political breeze. To 
the contrary, the Constitution binds Senators to serve the greater causes of the 
Republic and reserves the power of each Member to demand more time for 
debate, more time for thoughtful consideration” (U.S. Congress. Congressional 
Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11964).
Finally, even supporters of the legislation showed their annoyance with the compressed 
timelines of the process.  Senator Stevens, a keen supporter of S.2845, who cast his vote 
with the majority in favour of the legislation in both instances,  when faced with 
restrictions on his speaking time expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of the Senate 
timetable:
“Mr. President, I am constrained to say that I am disturbed at the process that has 
just been used.  [...]  I think in view of the haste with which this bill is moving 
forward, it is very sad. It is going to change this Senator's vote on cloture 
tomorrow because I am tired of having this bill being pushed so hard. [...]
I think we should take some time and consider what we are doing. If we are not 
careful, we will destroy the intelligence system we are trying to reorganize. I am 
in favor of reorganizing it. I said that in the beginning.  [...]  I think we should 
slow down” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 
2004. Vol.150, No.123, p. S10331).
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Despite these concerns, S.2845, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, was passed in the Senate by near unanimous consent as noted in Chapter 4.  
Despite this there was a core of Senate opposition, led by Senator Robert Byrd of West 
Virginia.  These opponents to the Senate legislation focused on what they viewed as 
flaws in the legislative process, namely a rushed effort to pass intelligence reform 
legislation.  This small core of opponents was joined by others who, although they 
would eventually support the legislation, nevertheless, expressed similar concerns about 
the pace of the legislative process.  While opponents in both Houses of Congress chose 
to focus on flaws in the process as a central rhetorical strategy to oppose the legislation, 
opponents in the House of Representatives focused on the theme of partisanship; 
whereas, opponents in the Senate focused on the rush to action.
5.5 Rhetorical Strategies for Legitimising and Resisting: Appropriating Authority
One rhetorical strategy was employed consistently by both proponents and opponents of 
the legislative reforms in Congress.  References to the 9/11 Commission were uniformly 
positive and employed by both sides to strengthen their respective positions.  It is of 
little surprise that supporters of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, (H.R.
10) and the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, (S.2845) made frequent an 
favourable mention of the Commission whose recommendations were the genesis for 
the reform legislation.  However, the degree to which opponents of the legislation used 
rhetorical strategies that were deferential in nature when invoking the Commission was 
considerable as well.  In their attempt to de-legitimise the legislative processes during 
Congressional debates, opponents of the legislation argued that the proposed reforms 
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did not go far enough in embracing the Commissions reforms.  Both sides of the debate 
attempted to adopt the role as the Commission’s strongest supporters.  Proponents 
asserted that they were implementing the Commission’s recommendations while the 
opponents were being obstructive and opponents countered that they were simply 
concerned that the proposed legislation was being commandeered for political purposes 
and would not be effective in realising appropriate and beneficial change.
5.5.1 Legislative proponents
Mentions of the Commission, its work and its recommendations amongst proponents of 
the legislation in Congress was prolific.  The rhetorical method in which the 
Commission, or its cause, was invoked was twofold: proponents praised the 
Commission and its work and they sought to link the Commission with the proposed 
reforms.  Praise for the Commission took many forms with some legislators focusing on 
the hard work or bipartisanship of the Commission while others praised the relevance of 
its recommendations.
5.5.1.1 Praising the Commission
Proponents of the reform legislation in both Houses of Congress consistently praised the 
Commission and its efforts.  Senator Carper joined many legislators who sought to 
recognise the work of the Commission and those associated with the process and to 
thank them for their efforts:
“To the members of the 9/11 Commission who have worked hard for about 18 
months, their staff, a lot of folks who lost loved ones who provided the impetus, 
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really the wind beneath the wings for the Commission and really for this effort, I 
say just a heartfelt thank-you for their efforts, and I hope they are pleased with 
where we are today” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11951).
In rising to speak in favour of the legislation, Representative Wynn extends his gratitude 
to the Commissioners as well, noting their work and their bipartisan efforts:
“Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule for the 9/11 Commission bill. Let me 
begin by thanking the leadership on both sides of the aisle for their hard work. I 
want to thank the members of the 9/11 Commission for their work on a bipartisan 
basis, and of course I want to thank the families from the 9/11 incident for their 
work as the driving force behind this bill” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11000).
Senator Lieberman, sponsor of both the pending reform legislation before the Senate (S.
2845) and the legislation that created the 9/11 Commission, expresses his appreciation 
for the Commission’s efforts, praising their extensive work, bipartisanship and pertinent 
reform recommendations: 
“We owe a great debt to the seminal work of the 9/11 Commission and to their 
staff whose recommendations we relied on in drafting this bill.  . . .
Under the strong leadership of Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton, this 
bipartisan Commission made 41 recommendations to strengthen our country 
against terrorists. The two that they have called the most urgent--that is, the most 
time sensitive to act on--a strong national intelligence director, and a national 
counterterrorism center, form the centerpiece of the legislation we put before 
the Senate today” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9703).
Finally, Representative Slaughter first acknowledges the intention of the legislation to 
implement the Commission’s recommendations and continues to praise the Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman’s hard work, ending with an endorsement of the Commission’s 
reforms:
“Today the House at long last is poised to consider the conference report to S. 
2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act. This measure seeks to implement the 
core intelligence reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission and makes 
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significant improvements to emergency preparedness and aviation and border 
security.
Since July, Governor Kean and Representative Hamilton have tirelessly worked to 
ensure their recommendations are not relegated to the circular file of history. [...]  
After reading their fine report and participating in a hearing with them in the 
Select Committee on Homeland Security, I, like most, if not all, of my Democratic 
colleagues in the House, endorsed all 41 recommendations” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. 
H10995).
Repeatedly, proponents would rise to speak to the legislation and include endorsements 
and praise of the Commission and its work.  They also sought, through their rhetoric, to 
link the Commission to the proposed legislation.  With such universal admiration for the 
Commission’s work, asserting a connection between the two made an implicit argument 
that because the Commission was good, so too was the proposed reform legislation.  In 
this way, proponents sought to confer legitimacy both on the legislation and on their 
decision to support the legislation.
5.5.1.2 Linking the legislation with the Commission
Legislators were clear, without the work of the Commission the pending reform 
legislation would not have been possible.  Regardless of how accurate this assertion 
was, linking the legislation back to the Commission and its work was a powerful 
rhetorical strategy for strengthening the legitimacy of the legislation through a close 
association to what was viewed widely as a successful and effective process that 
produced a series of sound recommendations.   The House of Representatives went as 
far as to name their reform legislation the 9/11 Recommendation Implementation Act, 
2004.  Clearly, proponents of the legislation saw benefit in maintaining a close and 
positive association with the 9/11 Commission and attempts to establish and reiterate 
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this association was prevalent throughout the remarks of the legislators during 
Congressional debate.
Senator Collins, sponsor of the reform legislation in the Senate, explains the 
foundational nature of the Commissions work to this legislation:
“This legislation uses the Commission's recommendations as our guide and these 
principles as our compass.  Valuable preliminary objectives have been 
accomplished in this legislation, consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission.  This bill implements both of the 9/11 Commission's most important 
recommendations” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9701).
Although criticised as not being enough like the Senate legislation, or containing all of 
the Commission’s recommendations, proponents in the House, nevertheless, sought to 
link their legislative efforts with the work of the Commission.  Representative Langevin 
is unequivocal when emphasising the foundations of the House legislation:
“The 9/11 Commission gave us a blueprint for that mission, and this legislation 
will help us to implement their vision. [...]  Mr. Speaker, I thank all of my 
colleagues for working in a bipartisan fashion to craft a landmark measure that 
will truly make America safer” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11002).
Echoing the ‘blueprint’ rhetoric in the Senate, Senator Durbin establishes the link 
between the legislation and the Commissions work, emphasising the influence of the 
Report in the creation process of the reform legislation:
“The bipartisan 9/11 Commission gave us an excellent blueprint, a sense of 
urgency, and a constant reminder that we had to rise above our partisan 
differences. We all know about this report. It is so well known and so well read. It 
was even nominated as one of the great literary works. That is rare for a 
Government publication, but it deserved that nomination because it is well 
written, well thought out, well prepared. Governor Kean of New Jersey, 
Congressman Lee Hamilton of Indiana put together an extraordinary panel of 
Democrats and Republicans who brought us this report. And this report was our 
blueprint, as we sat down to write this historic legislation” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p.  
S11948).
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Crediting the hard work of the Commission with the legislation before the House, 
Representative Reyes states:
“Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this conference report, though not without 
some reservations. I am encouraged by the bill's reforms to our Nation's 
Intelligence Community, reforms that would not be before us today without the 
hard work of the 9/11 Commission [...]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11008).
Senator Levin thanks the Commission for the course of action chosen in Congress and 
suggests that such significant reforms were the result of their work and influence:
“Madam President, first, I want to state how indebted we all are to the 9/11 
Commission and to the families for their work in putting us on the road to reform. 
That road will reach a culmination today. It is appropriate that we spent the time 
we did to try to put together a bill which is comprehensive and the most dramatic 
reform in the  intelligence community that we have had in many decades” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
139, p. S11955).
The rhetorical strategy for legitimising the reform legislation through linking the 
Commission, its work and its recommendations to H.R.10 and S.2845 was clear, but it 
was done in a way which was able only to imply an endorsement from the Commission.  
Senator Lieberman, however, was able to make this endorsement explicit upon 
receiving the public support of the leaders of the Commission:
“The 9/11 Commission supports our compromise. Chairman Kean and Vice 
Chairman Hamilton said in a statement:
     ‘We believe this is a good bill and a strong bill. We believe it will make our    
      country safer and more secure.’
They support this compromise because it implements the Commission's key 
recommendations to establish [a] DNI and a National Counterterrorism Center 
that will improve coordination and collaboration, as the Commission puts it, ``to 
forge unity of effort'' between the 15 intelligence agencies scattered throughout 
the Government, and to ensure that, unlike up until now, someone is genuinely in 
charge” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.139, p. S11942).
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Thus the proponents’ rhetorical strategy for leveraging their association with the 
Commission took the form of endorsing the Commission through praise as well as 
linking the Commission to the pending reform legislation before Congress.
5.5.2 Legislative opponents
While it may be obvious that proponents of the legislation that purported to enact many 
of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission would speak of the Commission in 
positive terms, interestingly the converse was not true of the opponents of the 
legislation who were attempting to de-legitimise the reform legislation.  As noted in the 
previous section of this chapter, opponents of the legislation in Congress chose to focus 
on what they perceived to be flaws in the legislative process.  They argued that either a 
rushed or overly partisan process would produce inferior reforms.  By focusing their 
objections on the process, they avoided sustained criticism of the content of the 
legislation or the narrative presented by its proponents.  Surprisingly, even less 
criticised by opponents of the legislation was the professed influence of the reform 
legislation, the 9/11 Commission.
Senator Byrd, the most ardent and vocal opponent of the Senate bill, who led the votes 
agains both the original S.2845 and the subsequent S.2845 Conference Report, had these 
words for the 9/11 Commission:
“The mistake of how the Senate is choosing to consider this bill is not the fault of 
the 9/11 Commission. That panel is a group of experienced and dedicated public 
servants. Their research went straight to the heart of the question that has burned 
in the minds of millions of Americans for 3 years: Namely, how did such a 
powerful Nation fail to defend itself from those attacks” (U.S. Congress. 
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Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.125, p. 
S10513)?
Senator Specter, an initial sceptic, who sought unsuccessfully to amend S.2845 by 
strengthening the power of the proposed Director of National Intelligence, at the 
expense of the Secretary of State, took the opportunity during the Senate debate to 
express his opinion that the Senate legislation did not meet the intentions of the 
Commission.  While Senator Specter credits the Commission for its efforts, he seeks to 
separate the Commission from the reforms before the Senate as a way of weakening the 
legitimacy of the legislation:
“[...]  [G]reat credit is due to the 9/11 Commission itself in structuring a report, 
which was filed in July, and then putting considerable pressure to have their report 
enacted.
I think, to repeat, the realities are that the final legislation is short of where the 
9/11 Commission would like to have gone either with respect to budget control or 
with respect to day-to-day operations, but in the tortuous process of making 
changes in the intelligence community, the 9/11 Commission has been a catalyst 
here in a very important way” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11946).
In the House of Representatives, opponents were equally generous in their praise of the 
Commission.  In fact, opponents sought to cast themselves as defenders of the 
Commission’s original intentions, as they criticised the H.R.10 for going beyond the 
policy scope of the Commission's recommendations while failing to implement all 41 of 
those recommendations.  Representative Royce, speaking in strong opposition to the 
House legislation, questions why the House bill appears to omit the more politically 
contentious recommendations: 
“Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this conference report because I 
strongly believe that all of the 9/11 Commission recommendations should be in it. 
The commission itself has said that all of its recommendations should be adopted 
in their entirety to ensure success in deterring terrorism. [...]
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Why are we not adopting all of the commission's recommendations to strengthen 
America's ability to intercept individuals who pose catastrophic threats? [...]  So 
why does this bill not address the 9/11 Commission's recommendation for a 
secure identification system?  [...]
I urge my colleagues to do the right thing and vote this bill down so we can 
include all of the 9/11 Commission recommendations in it and not just the 
politically convenient ones” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11002).
Echoing concerns that the House legislation misses important Commission 
recommendations, Representative Turner states:
“We understand that 85 percent of all critical infrastructure in our country is 
owned and operated by the private sector. It is, therefore, clear that a national 
standard is necessary to guarantee the safety of the American people. Yet, despite 
this very apparent and critical need, H.R.10 fails to adopt [the] 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations and, therefore, leaves a glaring gap in our Nation's 
security” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 
2004. Vol.150, No.127, p. H8905).
Representative Kilpatrick separates her opposition of the House legislation from her 
view that intelligence reform is needed and credits the Commission for making a strong 
case for this need:
“Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations 
Implementation Act. I do so not because I disagree on the urgent need to reform 
our intelligence infrastructure. On the contrary, the 9/11 Commission clearly, 
articulately and convincingly makes a compelling case that the U.S. intelligence 
network is in great need of overhauling.
My reasons for voting against the measure deal less with the concept of 
intelligence reform and more with the substance of the bill we are considering 
today” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.127, p. H8910).
Contrary to the bills’ proponents, who sought to link the proposed legislation and their 
support for that legislation to the Commission, opponents attempted to sever the link 
between the two so they could criticise the House and Senate reforms without criticising 
the Commission or its recommendations.
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The 9/11 Commission received consistent deference from members of Congress during 
the intelligence reform debates of H.R.10 and S.2845. Proponents of the legislation 
chose a rhetorical approach that praised the Commission and linked the proposed 
legislation to the efforts of the 9/11 Commission.  Opponents of the legislation 
attempted to insulate the Commission from criticism by articulating a clear separation 
between the reform bills and the Commission.  The rhetorical strategies of both sides 
would suggest that the Commission enjoyed a high degree of authoritative legitimacy 
and that its influence extended well beyond the publication of its final report and into 
the post-reporting phase of the public inquiry process.
5.6 Chapter Summary
The US Congressional intelligence reform debates during the post-reporting phase of 
the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process were dominated by a pro-reform 
narrative.  As illustrated by the voting rolls of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, 2004 in both the House of Representatives and the Senate (see 
Appendix E), this reform legislation received overwhelming approval.  Proponents of 
the legislation enjoyed numerical and ex-officio advantages in the debate.  Greater 
numbers can provide the advantage of more speaking time for one side and as sponsors 
and co-sponsors of the bills, proponents were able to speak first while introducing the 
legislation, thereby gaining an additional advantage by being able to frame the debate.  
These advantages allowed the proponents’ narrative to establish a dominant position and 
forced opponents of the legislation into a reactive role.
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The proponents of the reform legislation created a ‘Call to Action’ narrative.  In this 
narrative, proponents defined a challenge that was so important and significant that it 
could not be ignored by legislators.  First, proponents argued that the central moral and 
constitutional responsibility of Congress was to protect the American people from attack 
and to secure the Nation.  To fail to act in this capacity would be a complete abdication 
of one’s responsibility as a leader.  Second, proponents tried to establish that the United 
States faced a determined and lethal enemy.  This existential danger was emphasised by 
defining the nature of the threat through examples of recent terrorist attacks, by 
describing terrorist tactics and motives and, finally, through repeated assertions that 
further attacks were looming.  At this point, the first two rhetorical strategies come 
together.  With a certain attack approaching, Congress was duty-bound to protect the 
country.  Proponents argued that the best way to protect the American people was by the 
expeditious approval of the proposed intelligence reforms.  Finally, pro-reform 
legislators cast this mission to protect from immediate threats in an historic context.  
This was accomplished in a number of ways.  The proponents emphasised the historic 
scale of the September 11th attacks.  Comparisons were drawn with the Japanese Attack 
on Pearl Harbour, which launched the United States into the second world war.  They 
asserted that such a significant attack required extraordinary legislative reform.  
Proponents argued that this was a once in a generation opportunity to act.  This was to 
be the largest re-organisation of the US intelligence community since the beginning of 
the Cold War.  Legislators were encouraged to rise to the challenge.  This was an epic 
mission and a once in a generation call to action.  Legislators, it was implied, could 
endorse the reform legislation and be a part of history and protect the American people 
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against a vicious and deadly threat, or they could stand on the side-lines of history, 
oppose the reform legislation and do nothing as the United States’ enemies plotted to 
kill innocent Americans.  This was a provocative and polarising, yet effectively 
dominant, pro-reform narrative frame.
Proponents of the reform legislation employed additional rhetorical strategies within 
their established narrative.  These strategies were used to positively reinforce the 
intrinsic merits of the reform legislation.  In addition to the heroic associations for 
supporters of the legislation, who were cast as responding to an epic and noble ‘Call to 
Action’ narrative, proponents of the legislation used rhetoric which focused on 
praiseworthy characteristics such as bipartisanship and hard work.  Proponents applied 
these complimentary terms, in a persistent manner, to the legislation and supporters of 
the legislation.  As such, the legislation was described as the result of a bipartisan 
approach and enjoyed bipartisan support.  Fellow proponents of the legislation were 
commended for their willingness to engage in a bipartisan manner, to overcome petty 
personal or party-based political motivations to support a reform agenda in line with the 
national interests.  The rhetoric of hard work was employed in a similar manner.  The 
legislation was the product of incredibly hard work; therefore, despite any perceptions 
of a condensed legislative timeline, the reform legislation was well-research, well-
thought-out and sound.  In this, proponents sought to conflate hard work with a high 
quality result.  Hard work was use also, to compliment the supporters of the legislation.  
It was their hard work that had made a difference.  They had engaged a vital assignment 
and work diligently to produce comprehensive and appropriate reform legislation.
 
Page | 186
Unable to establish a counter-narrative in direct opposition to the pro-reform ‘Call to 
Action’ narrative, opponents of the legislation placed process at the centre of their 
critique of S.2845 and H.R.10.  In the House of Representatives, opponents criticised 
the process for being excessively partisan.  They contrasted what they asserted was the 
partisan process of the House with the bipartisan nature of both the 9/11 Commission 
and the legislative process in the Senate to develop S.2845.  Whereas in the Senate, 
opponents of the legislation claimed that the process was rushed and that legislators did 
not have the time needed to determine if the proposed reforms were appropriate or 
would be beneficial.  They cited the need for more time and suggested that rather than 
taking decisive action, proponents of the legislation were being swept-up by a 
momentum motivated by political considerations.
Finally, this chapter explores how both sides of the reform debate incorporated 
references to the 9/11 Commission and the families of the victims of the September 11th 
attacks into their rhetoric to support their respective positions.  As might be expected, 
supporters of the reform legislation in Congress invoke the work of the 9/11 
Commission to bolster their reform agenda, which they portray as an implementation of 
the conclusions and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission’s final report.  
Opponents of the legislation, likewise, claim the mantel of 9/11 Commission supporters. 
In the House of Representatives, opponents argue that support of the legislation have 
been side-tracked by partisan issues, as discussed above, and that the legislation that 
was produced does not go far enough in implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission.  In the Senate, linking references to the 9/11 Commission with their 
concerns over process, opponents assert that the rushed nature of the process does not 
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provide sufficient time to ensure that the Commission’s recommendations are 
implemented properly.  Both proponents and opponents of the reform legislation 
attempt to adopt a custodial role over the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
with the aim of strengthening their respective positions.
The considerable loss of life as a result of the September 11th attacks, required a 
sensitive and deferential approach to the families of the victims.  Both sides of the 
legislative debate sought to employ rhetoric that leveraged the tragedy of the 
circumstances and the moral authority of the families, while being extremely cautious to 
do so in only reverential and acceptable ways.  As such, proponents of the legislation 
suggested that Congress owed it to the families of the victims to enact the reforms 
before the House and the Senate; whereas, opponents of the legislation asserted that in 
order to honour the families of the victims, Congress must slow down the process and 
ensure bipartisanship so that the resulting reforms were of the best possible quality.  
This, the opponents argued, was the best way to honour the memory of the victims and 
their families.
Having presented the findings of the grounded theory approach to the legislative reform 
debate of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process, it is 
necessary to place these findings in a broader context.  With special attention paid to the 
areas of public inquiry research, the study of legitimacy and rhetoric, the following 
chapter initiates a discussion of the above findings vis à vis the relevant theory and 
academic literature.
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Chapter 6 - Discussion
6.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter presents the findings of a grounded theory analysis of the 
Congressional reform debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s 
public inquiry process.  The findings uncovered a series of rhetorical strategies that 
were employed to: legitimise the legislative narrative, legitimise the legislative content, 
legitimise opposition to the legislative process and appropriate the authority of the 9/11 
Commission to legitimise actions of both proponents and opponents of the reform 
legislation.  These findings will be discussed in the context of the rhetorical legitimation 
literature which has been detailed in Section 2.3 of the Literature Review (Chapter 2).
This chapter is organised in the following manner: Section 6.1 restates the research 
question and provides a brief overview of the research findings contained in Chapter 5.  
This review of the research question and of the findings will help keep the focus of this 
research project in mind before commencing our discussion of the findings.  Section 6.2 
provides an opportunity to discuss the research findings outlined in Sections 5.2, 
Legitimising the Legislative Narrative and Section 5.3 Legitimising the Legislative 
Content of the previous chapter.  It will then link these findings with the rhetorical 
legitimation literature examined in Section 2.3 of the Literature Review to help broaden 
the theoretical debates.  Section 6.3, Rhetorical Strategies for Resisting Change,  
considers the rhetorical strategies for opposing the legislative process, from Section 5.4, 
Rhetorical Strategies for Legitimising and Resisting the Legislative Process.  Section 
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6.4, entitled ‘The Rhetorical Construction of an Opposition’, examines the findings of 
Section 5.4 which focuses on the rhetorical strategies of the opponents of the reform 
legislation.  It assesses critically the true strength of the opposition and discusses the 
possibility that proponents of the legislation maintained an interest in exaggerating the 
scope and effectiveness of an ineffectual opposition.  This possibility is explored 
through a further examination of the proponents’ rhetorical strategies which focused on 
opponents and the broader opposition.  This exploration is conducted in the context of 
the public inquiry, re-legitimation literature, as outlined previously in Chapter 2 and 
possible contributions to the public inquiry literature are explored.  Section 6.5, entitled 
‘The Influence of a Successful Public Inquiry Narrative’, uses the findings of Section 
5.5 to explore the themes of re-legitimation and hegemonic narrative contained in the 
Public Inquiry scholarship outlined in Section 2.1 of the Literature Review.  The final 
part of this chapter, Section 6.6, will summarise these discussions and provide a preview 
of the final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 7 - Summary and Conclusions.
6.1 Research Question and Findings
The research question of this thesis is: ‘What rhetorical strategies were employed in the 
Congressional reform debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s 
public inquiry process?’  In order to answer this central question, a grounded theory 
methodological approach was adopted to analyse the Congressional Record transcripts 
of the legislative reform debate in the US House of Representatives and Senate.  The 
aim of this analysis was to uncover the rhetorical strategies of legitimation employed by 
legislators engaged in the legislative debates of H.R.10 and S.2845.  This research 
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revealed that rhetorical strategies were used primarily for four distinct purposes.  First, 
proponents of the legislation sought to frame the debate to their advantage by creating a 
dominant legislative, ‘Call to Action’, narrative.  The rhetorical strategies used to 
construct and legitimise this narrative were: protection and security, real and present 
danger and historic opportunity.  Legislators argued that it was their fundamental duty, 
as lawmakers, to protect the American people and secure the nation from assault. 
Legislators employed descriptive rhetoric to explain the terrorist threat and emphasised 
the catastrophic potential of looming attacks.  These two rhetorical strategies combined 
to encourage Congress to take immediate action to prevent a lethal onslaught.  The third 
rhetorical strategy, used to secure the ‘Call to Action’ narrative was a focus on the 
historic nature of this reform opportunity.  Not only would supporters of the legislation 
fulfil their highest responsibility of protecting America from a determined enemy, but 
they could be a part of a once in a generation chance to implement change on a colossal 
scale.  These were the central rhetorical strategies employed to legitimise and strengthen 
the legislative narrative of the dominant, pro-reform faction within Congress.
In addition to employing specific rhetorical strategies to frame the legislative debate and 
legitimise the pro-reform, action-oriented narrative, proponents of the legislation 
employed identifiable rhetorical strategies to legitimise the substance of the proposed 
intelligence reforms.  The quality and suitability of H.R.10 and S.2845 were assured 
through a sustained use of rhetorical strategies that focused on bipartisanship, hard work 
and expertise.  The proposed reforms, and those who had assisted with the development 
of the bills and those legislators who embraced the reform legislation, were repeatedly 
associated with these three commendable attributes thus strengthening the warrant of 
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the pro-reform agenda and defending it from criticism.  Both narrative and content 
legitimation strategies are contained in Table 6.0 below.
TABLE 6.0 - Proponents’ Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimation
PROPONENTS Legitimising the Narrative Legitimising the Content
Rhetorical 
Strategies
1) Protection and Security
2) Real and Present Danger
3) Historic Opportunity
1) Bipartisanship
2) Hard work
3) Expertise
4) Linking to the Commission
Opponents sought to legitimise their opposition on the basis of a ‘flawed process’ 
argument, in both the House and the Senate.  They employed rhetorical strategies to 
legitimise and strengthen their processual concerns regarding the reform legislation.  
Shaped by different experiences in the House and the Senate, the rhetorical strategies of 
the opponents in both legislative bodies differed in their focus.  Opponents in the House 
employed a rhetorical strategy of partisanship to resist H.R.10; whereas, opponents in 
the Senate used a rhetorical strategy that criticised the legislative process for being 
rushed and that this insufficient time for study and debate would produce flawed 
legislation.  The rhetorical strategies of the opponents of the legislation can be seen 
below in TABLE 6.1.
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TABLE 6.1 - Opponents’ Rhetorical Strategies of De-legitimation
OPPONENTS De-legitimising the Process
Rhetorical Strategies
1) Rushed process
2) Bipartisanship
3) Linking to the Commission
Finally, both proponents and opponents of the legislation employed a rhetorical strategy 
that sought, through association, to appropriate the authority of the 9/11 Commission, 
thereby attempting to further legitimise their respective positions.  Proponents 
positioned their legislative solutions as an extension of the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission and portrayed legislative action as a tribute to the families of the victims.  
With the same end-point, but presented in a different rhetorical manner, opponents of 
the legislation argued that the proposed reforms did not go far enough in enacting the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.  Opponents argued that Congress owed it to 
the families and the memory of the victims to ‘get it right’.  In the House, opponents 
argued that this could be accomplished only through a different, less partisan, process 
and in the Senate, opponents asserted, that this could be done by slowing the process 
and taking more time to consider the legislation.
6.2 Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimacy
6.2.1 Models from the literature
This section will begin with an examination of the models of rhetorical strategies for 
legitimation contained in the literature.  Four models from the recent scholarship on 
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discursive and rhetorical sources of legitimacy will be explored.  It should be noted that 
there are six authors represented in Table 6.2 below.  The first two authors are included 
because their work has been foundational to the rhetorical categories developed by 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), Vaara et al. (2006), Van Leeuwen (2007) and Erkama 
and Vaara (2010).   Aristotle (1991) is important for his contribution of the classical 
rhetorical appeals of logos (appeal to logic), pathos (appeal to emotion) and ethos 
(appeal to authority).  Suchman (1995) focuses on reconciling the split between the 
strategic approach to legitimacy and the institutional approach to legitimacy.  He does 
this through the development of a legitimacy model that identifies three primary forms: 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive.  The rhetorical models below the bold line in Table 6.2 
are evolutions of conceptions of the rhetoric and legitimacy based on empirical studies 
from a number of distinct societal settings.
TABLE - 6.2 From the Literature: Models of Rhetorical Legitimation
Authors Purpose Rhetorical Strategies 
Aristotle 
(1991)
‘Establishes the classical 
persuasive appeals of rhetoric.’
1) logos
2) pathos
3) ethos
Suchman 
(1995)
‘Seeks to reconcile the strategic 
and institutional approaches to 
legitimacy and identifies primary 
forms of legitimacy.’
1) pragmatic legitimacy 
(logos, pathos)
2)  moral legitimacy 
(ethos)
3) cognitive legitimacy 
(any or all over time)
Suddaby & 
Greenwood 
(2005)
‘How rhetoric legitimates 
profound institutional change.’
1) historical
2) value-based
3) teleological
4) ontological
5) cosmological
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Authors Purpose Rhetorical Strategies 
Vaara et al. 
(2006)
‘How discursive legitimation 
strategies are used to understand 
global industrial restructuring.’
1) normalisation
2) authorisation
3) rationalisation
4) moralisation
5) narrativisation
Van Leeuwen 
(2007)
‘How discourses construct 
legitimation for social practices 
in public communications and 
everyday life.’
1) authorisation
2) moral evaluation
3) rationalisation
4) mythopoesis
Erkama & Vaara 
(2010)
‘How rhetorical strategies are 
used to legitimate or resist plant 
closures in organisational 
negotiations.’
1) logos 
2) pathos
3) ethos
4) autopoiesis
5) cosmos
No single model, considered retrospectively, provides a suitable framework for 
understanding the 9/11 post-reporting phase.  However, aspects of each model were 
apparent throughout (for example, the appeal to logic and the emotionally driven ‘call to 
action’).  The nuances of the 9/11 post-reporting process were important in classifying 
the rhetorical devices and, consequently, understanding their broader rhetorical 
function.  The method of deriving an appropriate model from the findings is discussed 
below.
6.2.2  A Model from the findings
How then can the findings of this research project be categorised and understood 
relative to the above models?  These categories are not mutually exclusive and often 
rhetorical strategies will seek to appeal to more than just one aspect of the audiences’ 
psyche.  For example, the rhetorical theme of ‘To protect and secure’  may be classified 
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in a number of ways.  This theme could elicit an emotional response (pathos), by 
appealing to one’s sense of patriotism.  Closer to home, it might appeal to the emotion 
of a parent who is motivated to protect his or her children.   This rhetoric could also 
appeal to logic, as one wishes to protect one’s property because of the initial costs 
incurred with the acquisition of this property.  A final classification, following the 
example of ‘To protect & secure’ in Table 6.3 below, is an appeal to narrative.  If this 
rhetorical theme serves a particular overarching narrative then complimentary rhetorical 
themes can be seen as an appeal to narrative, while being logically and emotionally 
motivating at the same time.
As Vaara, et al. (2006) explains: 
“[...] discursive legitimation strategies are often intertwined. For example, 
normalization seems to be strongly supported by other practices, especially by 
narrativization.  Authorization appears to be linked with rationalization and 
moralization, not least because the authorities themselves usually (symbolically) 
represent specific institutions and viewpoints.  Rationalization is always based on 
some moral and ideological basis, although this is not usually stated explicitly.  
Moralization is often an attempt to put authorizations and rationalizations into 
particular legitimating and delegitimating perspectives” (pp. 24-25).  
This observation applies to the classification model put forth in Vaara, et al. (2006), but 
the observation can be extended to the classification of rhetorical strategies and themes 
in general.  Employing the various classifications offered by the models of the rhetorical 
legitimation literature, a categorisation of the rhetorical strategies of the Congressional 
debates is contained in TABLE 6.3 below.
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TABLE - 6.3 - Categorising the Findings
Legitimising ...
Rhetorical 
Strategies
Rhetorical 
Classifications
Grand Rhetorical 
Purpose
Narrative 
(Section 5.2)
1) To protect & 
secure
logos, pathos, 
narrative
NARRATIVE
2) A real and 
present danger
logos, pathos, 
narrative
3) An historic 
opportunity
teleological, pathos, 
narrative
Content 
(Section 5.3)
1) Bipartisanship ethos, pathos
ETHOS2) Hard work logos, pathos
3) Expertise authorisation
Resistance 
(Section 5.4)
1) Partisanship pathos
NORMALISATION
2) Rushed logos
In Table 6.3, the most appropriate rhetorical classification options are contained in 
column three.  In column four the overarching rhetorical purpose of the appeal is 
illustrated.  While not surprising, in the construction of a ‘Call to action’ legislative 
narrative, the main purposed for employing the repeated rhetoric of ‘protect and secure’, 
‘real and present danger’ and ‘an historic opportunity’ was an appeal to narrative.  
While these may also appeal to logos, pathos or even vanity, their primary purpose is 
the construction of an over-arching narrative, within which proponents of the legislation 
would gain advantage through the construction of a context that encourage change and 
favoured an immediate course of action.
Rhetorical strategies employed to strengthen and confer legitimacy on the content of the 
legislation are categorised in a different manner.  Bipartisanship can appeal to ethos (an 
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appeal to authority) because the more individuals agree on a course of action or a matter 
of policy, the more its claims to authority can grow.  The ‘spirit’ of bipartisanship may 
have emotional appeal as co-operation and consensus are typically viewed in a positive 
light by the general public - the constituents, at whose pleasure, the members of 
Congress serve.  The rhetorical strategies of resistance from Section 5.4 of the findings 
will be addressed in the following section of this chapter.
6.3 Rhetorical Strategies for Resisting Change
 
6.3.1 The findings in context
This section provides a discussion of the findings relating to the rhetorical strategies for 
resisting the legislative process, as detailed in Section 5.4 of the previous chapter.  
Opponents of the legislation, focused their rhetorical strategies on de-legitimising the 
legislative process in both Houses of Congress.  In the House of Representatives, 
opponents highlighted what they saw as an overly partisan process.  They argued that 
this partisan process had produced inferior legislation that was not in keeping with 
either the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission or the companion legislation in the 
Senate.  In the Senate, opponents of the reform legislation raised serious concerns about 
a highly-compressed process in which the legislation was not receiving sufficient study 
or debate.  This rushed, politically motivated timeline, they argued, risked the ability of 
Congress to produce reform that would effectively protect the American people.
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In their rhetorical attempts to de-legitimise the legislative process, opponents employed 
the use of both positive and negative retrospective examples of policy process to show 
what the reform debates in Congress should emulate and avoid respectively.  This 
rhetorical practice of supplying examples of what others do, or how others act, in order 
to legitimate similar behavior has been identified as the practice of ‘normalisation’ (Van 
Leeuwen 1999, 2007; Vaara et al. 2006).  These definitions of normalisation involve the 
use of positive examples of behaviour to show and persuade that this behaviour is 
proper or normal.  However, opponents of the legislation in the Senate employ both 
positive and negative exemplars.  This use of negative exemplars to show what is 
abnormal, and thus what to avoid, thereby encouraging and legitimating ‘normality’ as a 
cautionary device is an interesting extension to the current literature.
6.3.1.1 Resistance in the House
Upon initial inspection of the findings of the rhetorical strategies for resisting the 
legislative process, it appeared that the opponents to the legislation were employing 
rhetoric that should be classified as pathos and logos.  Opponents in the House of 
Representatives, using the rhetorical strategy of partisanship to discredit the legislative 
process, repeatedly referenced the activities of other groups as exemplars of process.  
They argued that these other groups had produced superior policy because they had 
followed a more bipartisan approach.  By contrast, the legislation in the House, H.R.10 
suffered in quality as a result of the partisan nature of the process.  As highlighted in the 
previous chapter, opponents of the reforms in the House, invoked the Senate’s 
legislative process and the work of the 9/11 Commission as models of bipartisanship 
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producing high quality results.  The following is a brief example, excerpted from the 
findings, of this strategy for de-legitimising the House process.  In the following 
excerpt, Representative Levin contrasts the differing approaches taken in the two houses 
of Congress.
“There have been two distinctly different approaches followed in the House and 
Senate on the critical issue of implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission. In the Senate, there has been an open and bipartisan process used to 
develop a bill that truly reflects the recommendations of the Commission. [...]
The Republican Leadership in the House took a different road. They introduced a 
bill that was developed in secret with no meaningful input from Democrats. This 
partisan process has produced a weak bill that does not reflect the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission” (U.S. Congress. Congressional 
Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, pp. H8913-H8914).
The Senate was not the only example of bipartisanship invoked by the opponents of the 
legislation in the House.  Although not a legislative process, opponents focused on the 
bipartisan nature of the 9/11 Commission inquiry.  Contained in his critique of 
partisanship, Representative McCarthy included references to the co-operative approach 
of the Commission saying: “Mr. Chairman, the 9/11 Commission in July presented its 
report to the Congress and to the American people. The five Republicans and five 
Democrats on the panel put aside their partisan differences and made 41 
recommendations [...]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, p. H8909).  Representative Millender-McDonald 
increases the contrast between the House process and the Commission when she refers 
to its recommendations as not merely bipartisan, but as ‘nonpartisan’.  
“Mr. Chairman,  I rise to express my concern on the course our Congress has 
taken.  We had a clear choice before us to have passed the Menendez substitute, a 
bipartisan approach that followed the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission --
a Commission that for three years studied the vulnerabilities of our national 
intelligence community and homeland security and then provided thoughtful, 
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nonpartisan recommendations” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.127, p. H8913).
Repeatedly, members of the House who opposed the legislation employed the critical 
rhetoric of partisanship.  This alone might suggest a rhetorical ‘appeal to logic’ (logos) 
in that partisan legislation implies a pursuit of narrow self-interests that does not reflect 
the national interest and risks the creation of policy with both suspect motives and 
inferior results.  Additionally, the charge of partisanship contains a number of negative 
associations: pettiness, self-interest, incivility, etc. ...  From this perspective, this 
rhetorical strategy could be viewed as an ‘appeal to emotion’ (pathos).  However “ [...] 
legitimating strategies are often intertwined. [...] In fact [...] drawing simultaneously on 
several legitimating strategies -- seems to be particularly powerful” (Vaara, et al. 2006: 
24-25).  The co-mingling of legitimating strategies in this particular case, however, is 
more accurately described as ‘normalisation’.  While Van Leeuwen (2007) considers 
normalisation to be a sub-category of ‘Authorization’, Vaara, et al (2006) argue that it 
should be viewed as a primary category of legitimation.
“[N]ormalization can be actually seen as the primary type of legitimation, as it 
seeks to render something legitimate by exemplarity.  This exemplarity can 
involve ‘retrospective’ (similar cases/events/practices in the past) or 
‘prospective’ (new cases/events/practices to be expected) references, both of 
which are important in rendering the case at hand as something ‘normal’” (pp. 
13-14).
In using the Senate and the 9/11 Commission as examples of more bipartisan processes, 
opponents in the House of Representatives implied that if only a normal (i.e.: bipartisan) 
process was adopted in the House the task of reform would be improved greatly.   
Opponents in the Senate used this rhetorical strategy of normalisation as well.  
However, there were examples of a modified version of this strategy, intended to de-
legitimise, which have yet to be explored fully in the literature.  The following section 
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will examine the practice of normalisation as a rhetorical strategy in the Senate, paying 
close attention to the examples of this modified use.
6.3.1.2 Resistance in the Senate
The resistance and opposition to the legislation in the Senate, while focused on process 
as in the House, employed the rhetorical strategy that accused the proponents of the 
legislation of rushing the process.  This rushed process, it was argued, compromised the 
quality of the reforms because it left insufficient time for consideration and debate.  
Opponents provided examples that could be considered ‘appeals to logic’ (logos) 
primarily.  If there was insufficient time, then there was a possibility that the Senate 
could pass reforms that were ineffective, or worse, damaging.  Logically, this would 
endanger all the work of the Commission and Congress, break faith with the families of 
the victims and leave the American people vulnerable to attack.
Speaking of the need for more time, Senator Inhofe asked why it was that the 
Commission was permitted an extra 18 months to complete their work, but the Senate 
could not take the Christmas break to consider the reforms before re-convening in 
January at the start of the 109th Congress.
“When the 9/11 Commission needed more time to conduct its investigation into 
the September 11 attacks, the Congress acted magnanimously in granting a 2-
month extension. Senators said at the time:
It would be counterproductive to deny the commission the extra 2 months it 
now says it needs to complete its investigations. [...]
Mr. President, the Founding Fathers would be ashamed of the notion that time is a 
luxury reserved for the unelected members of independent commissions. What 
about the Senate” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11964)?
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In his example, Senator Inhofe points to what was widely seen as a successful process 
that produced  high-quality recommendations for reform.  His implication is that they 
required more time and that this time was needed to achieve success.  If previous 
practice had been to allow time to ensure the production of effective intelligence 
reforms, why would the Senate take an aberrant course of action that would disallow the 
time needed for study and debate.  Thus, Senator Inhofe asserted that the Senate’s 
decision to take immediate action was not what was ‘normally’ done.  This can be 
viewed, much like the examples cited above from the House debate, as a traditional 
implementation of a rhetorical strategy of ‘normalisation’.
However, Senator Byrd, expressing his opposition to the legislative timelines, adopted a 
slightly different version of the rhetorical strategy of ‘normalization’.  He provided a 
retrospective exemplar with what he considered a negative illustration to re-enforce 
what the Senate should NOT do: rush the process.  His cautionary example focused on 
the October, 2002 decision by Congress to authorise the use of force against Iraq.
“Iraq was a rushed mistake: We saw, Madam President, the unwisdom of being in 
a hurry when it came to the invasion of Iraq. Our Government invaded. It won a 
short war, but it had not given proper thought to what would come after, had not 
given proper thought, it had not planned properly and carefully for a postwar Iraq. 
And now look at what is happening. Look at the terrible cost, the terrible price 
this Government is paying--paying with the blood of the sons and daughters of 
our country. Think of it.  Let's don't be in such a big hurry. Let's take more 
time” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.122, p. S10207).
Senator Byrd uses this as an example of non-normal behaviour that should be avoided at 
all costs.  In both cases, Senators Inhofe and Byrd use ‘normalization’ as a rhetorical 
strategy to de-legitimise the legislative process in the Senate.  However, it is Senator 
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Byrd’s repeated employment of this reverse-normalisation strategy that is of particular 
interest.  His second negative exemplar was Congress’ October, 2001 approval of the 
Patriot Act.
“Again, few, if any, Senate hearings have been held on these provisions by the full 
Senate Judiciary Committee. The inclusion of these provisions in title VI, with so 
little examination of their real meaning, reminds one of how the PATRIOT Act 
itself was enacted in haste without sufficient review, and with no real 
understanding of its true consequences.
 
These are unsettling provisions, and the Senate ought to insist on its rights to 
consider them more carefully. The Senate has not had enough time to understand 
this legislation or its implications” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th 
Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11962).
Reiterating the negative example of the Patriot Act, Senator Byrd also cites the passage 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the subsequent establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security as a third example of the negative outcomes of a 
rushed Congressional process.
“We are so threatened by the politics surrounding the 9/11 Commission's report 
and the release of its recommendations prior to the Presidential election that we 
stand ready--stand, salute--to abdicate our constitutional responsibilities rather 
than to question or probe deeper [...]  I say again it is the same kind of thinking 
that occurred prior to the vote on the war resolution with Iraq, the same mentality 
that led to the much regretted passage of the PATRIOT Act with only a single 
dissenting vote in this Chamber, and that led to the creation of a Homeland 
Security Department that now struggles with its mission to make Americans safer 
from terrorism” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.123, p. S10302).
In both Houses of Congress, the opponents of the legislation employ rhetorical 
strategies of normalisation to de-legitimise their respective processes; thereby, indirectly 
attacking both the substance of the legislation and the narrative of the legislative debate.
6.3.2 Contribution to the rhetorical legitimation literature
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Van Leeuwen (1999) provides the basis for Vaara, et al.’s use of ‘normalisation’ as a 
category of  rhetorical strategy.  In general terms, Vaara, et al. acknowledge the 
influence of Van Leeuwen’s  work on their rhetorical classifications as they note, “ [...] 
Van Leeuwen’s model serves as an important reference point [for our model] [...]” (p. 
9).  In particular Vaara, et al. (2006) trace their ‘normalization’ category to ‘Authority to 
conformity’, as a sub-category of ‘Authorization’ in Van Leeuwen’s model.  As the 
authors explain: 
“[...] ‘conformity legitimation’, dealing with custom and tradition, is a sub-type of 
authorization, and ‘fact-of-life rationalization’ or ‘naturalization is a sub-type of 
rationalization.  However, in our view, rendering something normal or natural 
requires special recognition as a specific category of ‘normalization’” (Vaara, et 
al. 2006: 13).
Tracing the use of ‘normalization’ back to its origins, Van Leeuwen (1999) states that 
“‘Conformity authorization’ rests on the principle that something is legitimate when 
‘everybody does it’, or ‘everybody says so’” (p. 105).  Van Leeuwen (2007) explains 
further: “The implicit message is, ‘Everybody else is doing it, and so should you’.  [...]  
No further argument [is necessary] [...]” (p. 97).  Van Leeuwen (1999; 2007) and Vaara, 
et al. (2006) associate the use of positive examples as a method of normalization with 
the intent on bolstering legitimacy for a particular course of action.  One should act the 
way others act.  But what if the intention of the rhetoric is to de-legitimise the dominant 
course of action, thereby legitimating resistance?  As illustrated by the examples from 
the Senate debate, this can be achieved by using negative examples of undesirable 
behavior or action.  Van Leeuwen’s model does not appear to account for the contrary 
formulation of ‘Look at what others have done.  It was inappropriate (or not normal) 
therefore we should not follow their example.’  The implication is that we should act 
‘normal’ by not doing what others have done.  So as Senator Byrd argues, if the Senate 
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does not want to repeat past mistakes, it should not rush the legislative process as it had 
in those previous and undesirable situations.
By reversing the following formulation by Vaara, et al. (2006) that normalisation is a 
strategy that ”[...] render[s] something legitimate by exemplarity [...] [that its use is] 
important in rendering the case at hand as something ‘normal’” (p. 14).  Reformulated, 
the findings suggest that normalisation can be a strategy that renders something 
illegitimate by exemplarity [...] that its use is important in rendering the case at hand as 
something ‘abnormal’.  While the literature makes a general acknowledgement that 
rhetorical strategies for legitimation can be used also for the purpose of de-legitimation, 
this example of a reverse-normalisation strategy, uncovered in the findings, is a unique 
addition to the established conception of the rhetorical tactic of normalisation.
This section has focused on a discussion of the findings relating to the rhetorical 
strategies for resisting the legislative process.  As outlined above and, more extensively 
in the previous chapter, opponents of the legislation in Congress focussed their 
opposition on a critique of the process.  In the House there were accusations of 
partisanship and in the Senate opponents to the legislation claimed that the legislative 
process was too rushed.  In both legislatures, opponents employed rhetorical strategies 
that are classified as normalisation.  They provided exemplars of policy development 
processes which were both positive and negative.  The positive examples were 
presented as ‘normal’ processes that should be emulated and the negative examples 
were presented as ‘abnormal’ processes that should be avoided.  It is this reverse-
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normalisation rhetoric, intended to de-legitimise the legislative process, that has not 
previously been discussed in the rhetorical legitimation scholarship.
6.4 The Rhetorical Construction of an Opposition
As outlined in Section 5.4 Rhetorical Strategies for Resisting the Legislative Process, 
opponents in both the House of Representatives and the Senate chose to focus their 
critique on their respective legislative processes, as such, the substance of their critiques 
were distinct.  Opponents in the House focused on what they described as an overly 
partisan political process driving reform; whereas, opponents in the Senate protested 
what they viewed as a rushed process that provided insufficient time for study and  
debate.  These were not the strongest oppositional strategies and it is clear from 
examining the data, that opponents of the legislation were hemmed-in by the dominant, 
pro-reform legitimation strategy.  In both Houses of Congress, these critiques were 
countered by proponents of the legislation through a reliance on the rhetorical themes 
which were used to develop the pro-reform narrative.  Proponents revisited themes such 
as hard work and reminded opponents of the need to reform in order to protect the 
nation from the looming threat of terrorism.
Despite the apparent rhetorical weakness of the opponents attempts to resist the reform 
legislation, proponents of the reforms treated opposition in two ways: first, they sought 
to downplay and dismiss the concerns of opponents; however, later in the debate they 
sought to cast their legislative achievements as significant while battered by opposition.  
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While it was clear that the congressional debate of the legislation contained opposing 
views, it is important to note that these ‘sides’ were not equally matched in terms of 
numbers, influence or rhetorical opportunities.  The debate contained proponents and 
opponents and their rhetorical strategies have been examined in the previous chapter, 
but while there were ‘opponents’ to the legislation, it is fair to question whether or not 
there was an ‘opposition’.  It is also fair to ask what role, if any, did the opponents of 
the legislation play in the eventual legitimation of the overall process and the resultant 
strengthening of the pro-reform agenda.  
The characterisation of the opponents’ view by proponents appears from the data to be 
divided into two phases.  In the first phase of the debate, as opponents were introducing 
their critique of the process, proponents sought to downplay and diminish oppositional 
concerns.  As the debate began to wind down, proponents of the legislation co-opted the 
presence of the opponents and their work in resisting the reform, to strengthen the 
narrative that there had been rigorous debate and that the reforms had withstood 
scrutiny.  In the first instance, the existence of an opposition, regardless of its size or 
effectiveness, was used as evidence that the Congress had fulfilled its mandate and that 
the fact that the legislation had stood up to a full and fair debate was evidence that one 
could be confident in its quality.  A more critical view is that this first assertion, can be 
seen as the fulfilment of Congress’ role in the broader ceremony of the public inquiry 
re-legitimation process.  Secondly, the notion that the legislation was forged and tested 
in legislative debate serves to strengthen a previously observed rhetorical tactic of the 
proponents, that of associating the reforms with hard work and expertise. The narrative 
was: Congress worked hard to debate these reforms and they withstood the scrutiny of 
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both the US House of Representative and the US Senate .  Thus implying that the 
legislation had withstood scrutiny but then came through the other side, battle tested and 
even more legitimate.  These two distinct phases of dealing with the opposition to the 
reform played a central role in legitimating the actions and the legislation of the 
reformers.  These strategies are illustrated in this section of this chapter and their 
implications with regards to the existing literature on the public inquiry re-legitimation 
process is explored.
6.4.1 Public inquiry literature: The re-legitimation process
As examined in Section 2.1.4 and Section 2.2.6.1 of the Literature Review, public 
inquiries have a re-legitimation role in which they attempt to restore the public trust and 
repair damaged legitimacy of state institutions within a post-disaster event context.  The 
public inquiry process can rebuild damaged legitimacy in a number of ways.  As noted 
in the Literature Review, Brown (2000) suggests that public inquiries are primarily 
focused on establishing, or re-establishing, the legitimacy of institutions.  Strengthening 
this view, Brown adopts a definition of legitimacy put forth by Suchman (1995).  
Suchman (1995) asserts that legitimacy is the: “perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (p. 574).  So in order to 
strengthen legitimacy the actions of a body, whether a Commission or a Legislature, 
needs to conform with society’s understanding of what is ‘desirable, proper, or 
appropriate’.  Brown’s view of the role of public inquiries, and their mode of producing 
legitimacy, can be extended into our observations within the post-reporting phase of a 
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public inquiry process.  If post-reporting legitimation is an extension of pre-reporting 
and reporting legitimation, then presumably subsequent bodies would need to adhere to 
the practices with which the public inquiry body found success.  So the United States 
Congress, both the House of Representatives and the Senate, would need to act in ways 
that were deemed proper and appropriate given what is generally expected of them.  
While the actions of an appointed Commission and an elected Congress will not be 
identical, both bodies would need to act in a proper manner, as judged by their role 
within society.
Congress, therefore would be expected to follow its own rules and traditions, it would 
allow sufficient opportunity for legislators to have their views heard, as a body it might 
be expected to carefully scrutinise the recommendations provided by the Commission 
and craft efficient and effective reforms.  Usually, legislation is forged in the midst of a 
rigorous debate; two opposing sides making their arguments, questioning, challenging, 
examining and vetting.  Congress is expected to provide a forum for all of these actions 
and is expected, after sufficient debate to work out agreements which allow for 
compromise which in turn improves the quality of the final legislation.  However, what 
would happen if there were not two sides to the debate?  What would happen if the 
opponents of a proposed piece of legislation were limited in both numbers and 
rhetorical strategic options to such a degree that the debate wasn’t sufficiently robust as 
to allow the hammering out of quality compromises that balanced the concerns of both 
sides of the debate.  Finally, what would happen if all of this transpired at a time of 
unprecedented attention to the process by the media and the public?
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In the case of the legislative debates of the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, 
H.R.10, in the House of Representatives, and the National Intelligence Reform Act, S.
2845, in the Senate, to ensure the perception that Congress was acting as expected, in a 
‘desirable, proper, or appropriate’ manner, it might be helpful, once the threat of any 
true opposition dissipated, to inflate retrospectively the true resistance of the opposition 
and the effort required to pass these reform bills.  Evidence for this is present in the 
findings of this research project.  Proponents of the legislation emphasised the effort 
and work that was required to pass the legislation and elevated the opposition in 
effectiveness and magnitude.  Empirically, the findings show that opponents to the 
intelligence reforms were ineffective in resisting the legislation and appeared 
overwhelmed by the rhetorical strategies of the proponents who established a 
formidable call to action narrative and created the perception that the content of the 
legislation was robust and would be effective.  These rhetorical strategies of the 
proponents limited the rhetorical strategies that opponents could adopt and they were 
particularly efficacious in facing down opposition to the legislation.  However, in order 
for Congress to appear credible in their role as effective legislators and to fulfil their 
ceremonial role in the broader public-inquiry re-legitimation process, it is 
understandable that proponents of the reforms would employ rhetoric that sought to 
construct a narrative of a strong, but misguided, opposition and significant legislative 
effort.  The following sections will examine the rhetorical strategies employed by 
proponents of the reforms to first counter the rhetoric of their legislative opponents and 
to later construct a narrative of opposition which they could leverage to further 
strengthen their dominant position and give the impression that Congress’ actions were 
appropriate.
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6.4.2 Dismissing direct criticism
The criticism of the reform legislation by opponents in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate did not go unanswered.  Proponents of the legislation, despite in an 
overwhelmingly dominant position, sought to address these criticisms of process.  They 
did so by reiterating the rhetorical themes addressed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the 
previous chapter.  Namely, they reenforced their call to action narrative by focusing on 
Congress’ responsibility to protect and secure, by emphasising the urgency of the threats 
and by using rhetorical themes such as bipartisanship and hard work to strengthen their 
pro-reform narrative and dismiss the concerns of opponents.
Representative Hastert, Speaker of the House and the sponsor of its legislation, declared 
that he was mystified by the opponents’ complaints regarding the legislative process.  
Relying on the rhetoric of  ‘to protect and secure’, as discussed in Section 5.2.2 of the 
previous chapter, he treats such complaints as unserious and he reiterates that the 
proposed legislation will make America safer and protect its citizens from attack.
“Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle complained about the 
process, and I must admit that I am baffled by those complaints.  [...]  Some have 
complained that we are going too fast. Some said our bill was too strong. Others 
said this bill is too weak. Some have complained because it is simply their nature 
to complain. Despite the complaints, I am proud of this work product.
This legislation will make this country safer. It will make our families safer. It will 
ensure the safety of our children and our parents. It is comprehensive. It reforms 
the government to make it more effective in battling terrorists that want to do 
harm to this country.  [...]  It improves terrorism prevention and prosecution so 
that we can get the terrorists and those who help them before they get us” (U.S. 
Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.
127, p. H8906).
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In the above passage, Representative Hastert marginalises opponents’ concerns by 
presenting them as trite when contrasted with the very serious matter of protecting lives. 
He suggests that some opponents have complained ‘because it is simply their nature to 
complain’ and not because their complaints are valid or worth consideration.  He then 
employs the rhetorical theme of protection and security in dramatic terms suggesting 
that the proposed legislation will allow authorities to ‘get the terrorists [...] before they 
get [the American people]’, thus presenting legislative opponents as frivolous when set 
side by side with the urgent and noble causes of protection and security. 
In addition to suggesting that opposition to the reform legislation was frivolous, 
proponents relied on the urgency of a ‘real and present danger’, as originally identified 
in Section 5.2.3 in the previous chapter.  Senator Collins, sponsor of the Senate 
legislation, poses a series of rhetorical questions, directed to the opponents of Senate 
bill S.2845, which emphasises a vital urgency for action in order to protect from danger:  
“I ask, If the time is not right now, when will the right time come?  When will there be 
no threats? I ask, What could be more cynical than our failure to act on something of 
such critical importance to the citizens of our country” (U.S. Congress. Congressional 
Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.118, p. S9703)?  In her 
statement, Senator Collins raises the possibility that Congress might fail to act ‘on 
something of such critical importance’ namely the need to protect the American people 
from the terrorist threat.  This focus on a need to act was employed repeatedly as a 
direct response to the criticism of opponents.  An implication of this is that opponents 
concerns were not persuasive or important enough to warrant further consideration, or 
sufficient justification to delay the passage of the reform legislation -which was cast as 
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taking action.  Therefore the rhetorical dichotomy, as structured by the proponents of 
the legislation was action versus inaction, in which action was heroic and inaction was 
irresponsible.
Proponents defended against criticism of the process by reiterating the same rhetorical 
strategies that were used to legitimise the content and quality of the legislation.  
Rhetorical claims of hard work and expertise, explored in Section 5.3.2 of the previous 
chapter, were emphasised by focusing on the long history of discussion and study that 
had contributed to the work of the 9/11 Commission and subsequently into the 
recommendations contained in the reform legislation under debate.  
Senator Rockefeller, employes this rhetorical device of a long history of work on 
intelligence reform, placing the current legislative debate in a broader historical context 
and rhetorically extending the perceived time given for debate significantly in an 
attempt to undercut criticism that the process had been rushed.  Senator Rockefeller 
argues that:
“Some have criticized this legislation for being too hastily conceived or rushed to 
completion. To the contrary, this reform has been 50 years in the making and the 
issues have been the subject of 46 different commission reports. Most of them 
have suggested the same kinds of things we are doing here” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. 
S11958).
In this response, Senator Rockefeller highlights previous research and recommendations 
dating back a half a century.  In doing this he is both refuting concerns about a rushed 
process by presenting the legislation before the Congress as an extension of a large 
body of work with considerable history.  Presumably many of the 46 commission 
reports to which he refers had the benefit of expert input.   In this way he is adding the 
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heft of extensive specialised knowledge and in effect bolstering the claim that S.2845 
will produce appropriate and effective reform.
Finally, proponents sought to defend against the criticism of the reform process, by 
reversing a charge that was levelled by opponents in the House of Representatives and 
accusing opponents of the legislation of partisanship.  Senator Sununu dismisses the 
criticisms of the legislation based on process grounds and suggests that these arguments 
are week and reflect the partisanship of those who ‘did not quite get everything they 
wanted’:
 “A lot of concerns have been raised about the legislation. [...] But a lot of those 
criticisms as well are on a weak foundation; concerns, for example, about the 
process, the speed and the timing with which this legislation was written.
  
The suggestion was made earlier last month that the Senate had rushed through 
this piece of legislation, that we moved it through too quickly, that there was not 
enough time taken for deliberations and hearings. I think of all the criticisms, that 
is probably the weakest I have heard.
  
[...]  Obviously, not everyone got everything they wanted in the final bill. When 
the process is criticized for being exclusive or it was rushed, that criticism is most 
often made by someone who just did not quite get everything they wanted in the 
bill.” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.139, pp. S12006-S12007).
The Senator asserts that those who are unhappy with the outcome are focusing on 
complaints about process because they lack substantive concerns with the content of the 
bill.  As explored in Section 5.3.1 of the previous chapter, partisanship is commonly 
associated with negative personal characteristics including self-interest and pettiness.  
By using the opposition’s charge against them, Senator Sununu is able to portray 
opponents of the legislation in a negative light dismissing their concerns as motivated 
by an immature reaction to not getting their way.
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Despite the limited threat posed by opponents of the legislation, proponents of the 
legislative reforms were quite rhetorically aggressive in their response to criticism.  
They sought to dismiss concerns as trite, petty and inconsequential and delays as 
irresponsible and outright dangerous to the wellbeing of the American people.  In doing 
this they relied on their previously employed rhetorical legitimation strategies including 
the need ‘to protect and secure’, the threat of a ‘real and present danger’ against which 
urgent action was necessary, the reassurance that years of ‘hard work’ had contributed to 
the quality of the reforms and, finally, by reversing a rhetorical strategy of the 
opponents in the House of Representatives and accusing the opponents of ‘partisan’ 
motivations.
6.4.3 Creating the narrative of opposition 
While it is understandable that proponents of the legislation would seek to address 
opponents’ criticisms of the reform legislation, a question arises as to the true 
magnitude of the threat posed by the opponents of the legislation.  As discussed above, 
the opposition to the legislative reforms was limited in two main ways: numerically and 
rhetorically.  First opponents were limited in numbers.  While more legislators raised 
specific concerns with the legislation in both Houses of Congress, only a very small 
minority of Senators and Congressmen went as far as opposing the legislation when 
casting their votes (see Appendix E).  Second, as explored in Section 5.4, Rhetorical 
Strategies for Resisting the Legislative Process, the rhetoric of opposition focused on 
processual issues: the perceived lack of time in the Senate and the perceived lack of 
bipartisanship in the House of Representatives.  These rhetorical strategies were limited 
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in both scope and effectiveness and, as can been seen above in Section 6.4.2, did not 
present a difficult challenge for the proponents of the legislation to overcome.  
Nevertheless, the purpose of a legislative body is to generate effective laws through the 
process of rigorous legislative debate.  So, it would seem, that despite disagreements 
between proponents and opponents of the legislation, and in the absence of a true threat 
of defeat at the hands of the opponents of the reform bills, proponents of the legislation, 
in fact, needed a debate, and sought to create a narrative of opposition, so that the 
Congressional process could be seen to function, their reform agenda could be codified 
in law and their contribution to an extended public inquiry re-legitimation process could 
be secured.
While it is clear that there were ‘opponents’ to S.2845, in the Senate, and H.R.10, in the 
House of Representatives, one could ask: But was there an Opposition?  As long as the 
threat of opponents’ arguments was mitigated sufficiently, proponents of the legislation 
could use the existence of opponents to create a dialectical narrative of rhetorical and 
ultimately ceremonial value.  Emphasising opposition once it has been overcome, or in 
instances when its threat was at best minimal, acts to strengthen the dominate, pro-
reform side of the debate.  The implication is similar to the implications explored in 
Section 5.3 of the Findings Chapter.  That the content of the proposed legislation, and 
the arguments in favour of its implementation, are strengthen by virtue of having 
undergone the scrutiny and testing of a rigorous debate.  The stronger the opposition, 
the stronger the winning side appears, having won the debate.  In addition to 
strengthening further the perceived warrant of the reforms, in a broader institutional 
sense, it raises the perception of Congress as a body of thorough and august debate.  
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Thus Congress’ function within the broader re-legitimation process, or as the next step 
in the re-legitimation process, taking the Commission’s recommendations, testing them 
in the forum of democratic debate and taking action which is perceived as appropriate 
and right, strengthens the legitimation of public institutions and the public inquiry 
process and contributes to the re-building of the public’s trust.  Irrespective of the 
legislation that the Congress produced, appearing to act in an appropriate and expected 
manner contributed to the broader re-legitimation process.  Rhetorically then, how did 
proponents of the legislation seek to construct and strengthen the narrative of the 
dialectic?  This was accomplished mainly through a self-congratulatory effort which 
returned to the rhetorical themes of bipartisanship and hard work.
6.4.3.1 Rhetorical strategies for the construction of an opposition
Taking an opportunity to revisit excerpts from a sample of the quotations contained in 
Section 5.3.1 ‘Bipartisanship’ and Section 5.3.2 ‘Hard work’ of the previous chapter, it 
is evident that proponents of the legislation sought to emphasise both the co-operation 
achieved and effort required to pass these reforms.  Bipartisanship implies compromise 
and compromise implies that at some point in the debate there were two opposing sides 
engaged in the back and forth of a dialectic.  In a system in which contentious issues 
often divide the legislatures down political party lines, casual observers of the debate 
would be forgiven for confusing bipartisanship (or agreement between parties) with the 
agreement between sides (or agreement between proponents and opponents of the 
intelligence reform legislation).  Nevertheless, proponents of the legislation exclusively 
refer to bipartisanship, implying compromise between two opposing sides, when in fact 
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the bipartisanship of the Congressional process was the agreement amongst the 
proponents of the legislation -a group of proponents who were made up of members of 
both parties.
Senator Durbin emphasises the unique nature of the proponents’ accomplishments when 
he states that, “[i]t is rare, if ever, that we can find a bipartisan consensus on an item of 
such controversy.  Yet we have achieved it” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 
108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11948).  The Senator suggests 
that Congress created a significant achievement by working in a bipartisan manner to 
overcome significant ‘controversy’.  At its best, this is the role of Congress, yet there is 
little evidence to suggest that the legislation was controversial.  However, the more 
controversial, the more effort needed and the greater the achievement.  This is a 
particularly powerful rhetorical device.
Senator Collins seeks to promote the bipartisanship of the process and the legislation.  
Commenting on the work of the Senate and of the joint-chamber Conference Committee 
she says:
 “We worked from the very beginning to forge a bipartisan bill, and I am very 
 pleased that the conference agreement we bring before the Senate today is a 
 bipartisan agreement.  I am confident that later today it will receive a strong 
 bipartisan vote” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
 session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S11940).
Senator Collins, links the term ‘agreement’ with the theme of bipartisanship.  This 
implies that both sides were able to sit down and work out their disagreements.  
However, two political parties should not be confused with two sides of a debate.  The 
Senator does not say ‘both opponents and proponents of the legislation’ worked out an 
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agreement.  She says that they worked ‘from the very beginning to forge a bipartisan 
bill’.  Bipartisan in this context, and in its use throughout the debate, means only the 
two political parties: Democrats and Republicans.  
It is not difficult to see why the term bipartisan could be confused with oppositional 
sides in a Congressional debate.  Political divisions in Congress are common on a 
number of ideological and policy issues (e.g.: tax policy, spending levels, gun rights, 
and a myriad of social issues).  However, it is clear that opposition or support of these 
proposed reforms does not equate, to a legislator’s particular political party.  Both 
Democrats and Republicans supported the legislation, despite the give-and-take over 
specific minor amendments which were resolved, in large numbers.  However, 
throughout the Congressional debates, proponents used bipartisanship to create the 
impression of significant compromise from opposing sides when in fact the sides they 
refer to with the term bipartisanship were not in a significant state of opposition.
The theme of bipartisanship was revisited repeatedly and often paired with the rhetoric 
of overcoming.  As Senator Durbin notes: “The path that led us to this point has not 
been without obstacles.  We had to make major compromises [...] work in a bipartisan 
manner [...] we have demonstrated that this kind of bipartisan cooperation makes 
America a safer place” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d 
session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. S11948)  While Senator Durbin refers to unnamed 
obstacles and compromises, Representative Watson elevates the impression of 
contention and debate with his rhetoric of ‘fights’, suggesting that they were widespread 
when he states that “There were fights about almost every issue.  We worked it out as 
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best we could.  We worked it out on a bipartisan basis [....]” (U.S. Congress. 
Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, p. H11014)  
Clearly, there were not fights about every issue.  As discussed in Section 5.4 neither 
opponents in the House of Representatives or opponents in the Senate ‘fought’ or or 
even contested much other than the legislative process followed in their respective 
chambers.  There were no direct ‘fights’ about the legislative narrative set very early on 
in the debate by the proponents of the legislation.  Opponents of the legislation engaged 
in very few ‘fights’ with respect to the specific content of the legislation.  In fact, most 
‘fights’ that erupted during the debates were amongst legislators who would end up on 
the same side and vote in favour of the legislation.  Generally, their concerns were not 
fought-out, but incorporated in the form of non-hostile amendments to the legislation.  
Finally, with both sides complimenting and deferring to the authority of the 9/11 
Commission and the families of the victims, ‘fights’ were not possible in an atmosphere 
of such complete unanimity.
Clearly then, this language was employed for the rhetorical purpose of suggesting that a 
great dialectical struggle had taken place within Congress and these rhetorical devices 
were employed repeatedly by proponents of the legislation.  Senator Roberts, echoes the 
rhetoric of battle by referring to ‘hard slugging’, saying: “They have put in a 
tremendous amount of hard slugging, sometimes very contentious and very difficult 
work [...]” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.139, p. S11953).  Senator Roberts comment furthers the narrative of 
opposition in a fairly undramatic fashion, but many legislators chose more hyperbolic 
language.  Senator Rockefeller refers to ‘endless work’ and ‘impossible’ achievement: 
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“After 5 months of endless work [...] we are poised to achieve what people thought was 
impossible” (U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. 
Vol.150, No.139, p. S11958)  Senator McCain suggests that some have characterised the 
obstacles to passing reform legislation as ‘insurmountable’:  
 “This has been a task that has been, in the view of many, insurmountable.  [...]  It 
 was through [the co-sponsors] tenacity, hard work and willingness to 
 compromise that we now have perhaps one of the most significant and important 
 reorganizations of the Federal Government certainly since 1947 [....]” (U.S. 
 Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, 
 No.139, p. S12007)
It seems clear that proponents of the legislation sought to emphasise their 
accomplishments by inflating the significance of obstacles and employing the theme of 
bipartisanship to imply that there were two equally matched sides in the Congressional 
debates.  In addition to the inflation of their achievements, these rhetorical strategies 
give the impression that: a) there were two relatively evenly matched sides, b) that these 
sides engaged in a thorough and rigorous debate, c) the legislation was forged out of 
hard work and bipartisan compromise.  Therefore proponents of the reform legislation 
constructed a narrative in which Congress had done what was expected of it, they had 
fulfilled their functional institutional role of taking the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission, testing them, improving upon them, they had carried out their institutional 
role in that they had engaged in a hard-fought, rigorous debate that resulted in effective, 
bi-partisan compromise, producing effective reforms that adhered closely to the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.  Thus Congress acted in a manner that was 
viewed as ‘desirable’, ‘proper’ and ‘appropriate’ which allowed it to contribute to the 
re-legitimation of damaged state institutions through a continuation of the process 
initiated by the creation of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process.
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6.5 The ‘Successful’ Public Inquiry
6.5.1  Measuring success
Brown (2003) asserts that public inquiry processes attempt to re-legitimate failed 
institutions through the production of an authoritative narrative.  An authoritative 
narrative was a key aim of the 9/11 Commission.  Referring to the failure of previous 
high-profile investigatory commissions, including the Roberts Commission 
(1941-1942), which was established to investigate the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii, Chairman Kean writes: “Neither the Roberts Commission nor a subsequent 
congressional inquiry into Pearl Harbor in 1946 provided an authoritative account of the 
Japanese attack on Hawaii [...] [therefore] [...] we had to create a new model for how to 
conduct a high-profile commission.” (Kean, et al. 2007: 29).  Was the 9/11 Commission 
successful in creating an authoritative narrative?
There is no standard metric which adequately measures the authority of a public inquiry 
report.  However, there are a number of factors which might suggest that, on this 
account, the 9/11 Commission was quite successful.  An element of the findings, 
presented in the previous chapter, illustrates the degree to which both proponents and 
opponents associated themselves with the Commission in order to strengthen their 
arguments.  Without exception, legislators on both sides of the debate were 
complimentary of the Commission and its work.  Proponents attempted to link their 
reform proposals to the Commission’s recommendations and opponents sought to link 
their motives for resisting the reform legislation to the interests of the Commission.  
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Opponents of the reforms were concerned about partisanship because they claimed that 
it didn’t allow for a more complete adoption of the Commission’s recommendations.  
They also criticised the process as too rushed and, as a result, risked producing inferior 
reforms which would be a disservice to the Commission and the families of the victims.  
Congress, they argued, needed to slow down the process, allow for more study and 
debate so that they could ‘get it right’.  
The reverential behaviour of the legislators is one indicator that the 9/11 Commission 
produced an authoritative narrative.  Another measure of authoritative success is the 
degree to which their recommendations were passed into law.  A third measure of the 
authoritative nature of the Commission Report is the degree to which the Commission’s 
rhetoric was adopted or appropriated by members of Congress or members of the 
media.  As findings of this research project show, the rhetorical strategies employed in 
Congress to legitimise the legislative narrative were the themes of ‘protect and serve’, 
‘real and present danger’ and ‘historic opportunity’.  A cursory search of public 
statements made by the Commission prior to the legislative reform process, shows 
similarities to the dominant rhetorical themes which emerged in the congressional 
debates. 
‘To protect and secure’:
“I am confident this bipartisan team will distinguish itself by fulfilling its historic 
mission to provide the American public with valuable insight into the 
circumstances leading up to the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and, just as 
importantly, provide recommendations regarding how we can better protect the 
American people” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States 2003a).
‘Real and present danger’:
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“The terrorist threat to the United States has not disappeared since September 11.  
Future attacks are expected. We hope that the President and the Congress study 
our recommendations with care and act on them quickly” (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004a).
‘Historic opportunity’:
In the last six months the commission has launched the most wide-ranging outside 
investigation of American national security in the history of the United States. We 
make this point so the public will understand that the issues we are addressing 
have few, if any, precedents” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States 2003b: 1). 
While it is possible that these are isolated statements and that any similarities in content 
is a coincidence, it is possible as well that they might represent a significant number of 
public statements that contributed to a national, rhetorical conversation during the 
investigatory phase of the Public inquiry process.  This could be an interesting line of 
inquiry for future research in which one would analyse the rhetorical strategies of the 
9/11 Commission’s public statements and writings to explore any similarities between 
the rhetorical strategies employed by the Commission, Congress or even the media.  
Similarities between the rhetoric employed by the Commission and the rhetoric 
employed in Congress would not prove a direct causal link, but it could help to build the 
case that the authority and legitimacy the Commission had established during the 
inquiry phase of its work, had extended beyond the production of its final report to the 
activities of the post-reporting phase.  In any event, this research project has uncovered 
the rhetorical legitimation strategies used in the intelligence reform debates.  An 
important reference point has been established which can act as an appropriate starting 
point for future research aimed at assessing the authoritative success of public inquiry 
processes and confirming the extension of a commission’s influence and authority into 
the post-reporting phase of a public inquiry process.
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6.5.2  A measure of opposition
There is a consideration of the 9/11 Commission’s authority that is not measured by the 
offensive success of the report, such as having it recommendations implemented, or 
having others adopt the Commission’s rhetoric.  This measure of a successful public 
inquiry is determined entirely by the rhetorical de-legitimation strategies of one’s 
opponents.  A surprising aspect of the findings was how narrow the choices of rhetorical 
strategies were to the opponents of the legislation.  They were forced to adopt what 
appeared to be quite week oppositional tactics.  They attacked the process, but rarely the 
substance of the reforms, less so the legislative narrative and almost never the 
Commission or its recommendations.  In the Senate the small group of opponents 
argued that the process was rushed, but they were unable to provide evidence that the 
reforms had suffered because of the pace of the legislative process.
In the House of Representatives, the opposition to the reform legislation was only 
slightly more substantial.  Critics in the House complained that the process was overly 
partisan.  As discussed in the previous section, partisanship can be a negative 
phenomenon, but that does not need to be the case.  Opponents in the house failed to 
make the case that partisanship damaged the quality of the legislation.  While it is true 
that opponents did not agree with many of the immigration and border control 
provisions included in H.R.10, that disagreement with its inclusion is also a partisan 
action.  The legislation may have been partisan and they may have not agreed politically 
with it orientation, but that is not quite opposition based on a critical evaluation of the 
substance of the legislation.
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The question is why was the opposition to the reform legislation so small in numbers 
and so limited in options for resistance.  The answer would appear to lie in the strength 
of the Commission, which was protected by both its authority and the authority of its 
inquiry narrative (including its recommendations for reform).  As noted at the opening 
of this section, Brown (2003) suggests that a successful public inquiry is one that 
produces an authoritative narrative, one that cannot be challenged in a substantial 
manner, thereby progressing towards its goal of the re-legitimation of failed institutions.
6.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter begins with an introduction and a restatement of the research question, as it 
is helpful to keep the research question in mind when discussing the findings of the 
thesis.  The first discussion section of this chapter focuses on the findings that detailed 
the rhetorical strategies employed in the Congressional reform debates to create and 
legitimise the narrative and those used to strengthen and legitimise the content of the 
legislative reforms.  It was these rhetorical strategies derived from a grounded theory 
analysis of the data that were the subject of discussion in this section of the chapter.  
These rhetorical strategies were discussed in the context of various rhetorical 
classification models from the rhetorical legitimation literature.  They were classified 
according to multiple, relevant categories and their grand rhetorical purpose was 
identified and considered.
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The next section of this chapter focused on the rhetorical strategies for de-legitimising 
and resisting the legislative reform process.  The rhetorical strategies uncovered by the 
analysis were matched according to their relevant rhetorical type, as provided by the 
models from the literature.  Opponents’ primary rhetorical strategies were classified as 
the practice of ‘normalization’.  A unique and interesting finding was the use of positive 
and negative exemplars.  While the use of positive exemplarity is common, and the 
basis for this classification, a strategy of ‘reverse-normalization’ was employed on 
multiple occasions.  This was new and does not appear in the existing rhetorical 
legitimation literature.  In the next section of this chapter, the strength of the opponents, 
both numerically and rhetorically was critically examined and the rhetorical strategies 
for dealing with opponents and opposition, by pro-reform legislators was examined in 
greater detail.  From this examination it was clear that proponents of the legislation first 
sought to dismiss the concerns of opponents, but later in the debate they employed 
rhetorical devices which created a narrative of triumph over a significant and 
determined opposition.  The rationale for this apparent narrative construction of an 
opposition was considered in terms of the public inquiry re-legitimation literature and it 
was determined that the construction of an opposition served a number of legitimating 
purposes all of which strengthened the position of the pro-reform agenda.  Next, a 
discussion of the metrics for measuring the success of a public inquiry was discussed 
within the context of the re-legitimation themes of the public inquiry literature.  It was 
suggested that links could be identified between the rhetorical strategies employed  in 
Congressional debates, as uncovered by this research project, and other groups of 
influencers in society.  Anecdotal evidence was presented that speculated as to possible 
rhetorical commonalities in the discursive practices of the pre-legislative debate 
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statements of the 9/11 Commissioners and those statements employed by legislators in 
Congress.  Research intended to determine if any such links existed was suggested as an 
interesting future research project.  Finally, this chapter concluded with a brief summary 
of the discussions of the research findings, before providing a transition to the final 
chapter of this thesis.
The final chapter of this thesis will begin with an introduction that outlines its subject 
matter and reiterates the purpose of this thesis i.e. the research question.  The next 
section will outline the complete thesis, before providing an opportunity for the 
discussion of the main contributions of this study, suggestions for future research and a 
discussions of the limitations of the thesis.  The final section will provide the author an 
opportunity to reflect on the research project, in particular, and the doctoral process in 
general.
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Chapter 7 - Summary and Conclusions
7.0 Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter provided an opportunity to discuss the findings of this research 
project in the context of the broader literature. The first discussion section focused on 
the rhetorical strategies employed to create and legitimise the legislative narrative and 
those used to strengthen and legitimise the content of the reform legislation.  These 
rhetorical strategies were assigned to rhetorical categories from models within the 
rhetorical legitimation literature.  Next, the rhetorical strategies employed by opponents 
of the legislation were identified and it was determined that they engaged in the 
rhetorical practice of  ‘normalization’ in an attempt to de-legitimise the legislative 
process.  The next section critically evaluated the scope and effectiveness of the 
legislation's opponents.  It was clear that the rhetorical strategies of the opponents 
presented a minimal threat to the pro-reform agenda.  It was recognised that proponents 
attempted to exaggerate the threat posed by the opposition and developed a narrative 
that framed the legislative debates as a significant struggle to overcome the opposition.   
This served a rhetorical purpose, in that it suggested that the legislation was strong 
enough to be tested and survive rigorous debate.  It served a re-legitimation purpose, as 
well, because the narrative in which Congress diligently fulfilled its mandate to conduct 
serious and sober debates that test proposed legislation.  As such, Congress would be 
seen to be acting in an ‘appropriate’ manner.  Thus contributing to the re-legitimation 
process initiated by the public inquiry process.  In the final section of the previous 
chapter, a number of possible metrics for measuring the success of a public inquiry were 
discussed.
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This final chapter of the thesis serves a number of functions.  First it restates the central 
research question as: What rhetorical strategies were employed in the legislative 
reform debates of the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 Commission’s public inquiry 
process?  This chapter will then provide a chapter-by-chapter review of the entire thesis, 
before discussing the key contributions of this study, suggestions for future research as 
well as a discussion of the possible limitations of this research project.  Finally, this 
chapter, and the thesis will conclude with the author’s final reflections on the thesis and 
the doctoral process.  
7.1 Overview of the Thesis
Chapter 1 introduced the thesis and provided a justification for the research project.  It 
then positioned the study within its practical context by outlining the timeframe of the 
9/11 Commission’s public inquiry process.  A chapter by chapter outline of the entire 
thesis was then provided.
Chapter 2 reviewed the relevant literature to familiarise the reader with the scholarly 
and theoretical context of this study.  The literature review provided direction for the 
research, identified areas in need of focus and helped to scope the research project while 
informing the research design.  The literature examined in this chapter was divided into 
three parts.  The first section explored the public inquiry literature.  The second section 
reviewed different perspectives on legitimacy and reintroduced aspects of the public 
inquiry literature that related directly to issues of legitimacy and the re-legitimation 
function of the inquiry process.  The third section of this chapter examined the relatively  
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recent literature pertaining to the rhetorical strategies for legitimation.  The chapter 
concluded with an identification of the research gaps and proposed further research that 
would strengthen these literatures.  The chapter stated a potential research question and 
explained how this would fit within the existing scholarship.
Chapter 3 outlined the considerations and decisions necessary in the selection of an 
appropriate research design.  A brief historical context was provided to review the 
research vehicle paying close attention to possible empirical requirements.  Next, an 
examination of the available ontological and epistemological options were reviewed.   
After evaluating the philosophical, empirical and methodological requirements of this 
study, a grounded theory approach was chosen.  This methodological approach was 
explored and deemed to be epistemologically consistent with the researcher’s beliefs 
and well suited for demands of this project, appropriate for engaging with the data and 
for answering the central research question.  The source and characteristics of the data 
were described and an explanation of how the data was organised and managed was 
provided, including an explanation of the use of the qualitative research software, 
NVIVO.  Finally, the three-stage, abductive coding process of grounded theory was 
detailed.
Chapter 4 provided a descriptive account of the key events and processes within the 
scope of this  thesis.    This timeframe, including the relevant contextual details, was 
presented in three parts.  Phase one recounted briefly the September 11th attacks and 
their immediate aftermath.  Phase two was focused on the creation of the 9/11 
Commission and brought to the fore the relevant details and important landmarks of this 
period of time.  The third phase described the post-reporting phase of the 9/11 
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Commission’s public inquiry process.  Within this phase a detailed accounting of the 
intelligence reform legislative process in Congress was provided, as this is the empirical 
focus of the research project.
Chapter 5 presented the findings of the grounded theory analysis.  The research question 
was restated to establish a context for this discussion.  The results of the grounded 
theory analysis were organised into four sections.  The first presented the rhetorical 
strategies employed to construct and legitimise the legislative narrative.  The second 
presented the rhetorical strategies employed to strengthen and legitimise the legislative 
content.  The third section presented the data showing that opponents of the legislation 
focused primarily on de-legitimising the legislative process by employing rhetorical 
strategies that stressed the partisan nature of the process in the House of Representatives 
and the rushed nature of the process in the Senate.  The final section discussed how both 
sides in the debate employed a deferential rhetorical strategy towards the 9/11 
Commission and their recommendations and attempted to strengthen their respective 
positions by associating closely with the Commission.
Chapter 6 contained a discussion of the findings of this research project.  The research 
question was restated and then the rhetorical strategies employed to create and 
legitimise the legislative narrative and to strengthen and legitimise the legislative 
content were discussed and categorised using the models of classification found in the 
rhetorical legitimation literature.  The following section discussed the rhetorical 
strategies used by opponents of the reform legislation in an attempt to de-legitimise the 
legislative process.  One such rhetorical strategy was identified as ‘normalisation’ or the 
use of a positive ‘roll model’ to show and encourage others to act in a ‘normal’ manner.  
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Also identified, was the use of negative examples to show others what is not ‘normal’ 
and therefore discouraging aberrant behaviour.  The identification of the use of  a type 
of ‘reverse-normalisation’ does not yet exist within the rhetorical legitimation literature.  
A critical evaluation of the legislative opposition revealed that once it was apparent that 
opponents posed no significant threat to the reform legislation, proponents engaged in a 
narrative that sought to inflate the seriousness and effectiveness of the opposition.  It 
was hypothesised that this was done for both rhetorical advantage and to allow 
Congress to serve a larger purpose within the re-legitimation process.  Finally, this 
chapter closes with a discussion of how success can be measured within the context of 
the public inquiry.
Chapter 7 restated the research question and then provided a chapter by chapter review 
of the contents of this thesis.  It then presented the research projects key contributions 
and suggested avenues for future research.  The next section provided a discussion of 
the limitations of this research project before providing an opportunity for the 
researcher to reflect on the research project, in particular, and the doctoral process, in 
general. 
7.2 Key Contributions
This thesis has made a number of contributions to knowledge.  Four are listed below.  
The first three focus on theoretical contributions made in the realm of the public inquiry  
literature.  The third is a hybrid contribution that involves both theoretical and 
methodological/practical implications.
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7.2.1 Theoretical contributions
The public inquiry scholarship has not been prolific and the relatively modest literature 
tends to focus on either the investigatory phase of the public inquiry process (see: 
Turner 1976; Douglas 1986; Gephart 1992), or the final reports of inquiry processes 
(Brown 2000a, 2000b, 2003; 2008; Topal 2009).  Surprisingly, there has not been a 
focus on the post-reporting phase of a public inquiry.  Nearly 35 years ago Turner 
(1976) developed an early model of the sequence of events associated with a failure of 
foresight, e.g.: a disaster-event.  His model was comprised of six stages, with what he 
called the ‘notionally normal starting point’.  The focus of his research was stage two, 
the ‘incubation period’.  However, this is how stage six, ‘full cultural adjustment’ is 
described. “an inquiry or assessment is carried out, and beliefs and precautionary norms 
are adjusted to fit the newly gained understanding of the world” (p. 381).  This final 
stage of Turner’s model only begins to describe the post-inquiry phase of a public 
inquiry process and while some more recent scholarship has shifted to focus on the later 
stages of this model, significant empirical work has yet to be conducted on the 
important, post-reporting phase of the public inquiry process.  This thesis moves beyond 
the formal public inquiry phase and examines the legislation of the 9/11 Commission’s 
recommendations by focusing on the rhetoric-legitimacy nexus at the heart of the 
legislative process.
The focus on rhetorical legitimation in the context of the legislative reform debates 
provided an unintended and welcome contribution to the public inquiry literature.  This 
contribution is centred on the finding that both proponents and opponents of the 
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proposed reform legislation employed rhetorical strategies that sought to appropriate 
authoritative legitimacy through an an association with the 9/11 Commission and the 
families of the victims.  It is expected that proponents, attempting to pass legislation 
which is based on the Commission’s recommendations, would associate themselves 
with the Commission; however, it was surprising that opponents of the legislation 
would adopt the same tactic in their opposition of the legislative reforms.  This seems to 
provide support for the assertion that the influence and authority of the Commission 
extended well into the post-reporting phase of the inquiry process.
A related observation was the relatively small number of legislators who were opposed 
to the legislation and the overall weakness and ineffectiveness of their rhetorical 
strategies in resisting the reform legislation.  More surprising was the treatment of the 
opposition by proponents of the legislation.  Early in the debates, proponents of the 
legislation sought to defend the legislation and the legislative process by adopting a 
rhetorically aggressive approach to the opponents’ critique.  This is not surprising, as 
one would assume that both sides in any important debate would defend vigorously 
their point of view.  However, once it is clear that opposition to the legislation will be 
limited, proponents of the reforms employed rhetorical strategies to construct the 
narrative of a robust, yet ultimately defeated, opposition.  Rhetorical themes employed 
to achieve this construction included: emphasising bipartisanship to imply that there 
were two evenly-matched sides in the debate that came together eventually in 
compromise and a focus on the very hard work involved in navigating such a difficult 
process.  At first, this strategy of building-up one’s opponents seems odd.  However, 
viewed through a rhetorical and legitimating lenses, this strategy is understandable.
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As a rhetorical strategy it strengthens the proponents’ pro-reform warrant in a number of 
ways.  First, it implies that despite meeting significant opposition, or perhaps because of 
it, the content of the legislation had been properly vetted and was of sufficient quality 
that it survived the process.  Employing a legitimating strategy, focusing on a narrative 
of robust debate and significant work and compromise, Congress is able to claim that it 
acted as it was expected and fulfilled its institutional obligations.  As both the public 
inquiry and legitimacy literature confirm, trust and legitimacy are strengthened when 
organisations act in ways that ‘fit’ with societal expectations.  By rhetorically 
constructing an opposition, proponents of the legislation strengthened their arguments 
for passing their preferred reforms and allowed Congress to participate in a re-
legitimation process that was launched with the creation of the 9/11 Commission.  
These observations suggest that, as asserted elsewhere in this thesis, public inquiry re-
legitimation processes do not stop with the publication of a public inquiry’s final report.  
Rather this is an ongoing process that can continue long after the public inquiry 
apparatus has been dismantled.  Given these findings and this contribution to the public 
inquiry literature, the value of looking beyond the public inquiry or the public inquiry 
report and situating research projects in the post-reporting phase of a public inquiry 
process is evident.
7.2.2 Hybrid contribution
A fourth contribution of this thesis is the focus on the grounded theory approach to 
rhetorical legitimation in the legislative context.  This process was able to identify 
specific rhetorical legitimation strategies from the transcripts of the intelligence reform 
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debates.  Once identified the methodological process, through the iterative use of open 
and axial coding was able to uncover the ways in which these strategies came together 
to create a legislative narrative.  Legislatures are a rich and continual sources of data 
and their activities are frequently significant.  Other research agendas would benefit 
from the combination of legislative debate source-data, a rhetorical approach to 
legitimacy and a grounded theory approach to method.  In considerations for future 
research a number of possibilities would be discussed, but one possibility, as an 
example of this positive mixture of data theory and method could be the regulatory, or 
legislative debates surrounding other significant Government action.  One possibility 
would be an analysis of the rhetorical strategies for legitimating, or delegitimating the 
reform debates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002.  Discovering the legislative narratives 
employed and the rhetorical strategies on both sides could  reveal potentially fascinating 
results.  This section has detailed four unique research contributions of this thesis.  
Three make a theoretical contribution, while the fourth provides a hybrid contribution 
that could be employed to focus on a wide-variety of potentially interesting and 
consequential research topics.
7.3 Suggestions for Future Research
There are a number of avenues open to researchers looking to expand there research 
agenda beyond the scope of the current research project.  While this thesis was 
successful in identifying the key rhetorical strategies employed by those engaged in the 
legislative reform debates, as directed by the central research question, it would be 
interesting to examine  the findings of this project within a larger societal context.  For 
example, what rhetorical strategies were employed by the media, by prominent 
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Americans, and by the 9/11 Commission leading up to and during these legislative 
reform debates.   What, for example, were the rhetorical strategies employed in their 
public statements, speeches, public correspondence and media interviews?  Were there 
connections between the rhetorical legitimation strategies between Congress and other 
public institutions such as the 9/11 Commissioners, what rhetorical legitimation 
strategies did they employ and are there links to be drawn amongst those outside of 
Congress with those inside the House and the Senate?  This search for a larger public 
rhetoric would be a worthwhile pursuit for a future research agenda. 
A second possibility would be to take the grounded theory approach which was 
effective in uncovering the rhetorical legitimation strategies employed in the 
Congressional debates of H.R.10 and S.2845.  This provided a framework of 
legitimating rhetoric and revealed a legislative narrative and discursive tactics of those 
individuals legislating major change.  Given the suitability of both the methods and the 
theory to carryout this type of investigation, it would be sensible to attempt to employ 
both again, but in a different empirical context.  Repeated application of these tools to 
multiple legislative circumstances would build-up a series of cases for compelling 
comparative analysis.  Do proponents of legislation have key rhetorical legitimation 
strategies?  Do opponents?  Are there a common invocations or particular rhetorical 
foci?  Are rhetorical themes used repeatedly or are there any discernible patterns?  This 
research would inform the theory situated at the rhetoric-legitimacy nexus, but it could 
also provide practical advice to lawmakers and others regarding common tactics and 
effective defences for legislative debate.
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7.4 Limitations
A methodological limitation
While the findings of this thesis are important, it is necessary to acknowledge certain 
limitations.  First, there is a balance to be struck between the demands of a grounded 
theory approach and the need to limit the risk of type II errors.  Proponents of grounded 
theory warn against an early introduction of the literature to a research project.  
Grounded theorists are concerned that too much interaction with the academic literature 
and theory would jeopardise the process because of the possibility that researchers 
would substitute emergent themes or emergent theory from the data for an a priori 
application of theory from the existing scholarship.  Grounded theory purists argue that 
researchers must come to the data completely free of prior theoretical knowledge, which 
they worry, would contaminate the analysis.  More recently grounded theorist recognise 
the unlikely possibility that a researcher would approach a dataset tabula rosa; however, 
such strict data-before-literature dogma has been substituted for a call to ‘theoretical 
agnosticism’.  They recognise that it is unreasonable to expect that a researcher would 
have no prior knowledge.  Instead, grounded theory researchers are asked to be aware of 
their prior knowledge and to guard actively against its intrusion into the coding process.  
This is a helpful concession.  As mentioned, at the beginning of this section, there is a 
risk that a researcher working in isolation would simply miss what is there and find 
what is not there.  This type II error problem can be militated against through an 
awareness of the relevant literature.
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An empirical limitation
The legislative debates, while interesting and an appropriate focus of this research 
project, are nevertheless political theatre.  Politicians have speeches written for them by 
political staffers, key messaging is created in party caucuses and handed out to 
politicians to ensure that they are ‘on message’ for the day.  This is not to suggest that 
legislators have no agency. However legislative debate is a particular form of speech.  
Legislative debates are only the top-level discursive acts.  Within Congress there are 
meetings, lunchtime conversations, in-camera committee discussions, private words in 
the halls of power all of which are difficult to capture and unavailable for analysis.  And 
there is no guarantee that these, more private, conversations parallel what is being said 
on the floor of the Senate.  The critique then is that these discursive acts are artificial.  
However, this is less problematic than it might initially appear.  An acknowledgement 
from a researcher of what they are studying and what they are not studying is sufficient.  
When applying a theoretical framework involving rhetoric, the subject of the study is 
rhetoric and not necessarily truth.  During legislative debates rhetoric will always be 
present, that is not necessarily the case for truth. 
7.5 Final Reflection
Writing this thesis has not been an easy task.  Feeling relief at the ‘discovery’ of the 
rhetorical legitimation literature would be a strange admission for someone outside of 
Academia.  But I was relieved.  I have found the subject of my study to be fascinating 
and I have enjoyed learning new methods and exploring new literatures.  I am happy to 
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be submitting.  I am happy to be done -for now.   But, as I write this last paragraph, 
despite all the time and all the work, more than anything, I am grateful to have had this 
experience.
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Appendix A - Sections of TITLE VI: 9/11 Commission legislation
Section Title
601 Establishment of Commission
602 Purposes
603 Composition of Commission
604 Functions of Commission
605 Powers of Commission
606 Non-applicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act
607 Staff of Commission
608 Compensation and Travel Expenses
609 Security Clearances for Commission Members and Staff
610 Reports of Commission; Termination
611 Funding
Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002. Title VI, Section 602
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Appendix B - Appointment authority: 9/11 commissionerships 
Number of 
Members Appointing Authority
Role
One President of the United States (R) Chairman
One Senior member of the Senate leadership (D) in 
consultation with the House (D) Leadership
Vice Chairman
Two Senior member of the Senate leadership (D) Commissioners
Two Senior member of the leadership of the House (R) Commissioners
Two Senior member of the (R) leadership in the Senate Commissioners
Two Senior member of the leadership of the House (D) Commissioners
Summary of Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002. Title VI, Section 603
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Appendix C - 9/11 Commission’s Final Report table of contents
1. “We Have Some Planes”
2. The Foundation of the New Terrorism
3. Counterterrorism Evolves
4. Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults
5. Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland
6. From Threat to Threat
7. The Attack Looms
8. “The System Was Blinking Red”
9. Heroism and Horror
10. Wartime
11. Foresight -and Hindsight
12. What to do? A Global Strategy
13. How to do it? A Different Way of Organizing the Government
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Appendix D - Source of transcripts for Congressional Debates: H.R.10 & S.2845
Congressional 
Chamber Legislation Date (2004)
Congressional 
Record Source
U.S. House of 
Representatives
Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention 
Act (S.2845)
December 7
Vol.150, No.138, 
pages H10994-
H11029.
9/11 Recommendations 
Implementation Act 
(H.R.10)
October 8 Vol.150, No.127, 
pages H8863-H8873.
U.S. Senate
Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention 
Act (S.2845)
December 8 Vol.150, No.139, 
pages S11939-S12010
National Intelligence 
Reform Act (S.2845) October 6
Vol.150, No.125,   
pages S10476-S10488
National Intelligence 
Reform Act (S.2845) October 5
Vol.150, No.124, 
pages S10384-S10388
National Intelligence 
Reform Act (S.2845) October 4
Vol.150, No.123, 
pages S10296-S10358
National Intelligence 
Reform Act (S.2845) October 1
Vol.150, No.122, 
pages S10197-S10252
National Intelligence 
Reform Act (S.2845) September 30
Vol.150, No.121, 
pages S10000-S10050
National Intelligence 
Reform Act (S.2845)
September 29 Vol.150, No.120, 
pages S9873-S9916.
National Intelligence 
Reform Act (S.2845) September 28
Vo.150, No.119, 
pages S9778-S9784
National Intelligence 
Reform Act (S.2845)
September 27 Vol.150, No.118, 
pages S9700-S9720
Accessed through: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/index.html
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Appendix E - Final Vote: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004
Congressional
Chamber Ayes Noes Not voting
Senate1 89 2 9
House of Representatives2 336 75 22
1U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.139, p. S12010
2U.S. Congress. Congressional Record. 108th Congress, 2d session, 2004. Vol.150, No.138, pp. H11028 - H11029
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Appendix F - Open coding examples of the Congressional debate transcripts
Emerging 
Themes Example
Anti-
bureaucratic
  “Some of the saddest aspects of the 9/11 story are the 
outstanding efforts of so many individual officials straining, often 
without success, against the boundaries of the possible. Good 
people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to.
This summarizes one of the major reasons we need reform. We 
have a system now that does not allow us to respond with agility 
to the threats we face today.  As this next chart shows, in our 
legislation we are not adding a layer of bureaucracy [...]”
Need to Protect “It recognizes that the fundamental obligation of government is to 
protect its citizens and that those protections must evolve along 
with the threats. It reorders the priorities of an intelligence 
structure that was devised for a different time and a different 
enemy.”
Endorsement 
based on hard 
work/expertise
“Our committee performed that task with dedication and 
diligence, and with the active participation of its talented 
members. From late July until mid-September, we held eight 
indepth hearings to assess the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission.
 
We heard testimony from more than two dozen witnesses, 
including Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Homeland 
Security Ridge, FBI Director Mueller, CIA Director McLaughlin, 
the 9/11 Commission Cochairmen, Kean and Hamilton, 
Commissioners Fielding and Gorelick, intelligence experts, field 
operatives, professors, and representatives of the 9/11 families. 
[...] This legislation is not, however, merely the product of 2 
months' work by our committee. It is based upon the work of the 
9/11 Commission and the inquiry that spanned 20 months, with 19 
days of hearings and 160 witnesses, the review of 2.5 million 
documents [...]”
Need to 
Modernise
This legislation, which I have introduced with my good friend and 
colleague, Senator Joe Lieberman, represents the most sweeping 
reform of our intelligence structures in more than 50 years. It 
reorganizes an intelligence community designed for the Cold War 
into one designed for the war against global terrorism and future 
national security threats.
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Emerging 
Themes Example
Need for 
Accountability
As the head of the new National Intelligence Authority, this 
Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed official will truly be in 
charge of our intelligence community. No longer will there be 
confusion and doubt about who is in charge and accountable. The 
answer will clearly be the national intelligence director.
Unprecedented/
Historic
As a result of this unprecedented effort and wide-ranging input, 
the committee has produced the legislation now before the Senate. 
It is legislation that is comprehensive, bipartisan--indeed, 
unanimous--and historic.
Patriotism/
Principles
We set as our goal an intelligence structure with the agility that 
the times and the threats demand, not simply another layer of 
bureaucracy. We were determined that this new structure not 
infringe upon the freedoms that Americans cherish.
Actions to right 
past failures.
Our past failure to act on these many studies, which spans 
decades, which is repeated over and over again, is why we are 
here today. 
For example, the Boren-McCurdy legislation of 1992 realized the 
emerging threat of the post-Cold War era, terrorism, and weapons 
proliferation. 
Using the successful restructuring of the military since World War 
II as models, the National Security Act of 1947 and the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, this legislation called for the 
creation--yes, you guessed it, Mr. President--the creation of a 
national director of intelligence with strong authority similar to 
what we propose today.
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